

REPRINT FROM THE PANDIT.

THE
VEDĀNTA
SIDDHĀNTAMUKTĀVALĪ
OF
PRAKĀSHANANDA.

WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND NOTES

BY

LATE CH. ARTHUR VENIS, M.A., BALLIOL COLLEGE,
FORMER ROSEN FELLOW SCHOLAR OF OXFORD UNIVERSITY,
PRINCIPAL OF THE GOVERNMENT SANSKRIT COLLEGE, BENARES



All rights reserved.

BENARES.

Printed and published by Dr. Jagannath Prasad, M. A., B. S.,
proprietor, R. J. Lazarus & Co., at the Medical Hall Press.

2nd Edition

1922.

1,000 copies

Price Re. 1-12.

सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली

प्रकाशानन्दविरचिता ।

— ०: —

१ अद्वैतव्यमानन्दमात्मानं ज्योतिरवययम् ।

विनिश्चित्य श्रुतेः साक्षाद्युक्तिस्तत्राऽभिधीयते ॥ १ ॥

तत्रादौ मङ्गलं तत्त्वाऽनुस्मरणरूपं सूचयन्मभिधेयप्रयोजनं साक्षात्प्रतिपाद्य कर्तव्यं प्रतिजानीते अद्वैतव्यादिना । आत्मानमुक्तविशेषणचतुष्टयविशिष्टं श्रुतिसाऽपरोक्षीकृत्य तन्नीकविशेषणचतुष्टयविशिष्ट आत्मनि युक्तिः श्रुत्यनुग्राहकस्तर्काभिधीयते इत्यन्वयः ।

२ अन्त्यात्मसाक्षात्कारे श्रुत्यपेक्षैव नास्ति देहादेरेवात्मत्वात् तस्य च लौकिकप्रत्यक्षादिरिह तत्रादिति चेत् न ।

1. Having first gained through Veda a true intuition of that Self, which has no second self and which is bliss and light and is imperishable, we next expound the method of reasoning in regard to that Self... I.

In the opening words 'which has no second self, &c.' the author implies a benediction recalling to mind the Reality (Brahman); and having directly shown the subject matter of his work (i. e. ratiocination in regard to the Self) and its aim (i. e. the attainment of Bliss which is Brahman) he premises his task. The grammatical construction is as follows. Having gained through Veda an intuition of the Self with its four above mentioned characteristics, reasoning, i. e. ratiocination which is confirmatory of Veda, is now expounded in regard to it, *tatra*, i. e. the Self, as characterised manner.

2. It may be objected that Veda is certainly not necessary to bring about an intuition of the Self; for the body and the senseorgans (*ādhā*) are the Self, and the existence of this Self is

आत्मा नित्योऽयथाऽनित्यो भेदस्त्वद्यो स्फुटो मतः ।

अन्तये कृतस्य हानिः स्यात्कृताभ्यागमस्तथा ॥ २ ॥

आत्मनो नित्यत्वात् । जगद्वैचित्र्यस्याऽदृष्टहेतुकत्वात् अन्यथा वैचित्र्यानुपपत्तेः दृष्टस्य क्षणविनाशित्वात् अदृष्टस्य च पूर्व-जन्यसम्बन्धित्वेन तदाश्रयस्यात्मनोऽनादित्वादनादिभावस्य च नित्यत्वनियमात् अन्यथा कृतहान्यकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात् देहादेश्च विकारजातस्याऽनित्यत्वकृतकत्वरूपवज्जडत्वपरिच्छिन्नत्वादिभिरनात्मत्वनिश्चयात् तस्य च नित्यस्यात्मनोऽविनाशी वा अरेऽयमात्माऽनुच्छित्तिधर्मेत्यादिश्रुतिसिद्धस्यापरोक्षीकरणे द्वारान्तरा-

proved by ordinary sense-perception and inference (*add.*). This objection is rejected :—

* The Self is either eternal or non-eternal. If eternal, then the difference (between the Self and the body) is clear (for no one believes the body to be eternal). If non-eternal, then what the individual had done in a former life would be lost, and further the consequences of actions which he had never performed, would accrue to him (in the present life)...II.

(It is rejected) because the Self is eternal. For the diversities of the present world must have their source in the unseen retributive power of actions (*adrīṣṭa*)—these diversities being inexplicable on any other assumption, since that which is seen is transitory—and since the *unseen* power links on to prior stages of existence, the Self as the locus of this *unseen* power must be beginning-less and also end-less, in accordance with the established induction that a positively existing thing can have no end, if it had no beginning

भावादस्त्येव श्रुत्यपेक्षा इत्यभिप्रेत्योक्तमवयवमिति । न विद्यते
वयवोऽभिनाशो धर्मतः स्वरूपतोऽवयवतो वा यस्य स तथा ।
निरवयवनिर्दुर्मकः कूटस्थनित्यः परिपूर्ण इत्यर्थः ।

३ नन्वात्मनि प्रमाणमस्ति न वा । न चेत्तस्याऽसत्त्वापत्तिः
न हि प्रमाणविरहिणो नः शृङ्गादेः सत्त्वं पश्यामः । आद्ये तत्त्वं
लौकिकं वेदो वा । नाद्य तस्य निर्दुर्मकत्वात् इन्द्रियाणां च रूपादि-
मत्परावस्तुविषयत्वेन तद्व्याप्तहेतोरनिश्चयेनानुमानाविषयत्वात्

If the Self were not eternal (anyathā) it would follow that the retributive power of actions could not be realised and that the results of certain actions would accrue to an individual who had not done those actions. And it is certain that the body and the sense-organs (ādī), which are an aggregate of products, are not the Self; for they are non-eternal, are products and possessed of form, are non-intelligent and limited, &c. And that Veda is necessary follows from the fact that no other means exists for the intuition of that eternal Self which is established in such passages as 'Verily that Self is imperishable and of an indestructible nature.' With this view the word imperishable, avyayam, was used (of the Self in our opening verse)—that is imperishable of which no vyaṣa, destruction is known as regards either attributes or essential nature or parts, which means that the Self has neither parts nor attributes, being eternally unchanged and infinite.

3. An objection is brought forward in the form of a question. Is there any evidence natural or supernatural, for the Self. for the Self or not? If not, then it follows that the Self does not exist, for we are not conscious of the existence of the horns of a man or like imaginary objects, to which no source of evidence is applicable. If any evidence exists, is it sensible or supersensible (so, Veda)? Not sensible. For the Self (as declared above) is without attributes (and only that which possesses

प्रत्यक्षाद्यविषयत्वेन लौकिकवाक्याऽविषयत्वात् तदन्यविषयत्वस्य सम्भावयितुमशक्यत्वात् । द्वितीयेपि वेदजन्यज्ञानभास्यत्वं वा प्रकारान्तरेण भासमानस्य वैदिकज्ञाननिवर्त्याऽज्ञानविषयत्व वा । आद्ये वेदजन्यज्ञानभास्यत्वेन घटादिवज्जडत्वाद्नात्मत्वापत्तिः । द्वितीये किं तत्प्रकारान्तरं स्वयं भानान्तरं वा । अरमे दीपस्योक्तत्वाद् आद्यः परिशिष्ये तच्च न सम्भवति स्वयंप्रकाशज्ञानस्याज्ञानविषयत्वानुपपत्तेः । न हि स्वयंप्रकाशज्ञानस्वत्वे ऋष्यन्दि-
नवर्तिन्यादित्ये ततः सम्भावयितुमपि शक्यम् ।

attributes can be known through the senses) And since the sense-organs can make known only external objects possessing form &c., there is no means of gaining a perceptual knowledge of the logical reason* (middle term) as being invariably attended by the Self (or major term here), and (in the absence of this knowledge, the induction or universal major premise of the syllogism cannot be formed), therefore the Self cannot be proved through a process of inference. Nor can the Self be known through what is technically termed *verbal evidence*, since it is not an object of perception or inference; nor possibly even through the other sources of knowledge (technically termed *presumptive evidence* and evidence from *non-perception of an object*; for both these are, in the first instance, dependent on sense perception which, as shown above, is inapplicable to the Self).

Secondly, if the evidence is supersensible, it may be asked, Is the Self made known (lit. illumined) by the knowledge gained through Veda; or, while shining forth through some other means, is it made an object of (i. e. invested by) Nescience, which is destroyed by knowledge gained through Veda? On the first alternative it follows that the Self loses its self-hood (i. e. character of Brahman, Intelligence), for it must be unintelligent, like earthen

४ अत्र केचिद्ब्रह्मसोऽज्ञादिव्यवस्थानाश्रित्य श्रुतिसिद्धमप्यद्वैतं सङ्कोचयन्त आत्मनोऽज्ञानविषयत्वमवहमानाः प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते ।

जीवाश्रया ब्रह्मपदा ज्ञाविद्या तदवबिन्नता ।

तद्विरुद्धमिदं बाह्यमात्मना त्वज्ञानमेव चर ॥ ३ ॥

नन्वात्मशब्देन शरीरः कथ्यते स चाऽज्ञानस्याश्रयो न तु विषयः विषयत्व तु ब्रह्मण एव । स च जीवोऽनेकोऽन्यथा व्यवस्थानुपपत्तिः । यस्य तु शब्दशब्दस्यावपादयेन ब्रह्मात्मना बोधस्तस्य po's &c., (which require illumination by Brahman before they can become objects for our consciousness), in that it has to be illumined by the knowledge gained through Veda. Adopting the other alternative, what are the other means? Does the Self know itself? Or is it known through some other evidence? The faultiness of the latter assumption having been exposed above the former remains to be dealt with and is inadmissible: for a self-luminous Self cannot be invested by Nescience, no more than it is possible to think of darkness as existing in the self-luminous sun at noon.

4. Against this, some thinkers, keeping in view the

Met by a Vedantin of the not the- demands of bondage and eman- rough type, who repels that the cipation, narrow Vedantic mon- above argument does not apply, be- cupation, narrow Vedantic mon- cause it is Brahman and not the- ism (by teaching that Brahman the Self or jīva (personal sentience) that and jīva or personal sentience is invested by Nescience. The jīvas are distinct, and that there are many and distinct from Brahman is a plurality of jīvas), and Nescience also is a plurality. not tolerating the opinion that the Self (or jīva), is an object for i.e. is invested by Nescience, urge the following :—

Knowers of the truth maintain that Nescience has jīva as its locus and Brahman as its object. Opposed to this is the declaration that the Self (jīva) is an object for Nescience. III.

Certainly jīva is intended by the word Self. It is the locus of Nescience. And the jīvas are many, otherwise the transmigratory order of things could not be accounted for. Thus, he who has attained the knowledge that his Self is

मोक्षस्तदितरस्य अन्य इति । अत एवाज्ञानान्यनेकानि कल्पयन्ते । अन्यथाऽज्ञानस्यैकत्वं एकज्ञानेनाऽज्ञानतत्कार्यस्य कल्पनस्य निवृत्तौ प्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धस्य जतेऽनुभवप्रसङ्गः । न चैतावता कालेन कस्यापि ज्ञानं न जातमिति साम्प्रतं प्राचीनानां सम्यक् साङ्गीपाङ्गसाधनानुष्ठातृणां व्यासवसिष्ठादीनानपि ज्ञानानुत्पत्ताविदानींतनानां ज्ञानोत्पत्तौ सम्भावयितुमप्यशक्यत्वेन अथशास्त्रप्रवृत्तावनिर्मातृप्रसङ्गात् ।

५ ननु व्यवस्थानुरोधेनाऽज्ञानभेदकल्पनावत् प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणा नुरोधेन सत्यमेव द्वैत किं न स्यादिति चेत् तत्र वक्तव्यम् ।

Brahman, through proficient practice in the means prescribed in the Veda termed **hearing, pondering and deep meditation*, is emancipated; and he who is without this knowledge is in the bondage of the transmigratory world.

For the same reason Nescience also must be conceived of as a plurality. For if Nescience were a unity, then as soon as one single soul had gained the knowledge (described above) there would be an end to Nescience and all its products, whence it would follow that the world whose existence is given in perception &c. would no longer be an object of consciousness (to other souls). Nor can it be justly argued—that up to the present time no one has gained such knowledge. For if such knowledge was not attained by ancient sages like Vyāsa and Vasiṣṭha, who practised all the means, principal and subordinate, for its attainment, its realisation by men of the present day cannot be imagined even to be possible; hence the latter would not turn to 'hearing' and the other prescribed means, and it would therefore follow that for them there could be no emancipation.

5 Here a question may be asked :—Why should not the dual order of things be considered real as given in experience ?

प्रत्यक्षादिप्राप्तानां प्रमात्वं परतो यदि ।

अनवस्था स्फुटा तत्र स्वतस्त्वे दोषसंशयः ॥ ४ ॥

किमिदं प्रत्यक्षादेः प्रामाण्यं व्यवहारसमर्थार्थविषयत्वं वा सर्वथाऽवाधितार्थविषयत्वं वा । आद्ये कल्पितार्थत्वेनाप्यविरोधः । अन्त्ये तत्किं स्वतः परतो वा । नाद्यः प्रत्यक्षादेः सम्भावितदोष-
त्वेन स्वप्रामाण्यं प्रति दोषाऽभावग्राहकप्रमाणान्तरसापेक्षत्वेन
स्वतस्त्वाभावात् । नापरः गृहीतप्रामाण्यस्य प्रामाण्यनिश्चायक-
त्वेऽनवस्थानात् । अगृहीतप्रामाण्यस्य तथात्वे प्रामाण्यनिश्चयस्य
data of perception and the other sources of knowledge, just as
Nescience was assumed above to be a plurality to accord
with the transmigratory order of the world? The reply is as
follows —

If the trustworthiness of perception and the other sour-

Because experience cannot vouch for its own truth: nor is there any voucher for it. Besides Revelation some further evidence, then clearly declares the unreality of the world. a *regressus in infinitum* results. If the trustworthiness is self proved, it is vitiated by the doubt that (often) arises with regard to the knowledge supplied by perception &c.—IV.

What is this trustworthiness of perception &c ? Does it consist in the things known being such as admit of practical treatment in daily life; or such as can never be proved unreal? If the former, there is no opposition between your view and our own in that (we hold) then the objects of perception &c. to be falsely surmised (unreal) objects.

If the latter, then it may be asked,—Is this trustworthiness self-proved or proved through some further evidence? Not self-proved, for perception, inference, &c. being liable to error demand in support of their trustworthiness some further evidence which shall testify to their freedom from defect. Nor does their trustworthiness depend on any further evidence; for a *regressus in infinitum* results, if the voucher for the trustworthiness of the first cognition is a second whose trustworthiness has been vouched for (by a third

वैयर्थ्यात् प्रथमेनैव विषयनिश्चयात् । किंच नेह नानास्ति किंचन
 मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यादिति च प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ* निषिद्ध्यमानत्वमा-
 याप्रकृतित्वाभ्यां कतरनस्य जगतो मिथ्यात्वप्रदर्शनेन तद्विषयस्य
 प्रत्यक्षादेरप्राप्त्यस्य श्रुत्यैव दर्शितत्वात् । तस्माद्ब्रह्मण्यवस्थानु-
 रोधेन इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुषं वेद्यते इति भाषातिरिति बहुव-
 चनानुरोधेन च जीवाश्रयाणि ब्रह्मविषयाश्रयनेकान्यज्ञानानीति
 तत्कथमात्मनोऽज्ञानविषयत्वं विकल्पितमिति सङ्क्षेपः ।

cognition). And if the voucher of the first cognition is one whose trustworthiness is itself unvouched for, then the ascertainment of the trustworthiness of the first cognition is a useless proceeding; for certitude as to the object may as well be gained solely through the first cognition.

Moreover, by the declaration of the unreality of the whole world, in such passages as
 Brihad. Up. IV 4—10. 'There is in it (Brahman) no
 diversity' and 'know that the ma-
 terial cause of the world is Māyā'—
 Svetās. Up. IV. 10.

(in the first passage) by means of the negation (of duality) with regard to (Brahman, which is) the substrate of the erroneously surmised (world), and (in the second passage) by means of the qualification that the material cause of the world is Māyā (unreal)—Śruti also declares the untrustworthiness of perception, inference &c. which make known the world

Hence out of a regard both for the transmigratory order of things and for the plural form of the word Māyā in the text, Indra of many forms goes along by his magic powers,' it

must be maintained that Nescience is a plurality, residing in the jīvas and investing Brahman. The Self or jīva cannot therefore be supposed to be an object for *v. e.* invested by Nescience. This is a summary of the views (of § 4).

* A Vedantic technicality, usually explained by प्रतिपन्नस्य अप्रापितस्य जगत उपाविरधिष्ठ न प्रवृत्त

६ अथ वदन्ति

जीवब्रह्मयोगाभ्यानेकं वस्तुश्रयवा द्वयम् ।

आद्यो लिङ्गं मनैव स्यात् द्वितीये तन्मन्तकृतिः ॥ ५ ॥

जीवब्रह्मशब्दाभ्यामात्मनैवोच्यते उत जीवशब्देनात्मा ब्रह्म-
शब्देन तु तदन्वदिति । आद्यो व्यपमात्मनो नाऽज्ञानविषयत्वं
ब्रह्मशब्देनापि तरुषैवामिधानानात् । ननु आत्मनोऽज्ञानविष-
यत्वं कथं तस्य ज्ञानं ननु नाऽऽवृत्तत्वात् न ह्यन्वयकारावृत्तौ घटो
दृश्यते इति चेत् न प्रह्वयानन्दरूपेणैव तस्याऽज्ञानविषय-
त्वात् चैतन्यमात्रस्यैव भासमानत्वात् तस्य चाऽज्ञानाऽपि य-
त्वात् अन्यथाऽज्ञानस्याप्यस्तिदुष्टापत्तेः । प्रह्वयानन्दस्वरूपं चैत-
न्यमात्राद्भिन्नमेवेति चेत् ।

6. With regard to the above views some may ask —

Do the words *jīva* and *Brahman* denote one substance or two ? One, you say ? To this I agree. Two substances ?

The Vedāntin of § 1 is refuted by an opponent who adopts for the time being the rigorous Vedānta of our author, (a) *jīva* and *Brahman* are really one and the same though falsely imagined through Nescience to be distinct

Then your tenet (of Monism, so *Brahman* is the sole substance) is invalidated...V.

Is only the Self denoted by both words *jīva* and *Brahman* ? Or does the word *jīva* denote the Self, and the word *Brahman* denote something else ? If both words denote the Self, how can the Self not be an object for Nescience ? For by the word *Brahman* (you say) the Self is intenced (and *Brahman* you hold to be an object for Nescience, of v. 3). Against this you may argue that if the Self were an object for Nescience, it could not *shine forth* as being involved in darkness (Nescience), just as an earthen pot, involved in darkness, is not visible. Not so. For only in its character of the sole Reality and supreme Bliss is the Self an object for Nescience, since it is only to the Self as Intelligence that the character of *shining forth* belongs. And the Self as Intelligence cannot be an object for Nescience, for if this were possible, the existence of Nescience could not be proved (for if Nescience involved the Self, there would be no witness of

सत्यम् । वस्तुतस्तथैव । कथं तर्ह्यज्ञानविषयत्वव्यवस्थेति चेत्
 अनादिसिद्धाज्ञानसम्बन्धात् । स्वयंप्रकाशपरिपूर्णानन्दस्वरूपेण
 भासमानेऽप्यात्मनि निश्चयेन भेदं परिकल्प्याद्वयानन्दस्वरूपस्य
 विषयत्वान्निधानम् चैतन्यमात्रमेव भासते नानन्दस्वरूपमिति
 भ्रान्तप्रतीत्यनुरोधात् । कथमस्याः प्रतीतेर्भ्रान्तत्वमिति चेत् पर-
 मत्रेणास्वदस्यात्मन आनन्दस्वरूपेणैव भासनादत्वादिति वदामः ।
 तथापि परमार्थतोऽज्ञानस्य विषयाश्रययोर्भेदो न निरूपित इति
 वत् । सत्यम् ।

अविद्या स्वाश्रयाभिन्नविषया स्वात्मो यतः ।

यथा वाच्यं तमो दृष्टं तथा चेयं ततस्तथा ॥ ६ ॥

Nescience). Again, you may urge that the Self, as the sole Reality and as supreme Bliss, is identical with Intelligence. This is quite true from the standpoint of absolute truth. How then, it may be asked, is the being an object for Nescience fixed on the Self as the one Reality and supreme Bliss? Through an eternally established connexion of Nescience (with the Self). Although, in reality, the Self shines forth as self-luminous, absolute and blissful, a differentiation of it into parts is falsely imagined through Nescience; hence the Self in its character of the one Reality and supreme Bliss is said to be an object for Nescience. It is due to this false knowledge that the Self is said to shine forth in its character of Bliss. But why, you ask, is this knowledge said to be false? Because the Self, in this very character of Bliss, does shine forth as the object of our highest love.* You urge, however, that the difference between the locus and object of Nescience was not declared by us to be absolutely real (—which we ought to have done, for Nescience being a power, śakti, demands that its locus and object should be absolutely distinct). True, we did not set forth the difference as absolutely real; for

The locus and object of Nescience are identical. For Ne-

As darkness resides within a house science is a kind of darkness, and and pervades it, so Nescience resides is known as the external darkness in and pervades Brahman is. Hence, as in the case of external-darkness, its locus and object are identical VI

* As shown in our desire to live of Panchadasi I, 8

तस्य तमःशब्दवाच्यस्य तदनपेक्षत्वात् । न हि गृहोदरवर्ति-
तमः स्यान्नयगृहान्तर्वर्तिदेशं न विषयीकरोति येन तदतिरिक्तम-
पेक्षेत । अत एव न द्वितीयोऽपि । किञ्च

ब्रह्मात्मनोर्विभिन्नत्वे भेदः स्वाभाविको यदि ।

अौपाधिकोऽथवा भेदः सर्वथाऽनुपपत्तिकः ॥ ७ ॥

ब्रह्मात्मनोः स्वाभाविको भेदः अौपाधिको वा । आद्यो-
द्यात्मभिन्नत्वेन ब्रह्मणो जडत्वापत्तिः । तथा च विज्ञानमानन्दं
ब्रह्मेति श्रुतिव्याकोपः ब्रह्मणोऽज्ञानविषयत्वानुपपत्तिश्च । आ-

For the thing denoted by the word darkness does not require that its locus and object should be different. For darkness within a house makes an object of the space within the house, while this space is itself the locus of the darkness so that no space other than that within the house need be sought for as the object of the darkness. Hence too (i.e. since locus and object of Nescience are identical) the other alternative, viz., that the words *jīva* and *Brahman* denote two different substances, is inadmissible. Moreover, If *Brahman* and the *Self* (*jīva*) are distinct, their differ-

(b) The distinction into *jīva* (*Self*) hence must be either natural (so, and *Brahman* wholly unwarranted) constituted by the nature of each) or due to external limitations. In either case the difference is altogether incapable of proof...VII.

If the difference is *natural*, it follows that *Brahman* as being different from *Self* is un-
The distinction not determined from within, for then *Brahma*-hood and *Soul*-hood would be at an end intelligent (for *Self* is intelligent).
And if this is so, the *Śruti* passage, '*Brahman* is Intelligence, Bliss' is contradicted. And if unintelligent, *Brahman* cannot be the object of Nescience (as held in § 4, for whatever is unintelligent is Nescience, and to assume that Nescience invests itself is idle), and, further, it would follow that the *Self*, as being different from *Brahman*, would lose its selfhood (so its absolute pervasive self-presenting character) to become like earthen pots &c

नतश्च प्रत्यक्षमिह त्वे घटादिवद्भावात्कापत्तिः । द्वितीयेऽप्युपाधि-
जन्यत्वं चैतत्वं तत्त्वत्वं वा जीवाधिकार्यम् । जीवब्रह्मभेदस्य नपा-
धिरप्यहोममेव प्रकृत्यम् अज्ञानकार्यस्य कादाचित्कत्वेन जीवब्रह्म-
विभागानुपाधिकत्वात् । तत्र नाद्यः जीवोत्पत्तिः पूर्वमेव केनसि भा-
त्मन्यज्ञानविहेर्भेदानपेक्षयात् स्वतन्त्राऽज्ञानानङ्गीकारात् । न
द्वितीयः अज्ञानस्य उत्पत्त्येव भावकत्वानुपपत्तेः । नापि तृतीयः ।

On the other alternative that the difference between jiva and Brahman is due to external limitation, it may be asked,

For determined from without for Nescience, the only possible external determinant in this case, can be neither cause, actual or logical, or the distinction, nor subject in which the distinction should inhere as attribute.

Does this limitation consist in the difference being an effect produced by the limiting condition as its cause, or in the difference being made known thro-

ugh the limiting condition, or is it some other kind of dependence on the limiting condition? It must be premised that Nescience is the only limiting condition possible with regard to the difference between jiva and Brahman : for the products of Nescience (sc. mind, sense-organs &c.), as being temporary, cannot be the conditions determining the difference between jiva and Brahman : for the products of Nescience determining the difference between jiva and Brahman (—a difference which in the Vedānta is held to be eternal *ab ante*, anādi—). To consider these alternatives. The first is inadmissible, viz., Nescience as the limiting condition is the cause of the difference, so the effect. For, since Nescience has been proved to have existed in the undifferentiated Self even before the difference between jiva and Brahman was brought about, the differentiation is unnecessary (—the Vedāntin of § 4 distinguished between jiva and Brahman in order to provide Nescience with locus and object, but the identity of the latter is proved in v 6 et seq.—). And Nescience cannot be admitted as an independent entity (sc. it must have a locus somewhere and embrace some object : hence the assumption of a 'differentiation' into jiva and Brahman effected through Nescience is unnecessary). Nor is the second alternative admissible for Nescience the limiting condition

तन्नत्रत्वं हि त्रिधा दृष्टं लोके अन्यत्वेन आश्रितत्वेन भाष्यत्वेन च ।
तत्र अन्यतमस्यापि प्रकारस्याऽज्ञाननिरूपितस्य प्रकृतेऽनसम्भवात्
तन्नत्रत्वानुपपत्तिः । न चाऽज्ञानात्मसम्बन्धवत् अज्ञानतन्नत्रत्वं
ब्रह्मात्मभेदस्येति वाच्यं सम्बन्धस्य सम्बन्धितन्नत्रत्वनिवृत्त्यात्
भेदस्य च तथात्वाभावात् । तस्माज्जीवब्रह्मविज्ञानद्वयमात्मान-
माश्रित्य तमेव विषयीकरोतीत्यज्ञानविषयत्वमात्मनः निदुःख-
तदुःखम् । आश्रयत्वविषयत्वभागिनी निर्विश्रामवित्तिरेव क्वेला ।
पूर्वनिदुःखतमसौ हि पश्चिमो नाश्रयो भवति नापि बोधरः ॥

being itself unintelligent, can make known (lit. illumine) no-
thing. Nor is the third admissible. For the kinds of depende-
nce commonly recognised are three, viz, the procession of an
effect from a cause, the attachment of an attribute to a sub-
strate; the cognitional relation between something made know-
n and that which makes it known. And since, in the pre-
sent case, neither of these kinds of dependence is possible with
regard to Nescience, dependence on a limiting condition cannot
constitute the difference between jiva and Brahman. Nor
can it be urged that the difference between jiva and Brahman
is dependence on Nescience, like the relation which exists
between Nescience and the Self,* jiva, (so a relation not

* Both causal and cognitional relation having been shown to be inapplicable to
Nescience, the attributive relation remains to be disposed of. This difference
(bheda) is negation (adhyaya): every negation has as its counter entity (pratyaya)
that which is negated, and resides in a locus (anyogī अनुयोगि in the sense
of locus used also in such a case as घटवद्भूतलम् where भूतल is अनुयोगि
also used in sense of विशेष्य) other than the pratyaya; thus, the judgment
'jiva and Brahman are different' may be otherwise expressed by 'the negation of
jiva resides in Brahman and has jiva as its counter-entity'—जीवप्रतियोगिका ब्र-
ह्मनिष्ठा भेदो ब्रह्मणि वर्तते—and *vice versa*, by 'the negation of Brahman resides
in jiva and has Brahman as its counter entity'—ब्रह्मप्रतियोगिका जीवनिष्ठा भेदो
जीवे वर्तते—Thus, the locus (anyogī) of this difference is either jiva or Brah-
man, and not ajana. But ajana may yet be a locus for this difference between jiva
and Brahman—an opponent is supposed to argue,—if bheda be regarded as relation
(sambandha) in the technical sense of something apart from, and linking on to, the
things related (sambandhi). Thus the difference between jiva and Brahman might
be conceived of as sambandha existing not only between these but also between
these and ajana, and thus finding a locus in ajana. The text replies, difference
(negation) is not the technical relation—भेदस्य च तथात्वाभावात्—so the nega-
tion of negation does not reside in jiva etc. which ought to be the case if bheda were
the sambandha andh

७ तथापि तदज्ञानमेकमेकं वेति कथं निर्णय इति चेत्
 एकमेवेति वदामः । किं तत्र साधकमिति चेत् । वक्ष्यते ।

लौकिकी वैदिकी चापि नाऽज्ञाने दृश्यते प्रमा ।

कार्यदृष्ट्याय कल्प्यं चेद्वाच्यवादेकमेव तत् ॥ ८ ॥

अत्रान किं वेदसिद्धमुत लौकिकप्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धमुत परिदृश्य-
 मानकार्यान्यथानुपपत्त्या कल्प्यम् ।

only between Brahman and jīva but also between these and Nescience). For with regard to relation the restrictive rule is that relation is dependence on the things related ; and *difference* is not *relation* (in the technical sense of *sambandha* or a link that joins on to two things, while it is itself different from them). Hence Nescience takes as its locus the Self, which is free from differentiation into jīva and Brahman, and makes the Self its object. Thus the Self has been proved to be an object for Nescience. This conclusion has been declared thus .—'Undifferented, absolute Intelligence is the locus and object of Nescience. For that which follows from Samkshepasārīraka, I, 319, *Pandit*, previously existing Nescience (sc. jīva and *Īvara*) is neither Vol V, 528. locus nor object of Nescience.'

7. Nevertheless, it may be asked (by the Vedantin of §4),

(c) Nescience, for whose existence only presumptive evidence is found, must be a unity, in accordance with the law of parsimony

what proof is there of Nescience being a unity or a plurality?

It is a unity, we say. What

proof of this, (he asks)? We reply :—

Of the reality of Nescience there is no evidence, revealed or human. If Nescience is to be assumed as the cause of certain visible effects (so this world), then, in accordance with the law of parsimony, Nescience must be a unity and not a plurality... VIII.

Is Nescience proved by Veda ; or by perception &c., sc. inference and human testimony ; or is it assumed to account for the world of experience, which cannot otherwise be accounted for ?

तत्र नाद्यः पूर्वकायद्वयस्य कर्ममात्रविषयत्वात् वेदान्तानां च परिपूर्णसच्चिदानन्दब्रह्ममात्रविषयत्वात् तत्रैत फलसम्बन्धात् अज्ञानादौ तदभावात्तदप्रतिपादकत्वात् । नापि द्वितीयः स्पष्ट-प्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धत्वे विवादाभावप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मात्स्वतोऽसङ्गोदासीनस्य सदा स्वानन्दतत्त्वस्याऽसत्यानेकविधसुखदुःखाद्यात्मकप्रपञ्चरचनामुपपत्त्याऽज्ञानं कल्प्यत इत्येव वाच्यं गत्यन्तराऽभावात् । तथा च कल्प्यमानमज्ञानमेकमनेकं वेति विवादे एकस्यापि निद्रादोषस्यानेकविधकार्यजनकत्वस्य स्वप्ने दृष्टत्वाच्चाद्यसहकृतान्यथानुपपत्तिर्त्रिचिन्नशक्तिकमेकज्ञानमादाय विश्राम्यतीति युक्तम् ।

Not by Veda. For the earlier portion of the Veda (karmakāṇḍa) is devoted to ritual, and the later portion (Vedānta proper) expounds only Brahman, the Absolute, Existence Intelligence, Bliss; since in this declaration of Brahman as the only Real, the intended result of the Veda (i.e. cessation of pain and attainment of absolute Bliss) is secured. And since this result would not follow in the case of Nescience and its products being declared real, the Veda does not set these forth.

Nor by perception, inference or human testimony. For if by any of these Nescience, were clearly proved, controversy would be at an end. And since there is no evidence for Nescience it must needs be granted that Nescience is *assumed* to account for the otherwise inexplicable production of an unreal world, a complex of joys and pains, by the unrelated, passive, ever blessed and satisfied Being. For there is no other course apart this assumption of Nescience. Accordingly, in the debate as to whether this assumed Nescience is a unity or a plurality, the just conclusion is that, as in the case of dreams, the defective nature of sleep, which is a unity, is known to produce, a variety of objects, so in this case presumptive evidence, seconded by the law of parsimony, is satisfied in the acceptance of Nescience as a unity possessing manifold powers. Moreover since Nescience is the limiting condition

Jīva also a unity, defined according to this view. of jīva and is a unity, the Self conditioned by Nescience, i. e.

jīva, is a unity - thus declare those who hold that jīva is a unity

अत एवाऽज्ञानस्य जीवोपाधित्वात्तस्य चैकत्वात्तदुपाधिक
 आत्मा जीवो भवत्तेक एव भवतीत्येकजीववादिना वदन्ति । य-
 थोक्तानुपपत्तिमिद्वार्थानुवादिनी श्रुतिरपि । अजामेकां लोहितशु-
 क्कृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजनानां सत्त्वाः । अजो ह्येको जुषमाणो-
 ऽनुशेते जहात्येनां मुक्तभोगासजोऽन्यः । अस्योऽयमर्थः । अकृत्य-
 स्य जगतोऽविद्याहेतुकत्वे वक्तव्ये सा किं जन्माऽजन्मा वेति सशये
 न जनयेत्याह अजामिति । न चाऽविद्यावाचकपदाभावः अजामि-
 त्यस्यैव स्त्रीलिङ्गनिर्द्देशस्य तद्वाचकत्वात् । तस्या अनेकत्वं व्या-
 वर्तयति एकामिति । तस्या विचित्रकार्यजननसामर्थ्यं त्रिगुणात्म-
 कत्वेन स्मर्यते लोहितेत्यादिना । तादृशाऽविद्योपहितस्य जीव-
 स्योत्पत्तिं निरूपयति अज इति । तस्य जीवस्यानेकत्वं निषेधयति
 एक इति ।

S'nti also declares what the above assumption establi-
 shed (sc. Nescience and jīva as unitie-). 'There is *one* unborn
 (female), red, white and black, producing uniform, manifold

Svetaś Up. IV 5 supports this offspring. There is indeed
 view. For var 10 of Sacred Books, one unborn (male) who, loving
 Vol XV. her, lies by her. This other

unborn leaves her through whom he has had his fill of
 enjoyment.' The meaning of this passage is as follows. —
 Since Nescience is to be declared (in the second quarter of
 the above verse) as the cause of the unreal world, the doubt
 arises whether Nescience is a product or not. It is not a
 product as shown by the word *unborn* of the text. Nor can
 it be said that there is no word in the text for Nescience,
 for the adjective *unborn* with a feminine termination deno-
 tes Nescience (*avidyā*, fem.). In the word *one* a plurality
 of Nescience as made up of the three *gunas* is able to pro-
 duce manifold products. In the word *unborn* (masc) the text
 denies that *jīva*, which is conditioned by Nescience, is a
 product. In the word *one* the plurality of *jīvas* is denied.
 It might be objected that a plurality of *jīvas* is a matter of
 common experience, and the unity of *jīva* is, therefore, not
 possible to meet this objection the text shows by the word

ननु जीवगतमनेकत्वं लोकेऽनुभूयते तत्कथमेकत्वमित्याशङ्काम्भेदस्योपनिषत्प्रसिद्धत्वं युक्तिसिद्धत्वं च प्रसिद्धार्थेन हि शब्देनाह हीति । ननु स्वयंप्रकाशब्रह्माऽभिजात्याजजीवस्य कथं तद्विलक्षणत्वस्येत्यत आह अनुशेत् इति । तामविद्यामनुसृत्य निद्रित इव ज्ञेते अज्ञानेनावृतः सन्मुद्रितज्ञाननेत्रो भवतीत्यर्थः । पश्चात्कार्याकारेणस्थितां तामेव जुषमाणः सेवमानः संसारी भवति स्वप्नद्रुगिवेत्याह जुषमाण इति । नन्वविद्याया अनादित्वेनाऽविनाशित्वादनिरमोक्षप्रसङ्ग इत्यत आह जहात्येनामिति । यावोत्थात्मनश्चसाक्षात्कारेण निवर्त्तयतीत्यर्थः । तथाज्या चेदविद्याकथं तर्हि तामाश्रितवानात्मेत्याशङ्क्य भोगार्थं ह्यविद्याऽऽश्रयकं भोगस्य च तया जनितत्वादिदानीं स्वात्मदर्शनेन प्रयोजनशून्या मन्यमाना जहातीत्याह मुक्तभोगारमिति । मुक्तो भोगो यथा सा तथेति विग्रहः ।

indeed, which expresses something well-known, that the non-differentiation (sc. unity) of jīva is proclaimed in the Upanishads and is proved by argument. Again, it may be objected that since jīva is identical with the self-luminous Brahman, it cannot have any other mode of existence. This objection is met by the word *lies by*, which means that jīva approaches Nescience and lies as if asleep, i. e. being involved in Nescience, jīva's eye of knowledge is closed. Afterwards, jīva, *loving* i. e. serving Nescience in the form of objects, is involved in the bonds of the transmigratory world, just as the dreamer is engaged with the objects of his dreams. It may be objected that Nescience being eternal *ab ante* must be indestructible—from which it would follow that final emancipation is impossible. This objection is met by the words *he leaves her*, i. e. he puts an end to Nescience by the intuition of the real nature of Self attained through Śruti. Again, it may be asked, why should the Self approach Nescience, if the latter is to be abandoned? The reply is that recourse to Nescience is indeed for the sake of enjoyment, because enjoyment is effected through Nescience. The jīva abandons it when through intuition of the Self he deems Nescience worth *eat*. Hence the compound in text must be resolved thus *her through whom enjoyment has been enjoyed*

मन्वविद्याविशिष्टस्य जीवत्वादविद्याया जीवत्वकूपान्तर्भा-
वात्कथं जहातीत्युक्तमित्यस्य आह अजोऽन्य इति । अजोऽन्य
इति । अजो जीवो ऽविद्यालोऽन्य एव न त्वविद्यान्तर्भावेन जी-
वत्वम् अविद्याया कष्टत्वात् जीवस्य च चेतनत्वाज्जीवोपाधित्वेन
स्वीकाराच्चेति ।

८ अथमेकत्वस्या स्याज्जीवाभेदे कथं तव ।

यथा द्रष्टं तथैवास्तु दृष्टत्वात्स्वप्नद्रष्टव्य ॥ ९ ॥

नन्वेक एव जेह्वीवः कथमेको बहु एको मुक्त इति व्यञ्ज-

Here an objection may be taken that since association with Nescience as an attribute is essential for jīva-hood, Nescience must form a part of the nature of jīva (so Nescience as the attribute portion, *viśeṣaṇa*, falling within jīva, the subject portion, *viśeṣhya*). How then is the declaration of the text possible, viz, jīva abandons Nescience, (i. e., abandons a part of itself)? To meet this objection the text supplies the words, *the other unborn*, i. e. the unborn jīva which is different from Nescience. For jīva-hood is not constituted by the presence within it of Nescience as an essential attribute, since Nescience is unintelligent and jīva is intelligent. And for this reason Nescience is held (by some Vedāntins) to be a limiting condition, *upādhi*, (and not an essential attribute, *viśeṣaṇa*) of jīva.*

8. If there is only one jīva, what basis have you for

Objection - If jīva is a unit, then the transmigratory order of the world becomes inexplicable. Yet, by showing that the objection itself is based on the unphilosophic consciousness which confounds the body with the Self, jīva-illustrations from the fictions of the dream-world and of the Yogi.

bondage and emancipation? Accept for these, we reply, precisely that basis which is given in experience; for they are matters of experience; as are objects seen in dreams...IX.

The preliminary doubt is, How if jīva is one only, can this settled order be accounted for, viz, that one man is emancipated and another is bound? What is the contradiction here, we ask? None, for duality is directly given in experience.

स्थितिः । ननु काण्वानुपपत्तिरनुभवसिद्धत्वात् द्वैतस्य । अनुभव
एव नोपपद्यते एकमुक्त्या सकलसंसारोच्छेदादिति चेत् न अन्तः-
करणादेर्यथायपनःविद्यकस्य स्वीकारात् करणानुपपत्त्यभावात् ।
विषयाऽनभावात् प्राप्ताख्यानुपपत्त्याऽनुपपन्नोऽनुभव इति चेत् तत्र
सकलं कीदृशो विषयोऽपेक्षितः । व्यवहारायोग्यश्चेदस्यैवासी ।
परमार्थसत्यश्चेत् कथमेवं भविष्यति एकत्वस्यैव वेदतात्पर्यविषय-
त्वात् तत्रैव फलमन्वदन्धात् । नैदस्य च सर्वस्य प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ नैति
नैतीति वाक्येन निषिद्धा नान्तया निश्चयात्बस्य सिद्धत्वात् । वेदे एव

If it be argued that (on the single-jīva theory) a consci-
ousness of duality is impossible, because the whole world would
be at an end as soon as one man was emancipated, we reply,
not so ; for, in as much as we admit that mind, sense-organs
&c, as severally necessary, do exist as products of Nescience
(sc. are unreal), the existence of instruments for this consci-
ousness of duality is provided for. If further you urge that
the consciousness of duality is impossible, because in the abse-
nce of an object to be known (sc. a *real* duality) the instru-
mentality of mind, sense-organs &c. in regard to such consci-
ousness is impossible, then you must declare what sort of an
obj-ct is necessary (to make the consciousness possible). Is
the required object one that shall meet the demands of common
experience (so such as shall be real to the unphilosophic cons-
ciousness of the many)? Such duality is provided for (by our
admission above). Or do you demand an absolutely real
duality? Such there cannot be ; for nothing but unity is the
teaching of the Veda, since it is with this as its result
that the Veda is connected. And since all duality with
regard to the substrate (Brahman) of the erroneously
imagined (world) is denied in the passage 'Brahman is not
this, not thus,* the falsity of such duality is proved.

Again it may be urged that the knowledge of Brahman pos-
sessed by Vānadeva and other Rishis is declared in the Veda

ब्रह्मदेवादेर्ब्रह्मज्ञानं श्रूयते इति चेत् सत्यम् तस्य जीवभेदाऽप्रतिपाद-
कत्वात् । श्रुतार्थाऽनुपपत्त्या कल्प्यते इति चेत् न निश्चितार्थजी-
वैक्यप्रतिपादकज्ञानान्तरविरोधेन कल्पनानुपपत्तेः । एकजीवपक्षे
एकमुक्त्या सर्वमुक्तिप्रसङ्ग इति चेत् न एकत्ववादिनं प्रति सर्वत्वस्य
निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात् । तथापि बह्वेषां जीवा अनुभवसिद्धा इति
चेत् भवतु तर्हि स्वप्नबहुव्यवस्था ।

itself: (this knowledge constitutes emancipation, these
Rishis were therefore emancipated, and the Veda therefore te-
aches a plurality of jivas, some bound and some emancipated).
True, we reply, as regards declaration of a knowledge of Bra-
hman, but the passage does not declare a plurality of jivas.
To the further objection that this plurality must be assumed
in order to save the meaning of Śruti from contradiction,
we reply that this assumption is inadmissible as contradictory
of another Śruti passage declaratory of the unity of jīva,
(which unity is) the undoubted meaning of Śruti.

Another objection—it will follow on the single-jīva theory
that when one person is emancipated all persons will be ema-
nipated. This objection is to be set aside, for the question
of *all* (as implying a plurality of really existing jīvas) can-
not be raised against the holder of the single-jīva view (who
denies the real existence of such plurality).

Yet the jīvas are many, it is urged, as proved by our
consciousness. Well then, we reply, let this order of plurality
be admitted on the same footing with that of dreams. Aga-
inst this it may be argued that as in a dream the only real
person is the dreamer and all the other persons in the dream
are falsely imagined, so (on the above assumption of the
dreaming and waking states being on the same footing) in
the waking state there can be only one real person, all the
rest being falsely imagined by him—and this being so, there
will be uncertainty as to which out of the many persons is
the only real person, while owing to this uncertainty
no man will apply himself to the prescribed means of

ननु यथा स्वप्ने एक एव स्वप्नदृक् परमार्थसत्यः अन्ये तद्व्य-
भक्तलिपताः सर्वे एवं जागरेपि एक एव परमार्थसत्योऽन्ये सर्वे क-
ल्पिताः तथाच बहूनां मध्ये कोऽसावेक इत्यनिश्चये कः श्रवणादौ
मयस्येति साधनानुष्ठानाभावेऽनिर्मातृप्रसङ्ग इति चेत् नूनं देहा-
त्मवादमाश्रित्य आत्मेऽसि । कथमिति चेत् शृणु । स्वप्नेऽन्ये जीवाः
कल्पिता इति कोऽर्थः । किं देहा देवगन्धर्वादिसङ्ख्याः कल्पिता
उताऽज्ञानोपाधिकौ ये जीवाऽस्मदभिमतस्तादृशा एव बहवो-
ऽनुभूतास्तेषां मध्ये एकः सत्योऽन्ये कल्पिता इति । नाद्यः देहानां
कल्पितत्वेऽप्यविरोधात् । नहि देहं वा देहावच्छिन्नं वा अ-
थाद्यधिकारिणं ब्रूयो येनाऽविनिगमो दोषः स्यात् ।

emancipation termed 'hearing' &c., and since the pre-
scribed means will not be employed, it will follow that there
will be emancipation for none.

In reply to the above we would say to the objector.—
You are indeed in error, holding as you do that the body is
the Self. How so, he asks. Listen! what is meant by your
statement that in a dream other jīvas are falsely imagined by
the dreamer? Do you mean that bodies under such names
as gods, gandharvas &c. are imagined? Or that many jīvas
are perceived in our sense of the word jīva, so that which
has Nescience as its limiting adjunct, and that one of these
jīvas is real and the rest unreal.

The former interpretation will not avail you against us, for
even if the bodies (in the waking state) are unreal, the pos-
sibility of emancipation is not overthrown (which was the point
you urged against us above). For we do not say that the per-
son qualified to enter on 'hearing' and the other means of
emancipation is the body, or Intelligence limited to a body—
which statement would have exposed us to the charge of pro-
posing alternatives (sc. as to which of the jīvas thus defined
is real) without giving reasons to compel the adoption of one
or other of the alternatives. Nor is the latter interpretation
applicable, since in dreams a plurality of jīvas is not perceived,
using jīva in the sense of that which is conditioned by

न द्वितीयः लज्जानावच्छिन्नस्य स्वप्ने मेराऽनुभवत् । न हि पराऽलज्जानावच्छिन्नः परस्य प्रत्यक्षो भवितुमर्हति । तथापि तत्तद्देहचेष्टया अनुमीयत इति चेत् न एकेनाप्यनेकदेहचेष्टोपपत्तेः त्रैवायिकानां कायव्यूहदशायां योगिदेहवत् । तद्देवानुसन्धानमनङ्ग इति चेत् सत्यम् अविद्यावच्छिन्नं प्रतीयत्वात् तत्तद्देहावच्छिन्नं प्रति तत्राप्यभावात् आत्मनात्रस्यानुसन्धात्त्वाद् । अत एवैकस्मिन्नपि देहे पादावच्छिन्नः शिरोऽवच्छिन्नस्य दुःखं नानुसन्धत्ते पादे मे सुखं शिरसि मे वेदनेत्यनुभवात् ।

Nescience.' For A. or 'that which is conditioned by the Nescience associated with A' cannot be perceived by B similarly defined (none can be immediately conscious of another's ignorance or knowledge). Still you urge that a plurality of jivas is inferred from the (visible) actions of the several bodies. We reply that the inference will not hold; for the actions of various bodies may be proved to result from a single jiva, as is the case with the Yogin's body,* which, as the Naiyāyikas teach, assumes a variety of manifestations. You may further urge that as in the case of the Yogin who recognises himself as real and the bodies he has created as false; so in the case of jiva there must be a recognition of itself as real, and of the others as falsely imagined by it. We reply that such recognition is to be admitted in the case of jiva defined as 'that which has Nescience as its limiting adjunct' and not as 'that which is limited to a body', for, in the example also, such recognition does not pertain to the bodies created by the Yogin, since his Self alone is the recogniser.

And since the Self (jiva or Intelligence conditioned by Nescience) is the only knower, the Intelligence confined to the foot, even in one and the same body, is not conscious of a pain felt by the Intelligence which is confined to the head, as the common experience, 'my foot is at ease, my head pains,' shows. Thus we have proved that the common

तथाच देहात्मस्वममाश्रित्यैव जीवभेदानुभव इति स्थितम् ।
तथापि कथमत्रानुभव इति चेत् । श्रोतव्यं स, प्रधानेन । एक एव
मित्यदुल्लुभुमुक्तस्वभाव उपनिषन्मात्रगम्यो वस्तुतोऽस्ति । स एवा-
ज्ञानमाश्रित्य जीवभावं लब्ध्वा देवतिर्यङ्मनुष्यादिदेहान्परिक-
ल्प्य तदुपकरणत्वेन ब्रह्माण्डादिचतुर्दशभुवनं सृष्ट्वा तेषु तेषु देहेषु
कश्चिद्देवः कश्चिन्मनुष्यः कश्चिद्द्विरययर्षः सर्वेषां स्रष्टा कश्चि-
द्विष्णुः पालकः कश्चिद्वन्द्यः सर्वसंहारकर्ता रुद्रः प्रलये । तेषामु-
पाधयः सखादिगुणाः तद्वशात्तेषां सर्वं सामर्थ्यम् अहं पुनः
कश्चिद् ब्राह्मणकुमारः तेषां क्वकिं पूजानमस्कारादिनाऽनुष्ठाय
अवनादिसाधनं समादा मोक्षं साधयिष्यामीतीश्वरोऽपि सन्
स्वान्तो भवति जागरे ।

view of a plurality of jivas is due simply to the error of
confounding the body with the Self.

Nevertheless it may be asked, how in the waking state
is this consciousness of a plurality of jivas to be explained
(if jiva is really a unity ? Listen attentively. There is really
but one Self, in its own nature eternal, absolute, intelligent,
free, made known in the Upanishads only. This Self, associ-
ating itself with Nescience becomes jiva and falsely surmises
the bodies of gods, men &c., for whose enjoyment it creates,
as means, the egg of Brahmā and the fourteen worlds. Of these
bodies one is a god, another is a man. There is Hiranayagurba
the creator of all things, Vishnu the preserver, and Rudra
who destroys the world at a pralaya or final resolution.
These three have the rajas, sattva and tamas qualities res-
pectively as their limiting conditions, to which all their powers
are due. Then again there is the individual man who
thinks within himself 'I am the son of a Brāhman ; having
served the Gods in pūjā &c. and acquired 'meaning' and the
other prescribed means I shall gain emancipation. In all
these forms the Self, though really Isvara (Brahman) is
deceived in the waking state. Again, the Self having put
an end to the world of waking consciousness as described
above and lulled by the defects of sleep, surmises in dream,
a world precisely similar to that of waking, falsely imagining

पुनर्यथैकजागरप्रपञ्चमुपसंहृत्य स्वप्नेन्द्रिद्रादोषसहकृतः तादृ-
शमेव प्रपञ्चं परिकल्प्य तत्तद्देहेन्द्रियसाध्यभोगं भुक्त्वा वसिष्ठादयो-
मुक्ता अन्ये बहुधा अहमपि कश्चिद् बहुः दुःखी संसारी मुक्तो भवि-
ष्यामीति च कल्पयित्वा पुनस्तामवस्थामुपसंहृत्य जागरं सुषुप्तिं
वा सर्वभ्रमनिवृत्तिरूपां प्राप्नोतीति । एवं सति एक एवात्मना
परिपूर्णः स्वयंप्रकाशानन्दैकस्वभावः स्वाज्ञानवशाज्जीवः संसारी-
त्यादिशब्दाभिधेयो भवति । न तदन्यः कश्चित्संसारी सम्भाव-
यितुमपि शक्य इति स्थितम् । तस्यैवानादिसंसारसञ्चितपुरयजि-
व्यक्षपितकल्मषस्य वैराग्यादिसम्पन्नस्य शास्त्राचार्य्यप्रसादासा-
दितादरनैरन्तर्यदीर्घकालादिसेधितश्रवणोदिसाधनपाटवस्य यदा
तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थातनसाक्षात्कार उदयमासादयति सदाऽज्ञानं
तत्कार्यं सर्वमुपसंहृत्य स्थानन्दतृप्तः स्वे महिम्नि स्थितो मुक्तः

thus :—Vasishtha and other Rishis won emancipation, when
through their bodies and sense-organs they had experienced
the results of their actions, other men are bound ; I too
am bound, miserable in the bonds of transmigration, I shall
obtain emancipation. Then again the Self puts an end to
this dream and enters on the waking state, or that of dream-
less sleep in which there is an end to all such false imagin-
ings. Since this is the case, the Self which is one only, abso-
lute, self luminous and wholly blessed is, through the influence
of its associate Nescience, termed jīva, the transmigrating
individual. Nor other than this Self can any transmigra-
ting individual be conceived of: thus we have clearly proved.

When through such Śruti passages as 'that thou art'
this same Self (termed jīva) has gained intuition of Brahman (so
recognised its identity with Brahman the absolute)—
the Self with its sin destroyed by the store of merit
acquired during a beginning-less round of transmigrations,
possessed of dispassion &c. and proficient, through the grace
of the Sāstras and of a teacher, in 'hearing' &c. which have
been practised faithfully and continuously then the Self
becomes what is common y (regarded as an emancipated

इति व्यवहारमाभवति तस्यामवस्थायां न तदन्यः कश्चित्संसारो
तेनाऽननुभूयमानं द्वैतं वा किञ्चिदस्तीति रहस्यम् ।

९ अज्ञातसत्त्वं नेष्टं चेद् व्यवहारः कथं भवेत् ।

न ह्यदर्शनमात्रेण विषयो नाशनिश्चयात् ॥ १० ॥

ननु कथमेवमुच्यते तेनाऽननुभूयमानं द्वैतं नास्तीति यावता
अज्ञातस्यापि द्वैतस्य सत्त्वमभ्युपगच्छन्ति । अत एव त्रिविधसत्त्व-
मङ्गीकुर्वन्ति ब्रह्माः । न च तदज्ञातसत्त्वमभ्युपगमे उपपद्यते प्रा-
तीतिकपारमार्थिकमेवेन द्वैविध्यस्यैव सम्भवात् । अन्यथा ब्रह्मा-

man and is) described thus—' he has put an end to Nescience
and all its products, he is self-contained in that Bliss which
is his real nature, he is returned to that greatness which is
his real nature, he is emancipated.'

In that state of emancipation, so, when knowledge of Brah-
man has been gained by one, there is left no jiva other than
that one; nor for this reason does any *unperceived order of*
duality really exist —here lies the esoteric truth of the matter.

9. If the existence of things when unperceived is an in-

Objection: the view that the esse of things is percipi (which is a part of the jiva-unity theory) is opposed at once to common sense and to the express teaching of the ancients as to three kinds of existence:—*pāramārthikā satta*, real existence, so that of Brahman alone; *prātibhāsikā*, the esse of which is percipi, so that of objects of the dream—world and of those erroneously imagined in the waking state; *vyāvahārikā*, practical existence so. that of objects of waking consciousness.

admissible assumption, pray how is common experience possible? For no man grieves for an object, thinking it destroyed merely because he sees it not...X.

An opponent asks how we concluded above that 'for this reason no unperceived order of duality really exists', seeing that some thinkers have maintained a real existence for a dual order also even when unperceived; and adds that it was just because duality exists though unperceived that ancient Vedānta teachers taught three kinds of existence; and that this three-fold division of existence will not stand, if the existence of an unperceived object is denied for then there

निर्गतस्य पुत्रपश्वादिसकलसाधनजातमपश्यतस्तदभावनिश्चयेन
शोकाग्निना दह्यमानस्य रुदतो मरणप्रसङ्गः ।

ननु स्वप्नप्रवृत्तागरेपि प्रातीतिकसत्त्वसंपन्नेनैव द्वैतेन व्यवहारः
क्रियति नोपपद्यत इति चेत् न वैषम्यात् जागरणेन तस्य
बाधात् इह तु साक्षात्कारात्पूर्वं तदभोवादिति । अत्राहुः

सत्त्वत्रयं सदन्यादी प्रष्टव्योऽत्राधुना मया ।

सत्यं द्वैतमसत्यं वा नाऽसत्ये त्रिविधं कुतः ॥ ११ ॥

किं द्वैतं पारमार्थिकमात्रित्य ज्ञातसत्त्वं साध्यते इति निर्णयः ।

can be only two kinds of existence, viz, the absolutely real (pāramārthiki) and the merely perceptual (prātibhiki). If (he continues) the existence of an unperceived object is denied, it should follow that the man, who leaves son and home and herds and all other sources of joy, should die weeping and consumed by sorrow in the conviction that these loved objects exist not, since he no longer beholds them.

Here the opponent (speaking in v. 10) might be asked by way of objection, why experience of a dual order of things whose existence is merely perceptual is not possible in the waking state, as it is possible in the dreaming state, (for all schools hold that the esse of the dream-world is percipi). This objection he would put aside, because the waking and dreaming states are dissimilar : for whereas the latter state is put an end to by waking knowledge, there is no sublation of the world in the waking state previous to an intuition of Brahman. To the opponent's view they rejoin .—

The man who maintains three different kinds of existence

Met the common sense view that a thing exists even when unperceived is beset with difficulties : Ancient teachers admitted vyāvahāriki sattā only out of a kind regard of the needs of the vulgar mind

must be asked whether he holds duality to be real or unreal. Real it cannot be. If unreal (non-existent, asatya) ; how can existence (sattva) ; be three-fold?... XI

Does the opponent prove that an object exists even when

चनीयम् । नाद्यः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रामाण्यनिरासेन निरस्तत्वात् । अ-
न्त्ये अनिर्वचनीयं प्रथमतः क्वचित्सिद्धं न वा । न चेत् तर्हि दृष्टा-
न्ताभावात् कथमाकाशादेरनिर्वचनीयत्वं साधनीयम् । सिद्धं रज्जु-
सम्पर्पादिकमिति चेत् तर्हि तत्र यादृशं सत्त्वं तादृशमेवाकाशादेः
मग्नपञ्चस्येति स्थिते विवेचनीयं किञ्चिन्नतत्त्वं किं वा प्राती-
तिकमेव । यद्यज्ञातमपि सत्त्वंमाकाशादेः कल्पयेत् तदा कथमयं
दृष्टान्तो दार्ष्टान्तिके सामञ्जस्येनोपसंह्रियेत विरोधात् ।

unperceived by maintaining that the dual order is either ab-
solutely real or is what is technically termed *inexplicable** ?

The former alternative will not hold, for an absolutely
real duality must be rejected on the (already shown) rejection
on the trustworthiness of perception, inference and other so-
sources of evidence, (cf v. 4).

If the latter alternative be adopted, it may be asked whe-
ther this merely apparent existence was observed in any
instance prior (to the inference which establishes a merely ap-
parent order of duality), or not ? If not observed, how, in
the absence of an instance confirmatory of the inference, is
the merely apparent existence of the world, beginning with
the subtle element ether, to be proved. If it be replied that
the snake, which erroneously appears in the place of the rope
seen at night, is a well known instance, among others, of a
merely apparent object, then, it being premised that the exis-
tence of the world beginning with ether is precisely similar
to the existence of the snake in the example adduced, the
question remains to be discussed whether the object-world
exists even when unperceived, or only so long as perceived.
If an existence independent of perception be surmised for the
world, the example (sc. the existence of the snake) and the
case in point (sc. the existence of the world) do not suffici-
ently correspond, because of the dissimilarity (with regard
to the snake whose *esse* is admittedly *percipi*).

* An *inexplicable* object is one that merely appears in consciousness as some
thing more than nothing and yet is proved by experience to be less
than real sat Brahman. Hence it is *inexplicable* or a product of *Maya*.

न च गृहान्निर्निर्बतस्यासत्त्वनिश्चयेन रोदनादिप्रसङ्गो दोषः
 व्याचक्रमणस्याप्रवृत्तत्वेन अभावनिश्चयानङ्गीकारात् स्वप्नवत्स-
 र्वव्यवहारस्योपपादितत्वाच्च । न च तत्र बाधोऽस्तीति वैषम्यं
 अभावस्यायां कुत्रापि बाधस्यानङ्गीकारात् । प्रमाणप्रवृत्तौ बाधेपि
 न कश्चिद्दोषः तदानीं असन्निधेन व्यवहारानभ्युपगमात् । न च
 त्रिविधसत्त्वाभ्युपगमविरोधः सर्वस्य द्वैतस्य प्रातीतिकसत्त्वमपरि-
 त्यज्य तैर्धान्तसन्तोषनात्रस्य कृत्वात् प्रातीतिकत्वेपि प्रपञ्चस्य
 आन्तबुद्धिसिद्धावान्तरवैषम्यमाश्रित्य व्यावहारिकसत्त्वाभिधाना-
 विरोधात् ।

Nor against us can be urged the case of the man, who leaving home ought (as a logical consequence of our view, you said) to weep for his dear ones, because certain of their non-existence. For we do not say that he is convinced of their non-existence so long as no evidence subversive of his belief in their existence is forthcoming ; and, further, because we have shown that all experience is like that of dreams. [In dreams, the esse of all objects is percipi, admittedly ; and yet the dreamer weeps not for his absent son].

Nor can it be argued that there is a difference between the states of dreaming and waking, in that the former is destroyed by waking knowledge ; for in neither case, while the error lasts, is any sublation (of either state) admitted. Nor is there any inconsequence in holding that there is a sublation of error on the application of evidence ; for none would say that, when the error has been removed, there can be any further dealings with the erroneously surmised object.

Nor is the view of a two-fold existence contradictory of the older view of a three-fold existence ; for while ancient teachers e. g. Sarvajña Muni in the Samkshhepaśāstraka I, 1, 178) did not abandon the position that the existence of a dual order of things is dependent on the perception of it, they taught a third kind of existence (the so called *practical*) to satisfy the deluded vulgar. For although the esse of the world is percipi, there is no contradiction in maintaining the *practical* as a third kind of existence, if attention is had to those intermediate differences (so between the waking and dreaming states) which the unphilosophic are persuaded of

१० द्वैतभेदे प्रतिज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञा कथं वद ।

दशानां युगपत्सर्पश्चमे तद्वत्तथैव सा ॥ १२ ॥

तथापि अज्ञातसत्त्वानभ्युपगमे स्वप्नप्रबुद्धस्य च एवार्थं प्रपञ्च-
इति प्रत्यभिज्ञाने का गतिरिति चेत् एकस्यामेव रज्ज्वां मन्दान्ध-
कारवर्तिन्यां दशानां युगपत्सर्पश्चमेण पलायमानानां परस्परं संवा-
देन एक एव सर्पः सर्वैरनुभूत इति प्रत्यभिज्ञायां या सैवेति वस्तो-
हृदयम् । सत्र हि स्वस्वभ्रमसिद्धः सर्वैः पृथक् पृथगेवानुभूयते विषयः
अन्यभ्रमसिद्धस्यान्येन ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात् अन्यभ्रमस्याज्ञानात् ।

10 If for each cognition there is a separate object (as

Objection If esse is percipi, recogni- must be the case on the view
tion (which implies continuity of the that the esse of things is
object) would be impossible. Answer : percipi), then you must explain
recognition itself is error how recognition is possible (sc.

how the present object is recognised as the identical one pre-
viously known). The reply is that the recognition in this in-
stance is precisely similar to the recognition in the case of
the imaginary snake observed simultaneously by ten men
(each declaring to the other :- I saw the same snake as you
did)... XII.

Still (an opponent may urge as above)—if the view that
an object exists though unperceived be not maintained, what
explanation is there of the case of the man who waking from
dreams recognises the present world as identical with the one
he knew before falling asleep? Our opponent, we reply,
must content himself here with the explanation he is prepared
to offer for the recognition—'one and the same snake
we all saw'—of which the ten men speak when they
have fled from an imaginary snake, which was only a
piece of rope lying in the dark. For in this example the
erroneously perceived object (sc. the snake) is perceived by
all and each separately, since the object erroneously per-
ceived by the one man cannot possibly be perceived
by another for one cannot have immediate knowledge
of another's error.

अविवेकादेव तु नत्र प्रत्यभिज्ञानमेक एव सर्पः सर्वैरनुभूयत इति । एवं जाग्रदवस्थायां प्रपञ्चमनुभूय सुषुप्तिं गत्वा पुनरुत्थाय योऽयं प्रपञ्चानुभवः स प्रपञ्चान्तरमेव विषयीकरोति प्रत्यभिज्ञानं त्वविवेकादेव । न च सुषुप्तौ प्रपञ्चविलये प्रमाणाभावः न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते अविनाशित्वात् न तु नद् तद् द्वितीयमास्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यत् पश्येदिति श्रुत्यासुषुप्तौ द्वितीयाभावो वदन्त्या तत्र सर्वप्रपञ्चाभावस्य दर्शितत्वात् ।

११ सर्पश्चमाद्विशेषोऽस्ति जाग्रद्वेद्येऽन्यथा कथम् ।

इन्द्रियादेरुपादानं तदभावे यतो न धीः ॥ १३ ॥

The fact is that the recognition—'one and the same snake we all saw'—is simply due to error. And so when a man passes from waking consciousness into the state of dreamless sleep from which again he awakes, his present consciousness relates to a different series of objects, but his recognition of the identity of the present and former series is simply due to error.

Nor can it be said that there is no proof that in the state of dreamless sleep there is an end to the world of experience. For the cessation of all experience during dreamless sleep is indicated in the Sruti passage declaratory of the absence of any second thing during that state :—' For there is no loss

of sight to the seer, because it cannot perish. Nor is there then (in dreamless sleep) any second, any thing different from him that he could see.'

11. Waking consciousness is different from the false

Common Sense reasserts itself. If consciousness of an imaginary snake. If not different, how is it that the organs of sense are accepted as necessary to bring about waking consciousness? For when organs of sense are absent, no knowledge results. XIII



विषयविपर्ययस्योपादिज्ञानादाकाशादिप्रपञ्चज्ञानेऽस्ति कश्चि-
द्विशेषः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणाविद्याकारणकत्वभावानामाभ्याम् । न हि
यादृशमर्थनिन्द्रियादिजन्यं ज्ञानं विषयीकरोति तादृशमेवाविद्या-
जन्यभ्रमोऽपीति सम्भवति अमात्पूर्वं विषयस्यासत्त्वात् इन्द्रि-
यादिजन्यज्ञानस्य च सन्निकर्षादिजन्यत्वेन ज्ञानात्पूर्वं विषयस-
त्त्वस्यावश्यम्भावात् अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां चेन्द्रियादेः कारणत्वस्य
सिद्धत्वात् ।

In the above an opponent urges that, in spite of what has been said for the view that the esse of a thing is percipi (cathāpi), there is a difference between knowledge of ordinary objects and that of an imaginary object like the snake seen in a rope—the difference being due to the presence and absence respectively of perception and the other sources of evidence, on the one hand, and of Nescience, on the other, as causes (of these two kinds of knowledge, sc. sense-organs, and not Nescience, are the cause of ordinary waking consciousness ; whereas only Nescience is the cause of the false consciousness of an imaginary object). For it is not possible (so runs the objection) that the erroneous cognition effected through Nescience should have as its object one precisely similar to that which the cognition, effected through sense-organs, has as its object, since the imaginary object did not exist previous to the erroneous cognition ; and, because the cognition effected through the sense-organs and other sources of evidence was effected through contact of the object with the sense-organs &c., the existence of the object previous to its being cognised is a necessary postulate ; and because it can be proved, by the inductive method of conjoint presence and absence, that sense-organs &c. are causes of knowledge (so. when these are present knowledge results when absent, no knowledge

तस्मात्प्रपञ्चस्याज्ञातसत्त्वाऽभ्युपगमोऽवश्यम्भावी । अन्यथा
वैलक्षण्यानुपपत्तेः । मैत्रय

इन्द्रियाणां कारणत्वे भवेच्चोद्यं सदा तव ।

स्वप्नसमे यथा तेषामन्वयव्यतिरेकधीः ॥ १४ ॥

इन्द्रियादेर्वस्तुतः प्रपञ्चज्ञानं प्रत्यकारणत्वात् । कुत इति
चेत् तत्र कथं किमिन्द्रियादेः प्रमितिमात्रे कारणता किं वा
असप्रमासाधारणज्ञानमात्रे वा ।

Hence, concludes our opponent, the view that the world exists
though unperceived is a necessity; for on any other view the
difference (between true and false knowledge) is inexplicable.

Not so, we reply :—

Your objection would hold if the sense-organs were causes

of knowledge. Similar to the
But common Sense is delusive. The
senses can prove nothing real: The
world, or sum of effects, is a pure
fiction due to conscience as its cause
consciousness of the presence
and absence of these in the
delusion of sleep (is the consciousness, in the waking state,
of the presence and absence of sense-organs, which you urged
as a proof of the sense-organs being causes of knowledge,
i. e. our consciousness in both cases is false; for no one
maintains that the dreamer sees with his eyes though he
may imagine that he does so)...XIV.

For sense-organs &c. are not really instruments of our
cognition of the world. Why not, you ask. Declare then, we
say, whether the sense-organs, and the rest, are instruments
of true knowledge only, or of true and false knowledge, or
of false knowledge only?

नाद्यः इन्द्रियादिजन्यज्ञानप्राप्ताय अत्र विषयव्यावृत्तार्थविषयत्वेन साधनीयः अत्र विषयव्यावृत्तार्थत्वं च प्रमितिविषयत्वेनेत्यन्योन्याश्रयात् । न च प्रमितिविषयत्वमर्थसत्यत्वे हेतुरपि निश्चयेदं रजतमिति प्रमित्याऽसत्यस्यापि विषयीकरणात् अबाधितत्वस्य चाऽभिद्वे । किञ्च इन्द्रियाणां प्रसारणत्वेन अज्ञातार्थविषयत्वे वक्तव्येऽधिष्ठानभावविषयत्व प्रप्तं प्रपञ्चस्य सर्वस्य जडत्वेन अज्ञातत्वाभावात् ।

Not of true knowledge merely ; for the truth of the knowledge effected through sense-organs &c. would have to be proved by declaring that the object of (so. what was made known by) this knowledge was something different from what false knowledge makes known ; and again, that its object was something different from the object of false knowledge would be proved by the declaration that its object was the object of true knowledge—which would give rise to a logical see-saw. Nor does the fact that the knowledge is true, prove the real existence of the object made known by that knowledge ; for in the case of the true cognition—'this silver is unreal'—(e. g. where mother of pearl is mistaken for silver) a true cognition has as its object an unreal thing (so. the imagined silver). And (it cannot be urged that the difference between true and false objects consists in objects of the former kind being such as are not subsequently proved false for) absence of falsification cannot be maintained (in the teeth of Śruti and argument, which prove all save Brahman to be false). Moreover, since it must be held (on your view of things existing independent of cognition) that the sense-organs as sources of knowledge must have for their objects things which exist even when unperceived (for it is the essential character of an organ of knowledge, you say, to make known what existed before unknown), it follows that the sense-organs have as their sole object the substance of all things (so. the Self, Brahman) For the whole world of objects being non-intelligent (jada i. e. Nescience when considered apart from Self, Intelligence the substrate), it cannot be what is termed *unknown* (ajnāta, meaning thereby *invested by Nescience* ; for the objects are Nescience itself, and Nescience could only invest or make *unknown* Intelligence and not itself.

तथाचाविधानत्वस्यात्मन्येव विज्ञानतत्त्वेन प्रत्यगात्मविष-
याणीन्द्रियाणि प्रमाणातीति वक्तव्यं तच्च नोपपद्यते प्रत्यगात्मन
इन्द्रियाविषयत्वात् तस्य निर्दुर्मकत्वात् । तथाच श्रुतिः न चक्षु-
षेतिष्ठति रूपमस्य न चक्षुषा पश्यति कश्चिदेनं परास्मि खानि इय-
त्वात् स्वयंभूस्तस्मात्पराङ् पश्यति नान्तरात्मनिति । नचानयैव
श्रुतेन्द्रियाणां प्रपञ्चविषयत्वं दर्शितमिति वाच्यं स्वप्नेन्द्रियवद-
न्वयव्यतिरेकस्य न सिद्धप्रपञ्चज्ञानकारणत्वानुवादेनात्मन इन्द्रिया-
विषयत्वप्रदर्शने तात्पर्यात् । एतेन भ्रमप्रमासाधारणज्ञानकारण-
त्वमप्यपास्तं प्रमाकरणात्स्य निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात् ।

Accordingly, since the fact of being the locus of the world
can apply satisfactorily to the Self only, you will have to
declare that the sense-organs as sources of knowledge have
the Self within as their object; and such a declaration is
impossible, for the Self cannot be an object for the sense-
organs, since it is without attributes. And thus runs the

Katha Up 11. 6 D.
4 1.

Śruti—'His form is not to be
seen, no one beholds Him with

the eye.' 'The Self-existent pierced the openings of the senses
so that they turn forward (outward) . therefore man looks
outward not inward into his Self.' Nor can it be said that
this passage declares that the sense-organs have the world
of phenomena as their object. For while the passage re-states
the instrumentality of the sense-organs in regard to our know-
ledge of the world—which instrumentality is commonly regar-
ded as proved by a method of conjoint presence and absence
which is really false, as (the presence and absence of) senso-
organs in dreams (is purely imaginary)—the real meaning of
the passage lies in showing that the Self is not an object
for the sense-organs.

By thus showing that the sense-organs cannot be instru-
ments of true knowledge, we have refuted the (second) alter-
native that they are instruments of true and false know edg

अस्तु तर्हि अममात्रे कारणता इन्द्रियाणाम् । न अमज्ञान-
स्याऽविद्यामात्रयोनित्वस्य त्वयैवोक्तत्वात् ज्ञान प्रतीन्द्रियान्व-
यव्यतिरेकयोश्च स्वप्नेन्द्रियान्वयव्यतिरेकवदुपपत्तेः । एवं घटा-
दिकार्यमात्रे कारणाकाङ्क्षायां कारकत्वेनाविद्यैवोपसंहर्तव्या ।
तत्तदर्थिनां तत्तत्कारकविशेषोपादानं तु तथैव स्वप्नवदुपपादनी-
यम् । ततो ब्रह्मातिरिक्तं कृतस्वकार्यजातं ज्ञानं क्षयरूपं तत्सर्व-
माविद्यकमेव । इति प्रातीतिकमेव सर्वं सर्वस्येति सिद्धम् । तदुक्तं
वसिष्ठेन अविद्यायोनयो ज्ञायाः सर्वेऽपी मुद्बुदा इव । अणुमुद्भूय
नृच्छन्ति ज्ञानैकजलधौ लयम् ॥

together. Let then the (third) alternative stand, viz., the sense-
organs are instruments of false knowledge only. This will not
hold, for you yourself declared that Nescience alone is the cause
of false knowledge. And because we also have proved the
presence and absence of sense organs (which you urged as a
proof that the latter are instrumental) with regard to (waking)
knowledge is on precisely the same footing as the presence
and absence of sense-organs which we are conscious of in
dreams (sc. is a bare imagining).

Thus, to meet our expectation of a cause for all effects,
such as earthen pots, cloth &c, Nescience alone is to be
accepted as their cause. But the acceptance of special causes
for each of these effects (—clay for the pot threads for the
cloth—) by those who desire these effects can be proved to
be precisely similar to the acceptance during the dreaming
state (of these special causes when, as all admit the clay,
threads &c. are purely fictitious).

Hence, with the sole exception of Brahman, all things,
whether cognitions or things cognised are the effects of Nes-
cience ; and their esse has been proved to be percipi only.
And thus Vasishṭha declared :—‘All things have Nescience
Yogavāsishṭha Nirvāṇaprakaraṇa, § 20 as their source : bubble-like
The Bombay edition, p. 211, reads भेदः they spring up for a moment
and are refunded into the great ocean of knowledge (sc.
Brahman).’

१२ सदादीनां कारणत्वं न चेदिष्टं घटं प्रति ।

अविद्यायाः कारणत्वं कथं सिद्धीत्प्रमां विना ॥ १५ ॥

नन्वविद्यायोनित्वं भावनां कार्यकारणभावमङ्गीकृत्य न

वा । न चेदविद्यायोनित्वमपि कथम् । अस्ति चेत्कार्यकारणभा-
वस्तदा यथायथमन्वयव्यतिरेकादिरेव प्रमाणं तत्र प्रकारान्तरा-
सम्भवात् । तथाचान्वयव्यतिरेकादिंसिद्धं सदादिकारणत्वमपह्नाय
अविद्याकारणत्वाभिधानमनुचितमेव । किञ्च अविद्यायोनित्वं

12. If you do not admit that clay &c. are causes of a pot,

Common Sense again urges that the sceptic too must start from certain assumptions thus he must assume that the causal relation is itself real, in order to prove that Nescience is the cause of the world.

how, in the absence of a correct confirmatory instance, is the causality of Nescience to be proved ?—XV.

It may be asked whether, in maintaining Nescience as the source of existing things, the causal relation is assumed as real. If not, then the causality of Nescience also cannot be affirmed. If the causal relation be admitted as real, then the inductive methods of argument from conjoint presence and absence &c.,* as may be demanded in each case, are trustworthy sources of knowledge ; for no other methods of proof can apply to the causal relation (tatra). And so it is manifestly improper to maintain the causality of Nescience, while rejecting the causality of clay, threads, &c. (in the case of pot and yarn, cf. supra) which has been proved by inductive methods.

Moreover, he who holds that Nescience is the source of things should be asked, whether Nescience is the sole cause

* The *excetra* is glossed in Nānādikshita's *Biddhantadipika* by धर्मिग्राहकमा-
नपरम् so, all cases in which existence of substrate is inferred from existence of
attributes as subtle ether substrate inferred from sound attribute

भावानां वदन प्रष्टव्यः । किञ्चित्तरत्निरपेक्षा अविद्यैव कारणमुन्नाहू-
ष्टेश्वरादिकारणान्तरसापेक्षा । नाद्यः कारणवैचित्र्याभावेन कार्य-
वैचित्र्यानुपपत्तेः चेतनाधिष्ठानमन्तरेण जडशक्तेः कार्यकारित्वा-
नुपपत्तेश्च । नापरः अविद्याकारणवादिनाऽप्यहूष्टेश्वरादेः का-
रणत्वस्यावश्यं वक्तव्यत्वस्यावश्यं वक्तव्यत्वाहलापवात्त एव वि-
चित्रकार्योपपत्तौ किमज्ञानेन कारणत्वाभिहितेन कल्पितेन ।
तथाच प्रत्यक्षादेर्लौकिकस्य प्रमाणस्य पूर्वकारणरूपं च पुत्रपशुस्व-
र्गादिकं प्रति यागादेः साधनताबोधकस्य प्रामाण्यं समर्थितं

in dependant of any others, or as conjoined with the retri-
butive power of actions, God and the other *general causes* .
Nescience cannot be the sole cause , for variety in the effects
is impossible if the cause is a unity (as Nescience) is); and
because an unintelligent force (like Nescience) cannot be a
cause without the aid of an intelligent substrate (to will
that force). Nor will the other alternative stand, for he
who holds to the causality of Nescience is bound also to
admit the conjoint causality of the retributive power of ac-
tions, God, &c ; and since it is easier to account for the pro-
duction of a variety of effects from these various causes (*tat-h
eva*), what necessity is there to assume Nescience as the cause ?

And so (continues the objector) there is established the
trustworthiness of perception and the other sources of
human knowledge, and of the earlier (or ritual portion) of
the Veda which declares that sacrifices &c are the means
of obtaining sons, cattle, paradise &c. If the trustworthiness
of both human knowledge and Revelation be denied (*anyat-
hā*), pray what view can be adopt who thus places himself
in opposition to human experience and to the Veda ? Therefore
(concludes the objector), that the world has Nescience as its
only cause is a downright rash statement.

* To those mentioned in the text are usually added God's knowledge, desire
and volition the space antecedent non-existence of the effect and sometimes
absence of an obstructor, cf. Nyāyakosa ed. Bhūmāchārya *śādhāranūdrasāra*.

भवति । अन्यथा लोकवेदविकटुः क प्रसमयलम्बित । तस्मादविद्यामात्रकारणकं जगदिति साहसनाशम् । अत्र वदामः

यथा सतो जनिर्नैवमसतोऽपि जनिर्न च ।

जन्यत्वमेव जन्यस्य मायिकत्वसमर्पकम् ॥ १६ ॥

किमिदं कार्यं सत्पमसत्यं वा । नाद्यः एकमेवाद्वितीयमित्यद्वैतमात्रपर्यवसितागमविरोधात् अनुपपत्तेरपि । तथाहि किमुत्पत्तेः पूर्वं कार्यं सदबद्धा । असृज्यत् तर्हि शशविषाणमपि कारखान्यापाराज्जायेत असृज्याविशेषात् । सृज्यत् किं कारखान्या-

To the above we reply :—

Just as production cannot be (explained as proceeding)

The philosopher replies . So far from the causal relation being real the very action of it is inexplicable and leads us back to Nescience Maya, or the inexplicable, as the source of this inexplicable world.

from something previously existing, so also production from something previously non-existent cannot be explained. The

bare fact of production proves that the product is the work of Māyā...XVI.

Is an effect something real or unreal ? Not something real, for this is opposed to the purely monistic teaching of Śruti in such passages as 'one only without a second.' Nor can an effect be proved to be something real. To explain :—Previous to its production, is an effect existent or non-existent ? If non-existent, then a nonsensical effect such as the horn of a hare ought to be produced through the agency of the cause, sc. the non-existent in this case ; for the non-existent is a unity without difference (and if the non-existent can be a cause, why should it not endow the hare, as well as the ox, with horn ?) If the effect was something previously existent, then causal agency is unnecessary ; for the effect existed previous to the exercise of this function ; and the nature of the effect (as a *consequence*) is thus overthrown. If you urge that it is merely the manifestation of the thing that is brought about through causal agency we reply that even on this supposition there is no getting rid of the evil

पारेण पूर्वमपि तस्य सत्त्वात् कार्यत्वव्याघाताच्च । अस्मिन्-
 किमात्रं कारणव्यापाराज्जायत इति चेत् न तत्रापि सत्त्वासत्त्व-
 विकल्पस्यासन्नामानपायात् । अस्तु तर्हि सदसद्विलक्षणमनिर्वचनी-
 यमेव कार्यम् । एवं चेत्तर्हि कार्यानुरूपानाद्यनिर्वचनीयाज्ञानमेव
 कारणमुचितं सत्त्वस्यासत्त्वहेतुत्वानुपपत्तेः लोके तथा दर्शनात् ।
 न च कार्यवैचित्र्यानुपपत्तिः विविन्नशक्तिकस्यैवाज्ञानस्य कल्प-
 नादित्युक्तम् । न च पूर्वकारणस्य प्रामाण्यानुपपत्तिः तस्यापि
 साध्यसाधनभावमुखेन सत्त्वशुद्धिद्वारेण प्रवृत्तिद्वारेण वा ब्र-
 ह्मण्येव तात्पर्यात् तात्पर्यार्थे शब्दस्य प्रामाण्यात् । तस्मा-

fate which awaits you, which ever of the alternative you assume,
 (for you will have to admit that the manifestation, previous to
 its being brought about, was either existent or non-existent)
 Grant then (you say) that an effect is something inexplicable
 either as existent or non-existent In this case, we reply,
 it is fitting to maintain, as the only cause, Nescience, inex-
 plicable, eternal *ab ante*, and of the same nature as its effects;
 for it is impossible that entity should be the cause of non-
 entity and common experience vouches for this impos-
 sibility.

Nor may you urge that a variety of effects is impossible,
 (if Nescience as a unity be held to be the cause of the
 world) ; for, as we have already shown (§7) there is pre-
 sumptive evidence for Nescience as a unity, possessing mani-
 fold powers, (and the variety, of effects would follow, consis-
 tently, from the variety of the powers of Nescience).

Nor may you urge that, on our view, the authoritative-
 ness of the earlier or ritual portion of the Veda is impossible ;
 for the real aim of this portion also is to teach Brahman,
 indirectly, by teaching that certain means, sc. sacrificial
 rites bring about certain results, through the performance
 of which the intellect* (of the sacrificer) is purified (and
 thus prepared for a study of Brahman), or through which

* For the technical meaning of *sattva* cf. Katha Up II 6, 7. Sāṅkarabhaṣya
 in loco.

द्विद्यायोनित्वं भावानां सुष्ठूक्तम् । अतोऽद्विद्याकल्पितस्य ज-
गतः प्रतीतिसमकालीनमेव सत्त्वमुचितं रज्जुसर्पशुक्तिरजतमन्धर्व-
नगरस्वप्नप्रपञ्चेषु तथा दर्शनात् ।

१३ अत्रेदं निरूपणीयम् ।

प्रतीतिमात्रं सत्त्वं चेतसत्त्वं प्रातीतिकं मतम् ।

अतिरोधान्समापीष्ट तद्भेदे वद का प्रमा ॥ १३ ॥

प्रतीतिसमकालीन सत्त्वं जगत इति कोऽर्थः किं प्रतीतिरेव
सत्त्वं किं वा प्रतीतिव्यतिरेकेण जगतः पृथक् सत्त्वमस्ति । अन्त्ये
the soul was possessed with the desire to practise the means
of attaining a knowledge of Brahman (sc. *hearing &c* of
n. 10 (i)). And because the authoritativeness of the Veda
śabda, depends on the *implied* (and not on the *literal*)
meaning of the word.

Hence our view of Nescience as the cause of things is
consistent; whence it follows that our view that the Nesci-
ence-presented world is strictly coterminous with the
cognition of the world is also consistent. For such is our
experience of the existence of a snake imagined in rope, or of
the silver imagined in mother-of-pearl, or of the mirage,
or of the dream-world.

13. Here this must be explained. —

None of the commonly accepted If by your view that existence
'means of proof,' *pramāṇa*s, will prove is coterminous with percep-
duality, *bheda*, tion (*sattvam prātīkikam* of
supra) is meant that esse is merely *percipi*.* I accept your
view as not opposed to mine. If you hold that there is a
difference (between the existence of the world and the cogni-
tion of it), pray declare the proof thereof... XVII.

What is meant by saying that the existence of the world is
coterminous with the cognition of it? Is it meant that the

* प्रातीतिकं सत्त्वमिति यत्तत्प्रतीतिमात्रं प्रतीतिरेव सत्त्वमिति मतं चेद्यदी-
त्यनुवादः । N. D'E. gloss.

तत्र प्रमाणमस्ति न वा । अस्ति चेत्तत्र किं प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमागमोऽ-
र्यापत्तिर्वा । प्रत्यक्षमिति चेत् तत्र घटोऽयमिति यत्प्रत्यक्षमिदमेव
स्वस्माद् घटस्य भेदं 'विषयीकरोति प्रत्यक्षान्तरं वा । स्वयमेव
स्वविषयभेदं गृह्णाति प्रत्यक्षमिति चेत् तत्किं स्वप्रकाशं परप्रकाशं
वा । तत्राद्ये स्वविषयविशेषणत्वेन भेदस्य भानेपि विशिष्टज्ञानस्य

esse of it is percipi and nothing else ? Or that the world has
an existence independent of the cognition of it ? If the latter
meaning be adopted, it may be asked whether there is any
proof (for the existence of an unperceived world) or not ?

If proof exists, is it immediate perception, or inference, or
Veda or presumptive evidence ? If you say that immediate
perception is the proof, then we ask, does the perception, ex-
pressed in—'This is an earthen pot'—, make known a differ-
ence between itself (sc. the perception of the pot) and the
pot ? Or does some other perception make known this differ-
ence ? [This other perception taking the form—'this pot
is different from the cognition of pot'—]. If you say that
the very perception declares (lit. grasps) the difference bet-
ween itself and the perceived object, then, we ask, is this
perception self-known, or known through some other
perception ? If self-known, and if the view be adopted
that a *determinate* knowledge* (viśiṣṭajñā is effected

* Viśiṣṭajñāna is judgment or the knowledge of a subject, viśeṣya, as quali-
fied by an attribute, viśeṣaṇa. In regard to viśiṣṭajñāna two views obtain, as
stated in the text.—(a) "विशिष्टज्ञानस्य विशेषणज्ञानजन्यत्वपक्षः," (b) 'विशे-
षणविशेष्येन्द्रियसन्निकर्षमात्रं विशिष्टज्ञानकारण मिति पक्षः' The former
is the Nyāya view (cf. Bhaṣāparicheheda, Muktvāli II. 58). It holds that
for the formation of a viśiṣṭajñāna, e. g. ghato' yam, there is necessary
not only intercourse (sannikarsha) of senso-organs with the viśeṣya or
ghata, but also a previous knowledge of the viśeṣaṇa or ghatatva. Such previous
knowledge is technically termed *matir nirvikalpa*, and is not effected

विशेषणज्ञानजन्यत्वमत्र के एतेनैव भेदज्ञानविशेषणविषयेषु स्वयं
जन्यस इति प्राप्तं तदाप्युक्तमयः ।

through a knowledge of the *attribute* portion—then, although in the present case the difference (between the pot and the perception of the pot) is known as the attribute of the object (so. earthen pot) made known by the perception itself, (*sva*); it follows that the perception is self-originated in that it makes known an attribute, viz, the difference (between the pot and the perception of the pot: and, *ex hypothesi*, it is the knowledge of this difference as the attribute portion which brings about the determinate knowledge or judgment that the pot is different from the cognition of the pot): and this is an instance of the logical vice of self-dependence.*

through sense-organs, *atīndriyas*, *atīndriyam*. The latter view is that of the Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. It denies the necessity of a previous knowledge of the *viseshana*, all that is necessary is intercourse of sense-organs with both *viseshajanya* and *viseshya*.

To follow the argumentation of the text, it should further be remembered that the difference between cognition and the thing cognised (which difference is supposed to be made known by the *visishtajanya* in question, so *ghato'yam*) may be expressed in two ways :—(1) *मत्तो भिन्नो घटः*. Here *mattah* = *ghato'yam* *pratyakshat*: *bhōda* is the *viseshana* and is *ghatanishtha* (so, resides in locus *ghata*); *ghata* is *viseshya*; both *pratyaksha* is *bhedapratyogi*—(2) *मद्वययोर्भिद*. Here *bheda* is *viseshya*; both *pratyaksha* and *ghata* are *viseshana's*, *pratyaksha* is *bhedapratyogi*; *ghata* is *bhedadharmi*. The method employed in the text is that in vogue with controversial Vedānta treatises such as the *Khaṇḍana*, *Chitsukhi*, and *Advantasiddhi*. Briefly stated, it consists in the attempt to show that conser-

* of dualty whatever theories may be held as to its genesis and formal explicable (*anuvachaniya*) *śāstra* (śāstra)

विशेष्यत्वेन भेदस्य भाने विशेषणविशेष्येन्द्रियवृत्तिकर्तृत्वात्
विशिष्टज्ञानकारणमिति पक्षे ज्ञानोत्पत्तेः पूर्वं भेदोऽवश्यमिति वाच्यं
तथा च तस्यैव ज्ञानस्य कथं न भेदो विषयः स्यात् स्वरूपत्वेः पूर्वं
स्वरूपैक्यभावात् । ज्ञानान्तरस्य च स्वयंप्रकाशज्ञानादिष्वप्येव
सत्प्रतिबिम्बानिकरोदाऽविषयवत्त्वात् । अवर्तमानस्य ज्ञानस्य परप्रका-
शवत्त्वे वर्तमानकालोपपन्नं स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमिति स्यात् । वर्त-
मानकाले ज्ञानस्वरूपमेव स्वयंप्रकाशमिति चेत् न अनोता-
नान्तयोऽपि तस्याव्यापत्तेः ।

If (you say that) the difference (between the pot and the perception of the pot) is known as the subject-portion—and if the view be adopted that the sole cause of a determinate perception is the intercourse of sense-organs with both subject and attribute portions (of such determinate perception).—then you will have to admit that the difference existed previous to the perception of it, (otherwise there could be no contact of sense-organs with it, and, *ex hypothesis*, no determinate perception could follow)—and if the difference existed previously (तथा चा), that difference could not possibly be vouched for by the perception (as you first stated); for the perception did not exist before it was produced (through contact of sense-organs with the subject portion (so the difference between the pot and the perception of the pot). And since a second perception cannot make known a self-known perception (—and this is what you started with—), it cannot make known a difference which has as its counterentity a self-known a difference which has as its counterentity a self-known perception (तत्). If it be urged that a perception in other than present time is made known by a further perception (in present time), then the self-presentative character of cognition is made to depend on present time as its limiting condition (and is, *pro tanto*, destroyed). Again you may urge that the self-presentative character of cognition is by its very nature confined to the time of presentation,—which we deny; for self-presentative character belongs equally to the cognition of an object perceived in the past and to the cognition of an object yet to be perceived in the future (since both are cognitions like cognition

न हि घटः कदाचिदघट इति स्यात् । इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षा-
दस्य भेदस्य स्वसत्तामात्रेण स्वविषयकज्ञानजनकत्वमित्यपि प्रक्रि-
याभावं दशाद्याभावेन सत्तामात्रस्याप्यसिद्धेः । अस्तु तर्हि परमका-
शज्ञानयक्षे प्रत्यक्षान्तरेण ज्ञानाज्ज्ञेयस्य भेदग्रहः । सोऽपि उदा-
हरणप्रतियोग्यादियहपूर्वको न वेति विवेचनीयम् । न चेत्कथं भेदं
विषयीकुर्यात् । न हि निर्दुर्भिकं निष्प्रतियोगिकं वा भेदं कश्चि-
दप्रत्येति व्यसनरसाद्विक्रम इत्यनुसन्धात् ।

in the present time). (Nor can you argue for a change in the nature of cognition corresponding to a change in time), for the once perceived earthen pot ever remains a pot. Again, you may urge that, merely by the fact of its own existence (i. e. without being perceived), the difference (between the pot and the perception of the pot), with which difference the sense-organs were in contact, produced the perception in which that difference was declared. This is nothing but a bare statement on your part ; for, in the absence of evidence, the mere fact of existence (of difference, to which you refer,) is unproved.

Well then, let it be granted, on the view of one cognition requiring a second to make it known, that the difference between the thing perceived and the perception of the thing is made known through a second perception. Now it must be decided whether or not the knowledge of the difference was preceded by a knowledge of the reciprocally different counter-entity and locus (the counter-entity, pratiyogi, is the perception of the pot ; the locus, anuyogi is the pot : cf. p. 13, note) If not thus preceded, how could the second perception, we ask, make known the difference ? For no one is conscious of a difference which is destitute of locus or counter-entity, as is proved by the form our consciousness invariably takes (with regard to difference), viz., 'this is different from that.' If, on the other hand, you admit that the knowledge of the difference was preceded by a knowledge of the reciprocally different counter-entity and locus, you commit yourself to a regressus in infinitum in seeking for some

व्यावृत्तप्रतियोग्यादिग्रहपूर्वकत्वे तु व्यावृत्तिग्राहकप्रत्यक्षा-
न्तरान्वेषणेऽनवस्था । तेनैव व्यावृत्तिग्रहे आत्मशयः । तस्मा-
द्वस्तुमात्रावगाहि प्रत्यक्षं न भेदवार्तां जानातीति सिद्धम् । अस्तु
तर्ह्यनुमानाज्ज्ञानक्षेपयोर्भेदग्रहः । तथाहि विमतो विषयः स्ववि-
षयज्ञानाद्विद्यते तद्विषदुचर्माश्रयत्वात् यो यद्विषदुचर्माश्रयः स ततो

further cognition to make known this difference (—a second cognition will demand a third and so on—). And if you declare that the knowledge of the reciprocal difference (between the perception of thing and the thing perceived) was brought about by this same (second) cognition, the logical vice of self-dependence results (—the second cognition merely re states the already perceived difference: to say then that it is the cause of the latter is to say that it is the cause of itself—). Thus we have proved that perception, which testifies merely to something existing, gives not the least evidence for a difference (between the thing perceived and the perception of the thing).

Grant then, you say, that the knowledge of a difference between the thing perceived and the cognition of the thing follows from an inference. Thus:—*

i. The thing under discussion differs from the perception which makes it known.

ii. Because this thing is the substrate of † attributes which are opposed to the attributes of the perception which makes this thing known.

* The five-membered syllogism (nyāya) consisting of i. pratijñā or proposition to be proved, ii. hetu or probans, iii. udāharana or confirmatory instance, iv. upanaya or application; v. nigamana or conclusion. For the reduction of this number to three, cf. Ved par bh Pandit Vol V p 659

† as the object is jada, non intelligent, whereas the perception is chetana in

मिथ्यते यथा घटात्पटस्त्वयाचाय तत्त्वज्ञातया । नैवं विरोधस्य भेद-
निरूप्यत्वेन भेदादिभ्यां विरोधमिदं तद्विरुद्धवर्गाभ्यस्तत्त्वा-
प्यसिद्धे । साध्याप्रसिद्धा व्याप्यसिद्धेरव । न हि घटपटयोर्भेदः
केन चिन्मानेन सिद्धो येन साध्यं प्रसिद्धोत्त । प्रत्यक्षाभावे अनुमा-
नान्तरानुसरणेप्यनवस्थादिदोषस्य तादृशस्यत्वम् ।

iii Whatever is the substrate of attributes which are opposed to the attributes of some other thing is different from that other thing ; as for example, a piece of cloth is different from an earthen pot.

iv. And the thing under discussion, so the perceived object, is similar to the piece of cloth.

v. Therefore the *perceived* object is also different from the *perception* of the cloth.

We reject the above argument. For since the *opposition* (of the attributes) is to be known through the *difference* (between the substrates to which the attributes severally belong), it follows that while the *difference* (between the substrates) is unproved, the *opposition* (of the attributes) is also unproved. Hence (the probans, ii) 'this thing is the substrate of attributes which are opposed to the attributes of the perception which makes this thing known' is invalid. And because as long as the probandum (*sādhya*, *sc.* difference between the perception of the object and the object perceived) is unsupported (by any confirmatory instance) so long the universal concomitance (of opposition of attributes and difference of substrates expressed in iii, or the universal major premise) is unproved. Nor can the difference between an earthen pot and a piece of cloth (which was adduced as a confirmatory instance) be proved by any evidence whatever so as to support the probandum. And if in the absence of perception (to prove the confirmatory instance), recourse is had to a second inference to prove it, the logical vices of an infinite regress, a see-saw &c will continue to haunt the argument.

आत्मस्य भेदमात्रे तात्पर्येण पर्यवस्यत्यस्य भेदबोधकत्वं शङ्कितुमप्यशक्यम् । ननु ब्रह्मणः सकाशात् सृष्टिं प्रतिपादयन्नात्मनः कार्यजातस्य ततो भेदमपि प्रतिपादयति । अत्रेदे ततो जन्मैव स्यादिति चेत् न सृष्टिवाक्यस्य सर्वस्य प्रधानादिपरपरिकल्पितकारणान्तरनिराकरणपरस्य सृष्ट्यटादौ कारणत्वं कार्यस्य भेदेनानिर्गुणबद्ध ब्रह्मणः कारणात् कार्यजातस्य सर्वस्य भेदेनानिर्गुणत्वेनाद्वितीयब्रह्मसम्भावनाभावे तात्पर्यात् । अन्यथा भेदपरत्वे तन्निषेधोऽनर्थकः स्यात् । किञ्च सृष्टिवाक्यं न

Since the Veda finds its complete meaning in teaching nondifference only (i.e. Brahman alone exists), it is perfectly impossible to suppose that it can teach difference (i.e. duality or reality of the world). Here it may be objected that, in teaching the emanation of the world from Brahman, the Veda also teaches that all products are different from Brahman : for, if not different, their emanation from Brahman could not be (spoken of). This objection must be set aside. For since every Vedic passage bearing on creation is devoted to the refutation of those other causes (of the world), *sc. matter, prakṛti* &c. (of the Sāṅkhyas) assumed by other thinkers (i.e. non-Vedāntins), by showing that just as in such cases as that of earth and the earthen pot, it is impossible to explain what the difference is between earth, the cause, and the pot, the effect, so too it is impossible to explain what the difference is between Brahman, the cause, and the whole world which is an effect from Brahman, it follows that every such passage finds its real meaning only 'in making possible a conception of' Brahman, the one without a second. Otherwise, if the Veda were devoted to teaching *difference* (duality, or a real world), the prohibition with regard to duality (contained in such passages as 'there is no diversity in Brahman') would be purposeless. Further, passages

* If the difference is inexplicable, *anirvachanya*, it is unreal, and this is of course the implication of the text

तावत्साक्षाद्भेदं प्रतिपादयति भेदवाचकपदवाचकपदाभावेनापदार्थस्य वाक्यार्थत्वाभावात् पदार्थस्यैव सत्सृष्टत्वेन वा चर्त्तितान्नपदत्वेन वा वाक्यप्रतिपाद्यत्वात् कल्पनायाश्च निषेधवाक्यविरोधेनानुत्थानात् । न च ज्ञानमेव स्वातिरिक्तज्ञेयक्यतिरेकेणानुपपन्नं स्वस्मिन् ज्ञेयं विषयीकरोति न हि निर्विषयं ज्ञानं सम्भवति द्रुष्टं वा सविषयस्यैव भासमानत्वात् अन्यथा निष्प्रकारकमेव भावेन ज्ञाने विषयातिरिक्तस्य प्रकारस्याभावादिति वाच्यं ज्ञेयक्यतिरेकेण ज्ञानस्थानुपपत्त्यभावात् ।

dealing with creation do not *directly* touch *difference* (between Brahman, cause, and the world, effect) . for since no word bearing the sense of *difference* occurs in such passages, these cannot declare a meaning which the words composing them do not bear ; because it is only what is meant by the words that a sentence can directly make known, either by showing syntactical relation between the words, or by conveying the simple notion of identity* (of subject and predicate in the sentence) . And an inference (from Vedic passages bearing on creation of the world to the difference between Brahman and the world) is inadmissible as *contradictory* of (such) prohibitive passages (as 'Brahman is not this, not this' ; and human inference must yield to the direct utterances of Revelation) . Nor can the following be urged .—Cognition, which would be impossible in the absence of an object (to be cognised) different from the cognition itself declares that the object cognised is different from the cognition ; for object-less

* Nānādikṣiṭa glosses thus . अखण्डवाक्यत्वपक्षमाश्रित्य वाह धर्मीति । A sentence (vākya) is (a) predicative, i. e. makes known a relation (samarga) between the objects meant by the words (padārtha) in the sentence—पदार्थसंसर्गवाहि वाक्यजन्यज्ञानम्—or (b) it expresses the bare identity of the objects meant by the words without predicating and relation between them—वाक्यस्य अखण्डार्थता धर्मिमात्रपरत्वं वा—अखण्डार्थता = अपर्यायानेकशब्दप्रकाश्यत्वे सति अविशिष्टत्वम्, or = सजातीयविजातीयस्वगतभेदशून्यत्वम्
For the stock instructions, tat t and so yam Devadattah, cf. Ved paribh
Pandit Vol VII p 463

तथाहि तत्किं ज्ञानस्य ज्ञेयव्यतिरेकेणोत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तिः
स्थित्यनुपपत्तिर्ज्ञप्त्यनुपपत्तिर्वा । नाद्यः ज्ञानस्य स्वरूपतः
उत्पत्त्यभावात् । भावे वा प्रमाणतदाज्ञाताभ्यामेवतदुत्पाद-
नसम्भवे विषयानपेक्षणात् ज्ञानस्य सर्वत्र विषयजन्यत्वे
नियमाभावात् । नापि स्थित्यनुपपत्तिः विषयस्य ज्ञानानाश्रय-
त्वात् तथात्वे वा विषयत्वव्याघातात् । ज्ञानविषयकज्ञा-
नस्य विषयज्ञानाधीनत्वेन ज्ञेयं विना ज्ञप्त्यनुपपत्तिरस्तिवति
चेत् न ज्ञानस्य स्वयंप्रकाशमानत्वेन स्वव्यवहारार्थं स्वाति-
cognition is neither possible nor a fact of experience, since
only cognition accompanied by an object is experienced :
otherwise (sc. if object less cognition were a fact) only inde-
terminate cognition would be experienced, for apart
from an object cognised there is nothing to determine the
cognition. (The above is to be rejected) because the impos-
sibility of cognition, in the absence of an object to be cognised,
(as held above) does not exist. To explain :—Is it meant
that the *production* of cognition is impossible, or that the
persistence of cognition is impossible or that *secondary*
cognition is impossible? The first view will not hold, for
cognition (sc. Brahman) in its essential nature is not a
product at all. Or if it be conceded that cognition is a
product, an object is not necessary to produce it, since
cognition (whether true or false,) can be effected through
(trustworthy) organs of knowledge (sc. perception, infer-
ence &c) or through their counterfactuals—there being no
restrictive rule that cognition is in all cases produced by an
object, (thus, in knowledge through inference the inferred
object is not perceived.

Nor is it that the *persistence* of cognition is impossible,
for the object cognised is not the locus of the cognition. Or
if it be held that the cognised object is the locus of
cognition then the object has lost its character as an
object (and has become a substrate of cognition, i. e. a
cogniser).

* The point of this argument is against the Naiyāika with whom
know who can attribute that a cognition itself (without the object etc.) is a

रिक्तानपेक्षणात् । परप्रकाशत्वेन ज्ञानान्तरापेक्षायां तस्याप्यन्यत-
स्तस्याप्यन्यत इत्यनवस्थित्या ज्ञानासिद्धौ जगदान्वयप्रसङ्गात् ।
अज्ञायमानस्यैव ज्ञानस्य स्वविषयसाक्षात्कारत्वे प्रमाणाभावेन
नरशङ्कतुल्यस्य स्वरूपसंरक्षासिद्धेः । अस्तु वा ज्ञानस्य स्वज्ञागार्थ-
ज्ञानान्तरापेक्षा तथापि विषयापेक्षणं कुतः विषयज्ञानस्यैवापेक्ष-
णात् । ज्ञानसामान्यस्यानपेक्षयोः स्वविषयव्यावृत्तज्ञानापेक्षायां विष-
यापेक्षाप्यवश्यम्भाविनीति तत्तुच्छं ज्ञानस्य स्वत एव व्यावृत्त-
त्वात् परबिदुर्जात्यादिद्वत् ।

Suppose then that it is impossibility of *secondary* cogni-
tion, in the absence of an object to be cognised ; since *second-*
ary cognition is dependent on the cognition of an object.
This cannot be ; for cognition being self-presentative does
not require anything besides itself to make itself known.
Adopting the view that cognition is not self-presented, a
second cognition will be needed (to make known the first),
the second will demand a third cognition and so on ad infinitum ;
hence, cognition being left baseless, the world becomes
blank darkness (so nothing could ever be known) On the
view that it is an *unknown* cognition that testifies to the
object cognised, it follows that the very existence of this cog-
nition is a chimera like the horns of a man, for there is no
means of proving its existence, (the cognition being *unknown*,
ex hypothesi). Or granting that a cognition needs a second
cognition to make it known, yet why, it may be asked, is a
cognised object needed ? For only cognition of the object is
necessary. Against this it may be urged (by the opponent)
as follows :—Since the necessity of cognition in general (so,
apart from some object cognised) is not here postulated, it fol-
lows that there is a necessity for a cognition as *differentiated*
(determined) by some cognised object ; and hence the demand
for an object is inevitable. But the above objection is idle ; for
cognition is self-differentiated, as are the categories of generality
(jāti) &c. maintained by the other (schools of philosophy).

The etcetera includes akhandopādhī and viśeṣa cf. Muktivah 51. 10 and 78.

विशेषस्तु स्वतएव व्यावृत्तस्तेन तदपेक्षा नैस्तैव नैव
रिक्तपदार्थस्य किञ्चिद्धर्म नियमाद्

तथापि ज्ञानस्य ज्ञेयव्याप्तत्वाज्ज्ञेयं बोधयतीति चेत् न व्याप्यसिद्धेः ज्ञानज्ञेययोर्विभिन्नदेशत्वेन सामानाधिकरण्याभावात् । अतीनानागतार्थज्ञानदर्शनेनैककालत्वस्याप्यसिद्धेः । तस्मात् प्रत्येतद्व्यप्रतीत्योश्च भेदः प्रामाणिकः कुतः ।

प्रतीतिमात्रमेवैतद्भाति विश्व चराचरम् ॥ १८ ॥

ज्ञानज्ञेयप्रभेदेन यथा स्वाप्नं प्रतीयते ।

विज्ञानमात्रमेवैतत् तथा जगच्चराचरम् ॥ १९ ॥

Nevertheless (continues the opponent) the very fact of cognition¹ leads us to infer the existence of some object, because of the universally established concomitance of cognition and cognised object (sc. wherever there is cognition, there is also cognised object). Not so, is the reply. For this universal concomitance cannot be proved - because cognition and cognised object cannot exist together in the same locus (*adhikaraṇa*) since their spatial positions are distinct (sc. cognition is in the mind, and the cognised object is external to the mind; whereas smoke and fire are found together in one place) and, further, because the temporal co-existence (of cognition and cognised object) cannot be proved, since cognition of a past or future object is a matter of common experience.

Therefore, to sum up :—

There is no proof that cognition and cognised object are different. This universe, animate and inanimate, which appears in-consciousness, is nothing but cognition . XVIII.

As the world of dreams, which is really nothing but cognition (Brahman), appears in consciousness under divers forms of cognitions and cognised objects, so too the world of waking consciousness, of things animate and inanimate (is nothing apart from Brahman)...XIX.

* तथापि इति बोधयति ज्ञान मिति शेष N, D s gloss.

तन्तोर्भेदे पटो यद्वच्छून्य एव स्वरूपतः ।

आत्मनोपि तथैवेदं भानमात्रं चराचरम् ॥ २० ॥

रज्जुर्यथा भ्रान्तद्रष्ट्या सर्परूपा प्रकाशते ।

आत्मा तथा सूक्ष्मद्रष्टा जगद्रूपः प्रकाशते ॥ २१ ॥

आत्मन्येव जगत्सर्वं दृष्टिमात्रं सतत्त्वकम् ।

उद्रूप स्थितिमास्थाय विनश्यति मुहुर्मुहुः ॥ २२ ॥

पूर्वामन्दाद्भये शुद्धे पाप्मदोषादिवर्जिते ।

प्रतिबिम्बमिवाभाति दृष्टिमात्रं जगन्नयम् ॥ २३ ॥

तदुक्तं भगवता वसिष्ठेन तस्मिँश्चिद्दर्पणे स्फाटे समस्ता

वस्तुद्रष्टवः । इमास्ताः प्रतिबिम्बयन्ति सरसीव तटद्रुमाः ॥ तथा-

यस्य चित्तमपी लीला जगदेतच्चराचरम् । यस्य विश्वात्मकत्वेपि

Just as a piece of cloth really turns out to be mere non-entity, in the absence of its component threads (i. e. if we attempt to think of the cloth as existing independently of the threads); so too this world, whose esse is percipi, (is reduced to non-entity, in the absence of Self (Brahman, Intelligence)...XX.

As rope (in the darkness) when vision is deceived, appears to be a snake, so, when the mind is deluded, the Self appears to be this world...XXI.

In the Self alone (as locus), all this world, whose esse is percipi takes its rise, and persists, and perishes ever and again...XXII.

In the One without a second, which is absolute Bliss and pure, free from sin and all defects, appear, as if reflected, the three worlds† whose esse is percipi...XXIII.

His reverence Vasishṭha has declared the same view:—

‘In that pure mirror (Brahman) are reflected all these

Xogavāsisṭha Upasama prakarana, things whose esse is percipi, as
 śl. 13. trees on its banks are reflected
 „ Utpatti „ śl 3,4. in a stream. Again ‘All this world

* var lec दृष्टिमात्रमतत्त्वकम् ॥ † स्वर्गमर्त्यपातालस्थानि त्रीणि जगन्ति

खण्ड्यते नैकपिण्डता । तदेव दृष्टिमात्रात्कं जगदात्साग्रविषये-
णाज्ञानेन कृतमित्यात्मनेऽज्ञानविषयत्वं साधु विकल्पितम् ।
तथाचात्मनि लौकिकवैदिकप्रमाणासम्भवेन शशविषयादिवद्-
श्चत्वे प्राप्ते कुतस्तत्साक्षात्काराय शास्त्राभ्यासना कुतस्तदा
युत्तरेपेक्षेति रुद्धं पः ।

एवं प्राप्ते ऽभिधीयते ।

१४ यत्तत्त्वं वेदयुक्तं परमसुखतमं नित्यसुखस्थतात्वं सत्त्वं
सूक्ष्मात्सूक्ष्मं महदिदममृतं मुक्तमत्रैकमस्यम् । यस्यांशे हेतुनाहं
जगदिदमखिलं भ्रान्तिसात्रैकदेहं प्रत्यङ्ग्येतिःस्वरूपं शिवसिद्धम-
धुना कथ्यते युक्तितेऽत्र ॥ २४ ॥

is the mental sport of that one (sc. Brahman as Hiranyagar-
bha), and 'That one, although it constitutes the universe,
does not lose its character as a unity.'

Thus, therefore, the world whose esse is percipi is pro-
duced through Nescience, which has the Self both as locus

The opponent of § 6, acquiescing in our author's sensationalism, now
pushes it to its farthest limit and reduces the Self also to non-ENTITY, and dis-
penses with both Veda and Vedānta philosophy.

and as object, and the assumption, therefore, of the Self being
an object for Nescience (cf § 6) was excellent! In accordance
with this assumption (tathā cha) there can be no evidence, human
or divine (sc. Veda), for the existence of the Self, whence it
follows that the Self is non-ENTITY like the horns of a hare.
further, there can be no desire to study Veda in order to gain
intuition of the Self, much less can there be any necessity of
argument (to support the teaching of Veda as to the Self).

The above is a summary of the opponent's view.

14 To the view thus laid down it is replied:—

Now, in this place, we declare and support by argument
that Reality which lies hidden in the Veda, absolute Bliss,

Self, the knower, cannot be proved,
not because it is non-ENTITY, but be-
cause it is self-proved, i. e. superior
to all proof, as being that by virtue
of which proof, pramāṇa, can be said
to exist at all.

in its own nature eternal and
unrelated to aught else, the ex-
istent, smaller than the small
and infinite; this is emancipa-
tion and it to be apprehended
only by the emancipated, a
small part of a part of it is all this false world, it is in its
essence the light within, it is blessed XXIV

किं तत्र प्रमाणाभावेनात्मनः स्वरूपानुपपत्तिः प्रतीत्यनुपपत्तिर्वा । नाद्याः आत्मस्वरूपस्य नित्यस्यैतर्निरपेक्षत्वात् प्रमा-
णस्य स्वप्रमेयानुत्पादकत्वाच्च । द्वितीये प्रमाणेपि तर्हि प्रमाणा-
न्तराच्च तदभावे नरन्तर्वदसत्त्वेन स्वप्रमेयसाधकत्वासम्भ-
वात् । तथा च प्रमाणे प्रमाणान्तरानुसारेण जन्यस्थितेः प्रमाणेनैव
वस्तुसिद्धिरित्यभिमानमात्रम् । अथ प्रमाणं प्रमाणान्तरनिरपेक्षमेव
इयं स्वप्रमेयं च साधयति स्वप्रकाशस्वभावस्य तस्य स्वपरव्यवहारे
प्रकाशान्तरनिरपेक्षत्वात् प्रदीपप्रकाशवत् । न हि सर्वस्य साधकं
प्रमाणं स्वसिद्ध्यर्थमन्यदपेक्षन इति युक्तिर्यत् । हन्त तर्हि सर्वस्य
प्रमाणप्रत्ययेर्दम्भस्य जगतः साधक आत्मा कथं स्वाधीनसि-

In the above argument (*tatra*), is it meant that because there is no evidence (for the Self), the very existence of the Self is impossible, or that knowledge of the Self is impossible? Not the first; for the Self being in its essence eternal is independent of aught else (from which it should originate), and because evidence cannot originate that of which it is evidentiary. As regards the second alternative, even if evidence for the Self be granted, a second evidence must be premised to support the first evidence; for, if this second evidence be wanting, the first evidence is non entity, like the horn of a man, and cannot therefore be evidentiary of its object. And so, in postulating a second evidence to support the first evidence, the logical vice of an *infinite regress* results: hence the view (underlying the second alternative) that the existence of an object can be proved only through one of the (recognised) sources of evidence (*sc.* perception, inference &c.) is merely a bold assumption.

Now (the opponent interposes) an evidence is indeed independent of any second evidence and proves its own existence as well as that of the object (to which it testifies); for being by nature *self-luminous* the evidence requires no further *illumination* to make itself and its object (para) known, just as the light of a lamp (needs no other light to illumine it). Nor is it logical to hold (continues the opponent) that what is evidence for all things needs to be proved by something else. Sad conclusion this!—we reply—for how in the face of it can it be held that the Self, which is evidence for the varied universe of things known and instruments of knowledge, can be proved by evidence which, in its turn, has

द्विकेन प्रमाणेन सिद्धः स्यात् प्रमाणात्पूर्वमेव सिद्धत्वात् । अन्यथा
 असिद्धप्रमातृकं प्रमाणमेवात्मनः न लभेत । कथं वा सर्वस्य प्रमा-
 तारमात्मनः विषयीकुर्यात् प्रमाणं कर्मकर्तृविरोधप्रसङ्गात् तदन्यस्य
 च सर्वस्यात्मात्मत्वेनाप्रमातृत्वात् । तथा च श्रुतिः विज्ञातारमरे
 केन विज्ञानीयादिति । तथा च प्रमातुरात्मनः स्वत एव सिद्ध-
 त्वात् प्रमाणाभावात्तत्त्वप्राप्तिः । किञ्चेदनात्मनो ऽतरस्यसा-
 पाद्यमानं प्रमाणसिद्धमसिद्धस्वभावं स्वतो वा सिद्धम् । आद्ये ऽत-
 रव्याहकप्रमाणस्य प्रतियोगिविषयत्वनिश्चयेनात्मनोऽपि प्रमाणसि-
 द्धत्वेनासत्त्वानुपपत्तिः । न द्वितीयः असिद्धस्यापादनानुपपत्तिः ।

to be vouched for by the Self (sva)! For the Self must have
 existed prior to any source of evidence. Otherwise a source
 of evidence could not take on its character² as evidence while
 no cogniser of it existed. Or how could a source of evidence make
 known the Self which is the cogniser of all things; for this
 would be subversive of the distinction between agent, sc.
 knower, and object, sc. thing known (—the Self in this case,
 being both knower, and thing known)? Nor can anything
 other than Self be a cogniser, because it is not Self. And

Bṛhad. Up. IV. 5. 13 thus Śruti declares:—"By what
 should one know the knower." And thus, since Self, the
 knower, is self-proved, its non-existence is not proved by
 the fact that there is no source of evidence applicable to
 the Self.

Further, we ask, is this non-existence of Self, as urged
 above, something proved by one of the recognised sources
 of evidence, or is it by nature something unknown, or is it
 self-proved? In regard to the first alternative—since the
 restrictive rule is that any source of evidence that makes
 known a non-existence must also make known the counter-
 entity to that non-existence, the Self also must be proved by
 that source of evidence which declared for the non-existence
 of the Self, and therefore the non-existence of the Self cannot
 possibly be proved. Nor will the second alternative
 hold good, because no affirmation is possible in regard

* आत्मान स्वरूपम्. N D's gloss

+ पर प्रति शब्दानिष्टप्रसङ्गनमापादनमत्र

र्य N D's gloss.

न हि बुद्ध्याश्नाकृदस्वभावापादयितुं शक्यम् । तृतीये
 त्वात्तस्यैव स्वतःसिद्धी ऽस्तु अमरत्वस्य च स्वतःसिद्ध्यानुपपत्तेः ।
 अन्यथा आत्मनो नाभान्तरकरणप्रसङ्गात् । किञ्चात्मनो ऽस्त्वं
 किरात्मना ज्ञायते ज्ञातमना वा । नास्त्यः अनात्मनो ज्ञातृत्वा-
 भावात् । नाद्यः आघातात् । तथा हि किरात्मा स्वसत्ताकाले
 स्वासत्तां जानाति स्वासत्ताकाले वा । आद्ये स्वसत्ताकाले
 स्वासत्ता कुतः । तथा च किं जानीयात् विषयस्यैवाभावात् ।
 द्वितीये कथं जानीयात् स्वस्यैवाभावात् । स्वसत्ताकाले
 आत्मैव कारणान्तरभाविनो स्वासत्तां जानातीति चेत् नहि मन्नेवा
 ऽऽथा ऽनित्यः पर तच्च कृतहान्यकृतास्यागमप्रसङ्गेन परिहृ-
 to anything wholly unknown, for that which has not
 entered into the mind cannot be affirmed. But if the third
 alternative be adopted, then grant that it is the Self alone that
 is self-proved; and (grant this) because non-existence (being
jada non-intelligent, like *material things*) cannot be self proved.
 If this be denied (sc. if you regard non-existence as *chetana*,
 intelligent), it follows that you have given to Self another
 name (and called it *non-existence*). Moreover is the non-
 existence of Self cognised by the Self or by not-Self? Not
 by the latter, for the not Self is not a knower. Not by the
 former—which is a contradiction in terms. To explain our
 meaning, we ask, Does the Self cognise its own non-existence
 while it is itself existent or non-existent? On the first alter-
 native, the non-existence of the Self is impossible while the
 Self exists. Further, what should the Self cognise,
 since the very object to be cognised (sc. non-existence of
 Self) does not exist at that time? On the second alternative,
 the Self could not possibly cognise, because it is itself non-
 existent at that time. If it be argued that the Self, while
 existent, cognises its own future non-existence, then we reply
 that (according to this view) the Self, existent now, perishes
 later on. And this view of a non-eternal Self (*tachcha*) we
 have already refuted (cf. § 2), because it logically implies
 the destruction of the retributive power of actions and the
 fruition of actions never performed by the individual

तम् । किञ्चात्मनोऽसत्त्वत्वादी स्वात्मानं निराकरोति परात्मानं वा । आद्ये निराकर्तुरसत्त्वाकिराकार्य एवातमा परामार्थः सन् । द्वितीये निराकर्ता परामार्थ एव स्थितः कुतस्तेनात्मनोऽसत्त्वत्वा । तथा च श्रुतिः असत्त्वेन स भवति असद्ब्रह्मेति वेद चेत् अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेद्वेद सन्तमेनं ततो विदुरिति । किञ्च प्रमाणं सति विषये प्रवर्तते असति वा । असति चेत् तर्हि शशविवर्णमपि साधयेत् असत्त्वाविशेषादसत्साधनसमर्थत्वाच्च प्रमाणाणाम् । सति चेत् न तर्हि प्रमाणाधीना वस्तुसत्ता प्रमाणाप्रवृत्तेः पूर्वमेव प्रमेयसत्ताभ्युपगमात् । अन्यथा सति प्रमाणं प्रवर्तत इति स्ववचनठपाकोपः । सत एव वस्तुनो भानं

Further, does he who maintains the non-existence of Self mean to deny his own Self or the Self of another ? In the first case, since the denier is (by supposition) non-existent, that other Self which it was intended to deny remains behind as real. In the second case, the denier is indeed posited as real. How then is it possible to maintain the non-existence of Self ? Sruti confirms our view — 'He who knows Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing. He who knows Brahman as existing, him, in consequence, the wise know as existing.'

Again, we ask, Does a source of evidence apply to (sc. make known) an existent, or a non-existent object ? If it can apply to a non-existent object, then it ought also to prove the existence of a sheer non-entity like the horns of a hare, because non-existence is a unity indivisible and, therefore, includes pure nonsense like the above); and because (by supposition) sources of evidence are able to prove the existence of the non-existent. If a source of evidence is applicable to an existent object, then (the opponent's view) that the existence of an object is subordinate to some source of evidence (which testifies to the existence of the object) is no longer tenable, because he must admit that the object existed even before the source of evidence was addressed to it. If he denies the previous existence of the object (anyatha), he contradicts his

प्रमाणधीनमिति चेत् भवत्वभानस्वरूपे ऽनात्मन्य चेतने तथा । स्वयमेव भानस्वरूपे आत्मनि कथमेवं भविष्यति । तथा च श्रुतिः तमेव भास्वमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभातीति । किञ्चात्मनि किं प्रमाणाभित्यभिनिविशमानं प्रति सर्वाणि प्रमाणाभीत्येवोत्तरम् अज्ञातस्यैव प्रमाणविषयत्वात् आत्मन एवाज्ञातत्वात् जडस्य च स्वत एवावृत्तस्वभावस्याज्ञानलक्षणावरणान्तरकल्पनाप्रयोजनशून्यतया ऽज्ञानाविषयत्वेन प्रमाणाविषयत्वात् प्रमाणाधीना ऽविद्यानिवृत्तिविशिष्टात्मस्वरूपचैतन्येनैव जडस्य सर्वस्य प्रतीत्युपपत्तेः । तथा च सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धस्यात्मनः प्रमाणाभावादस-

own statement that a source of evidence is applicable to an existent object.' But (it may be urged) that it is the presentation in consciousness of an existent object that is subordinate to a source of evidence. Grant (we reply) that this is so in the case of not-self which is by nature non-presentative, unintelligent. But this cannot possibly be the case in regard to self, which is itself consciousness. Sruti confirms our view : — 'When the Self shines, everything shines after it : by its light

Katha Up. II. 5. 15/

all this is lighted.'

Moreover to the man who is determined to have an answer to his question. What evidence is there for the self ? — our answer is just this—All the recognised sources of knowledge are (evidence) of the Self. For only that which has been concealed by Nescience (ajnatasya) can be made known by an instrument of knowledge, (and) the Self is the only thing concealed by Nescience. And since it is unnecessary to assume further concealment, in the form of Nescience, of an unintelligent (material) thing, which is by nature self-concealed (sc. which is itself Nescience), an unintelligent thing cannot be (said to be) an object for (sc. concealed by) Nescience and cannot therefore be an object for (sc. be made known by) any of the recognised instruments of knowledge. For knowledge of all unintelligent (material) things is effected on y

त्वमिति साहसनाम् । कथं तच्छीपनिषदत्वमात्मनः सर्वप्रमाण-
विषयस्योपनिषत्मात्रगम्यत्वाभावादिति चेन्न परिपूर्णसन्नि-
धानन्दप्रत्यगुपेण सानान्तराविषयत्वादौपनिषदत्वमिति वदामः ।
ननु स्वयम्प्रकाशस्याज्ञानविषयत्वानुपपत्तिरित्युक्तम् । सत्यं
वस्तुतस्तदैव । तथापि यथा मध्यन्दिनवर्तिन्यपि सवितरि
स्वयम्प्रकाशे दिवान्धाः पेषकादयस्तमसा ऽऽवृता ऽयं
सवितेति कल्पयन्ति तथा ऽत्यन्तमूढबुद्धयो ऽज्ञानेनावृतायमा-
through Intelligence, which is the Self, when the Self is
attended by cessation of Nescience—this cessation of Nescience
being dependent on, as being effected through, an instrument of knowledge. Hence, it is a downright rash state-
ment to make, that the Self, which is proved by all the
instruments of knowledge, does not exist because there is no
evidence for its existence.

How then, it may be asked by way of objection, is the
Self to be considered as the *peculiar* subject-matter of the
Upanishads ; for the Self cannot be said to be made known
only by the Upanishads, if (as just admitted above)
it is made known by *all the instruments of knowledge* ? Not
so, we reply : for the Self is the peculiar subject-matter of
the Upanishads, in that the Self* is identical with (Brahman)
the absolute Existence, Intelligence, Bliss, cannot be known
through any other source of knowledge.

The opponent urges that he has already shown that 'a
self-luminous Self cannot be invested by Nescience' (p. 4,
1. 6.) True, we reply ; precisely so from the stand-point of abso-
lute truth. And yet just as bleary-eyed owls fancy that the
self-luminous sun at noon is enveloped in darkness, so the grossly
ignorant imagine that the Self is concealed by Nescience.
Hence all the Upanishads start to destroy the Nescience above
described which conceals the Self and is falsely imagined,
and which, through the special virtue of the Self (so
its self-luminousness), was already destroyed, i. e. was
non-entity even previous (to a study of the Upani-

स्मृति कल्पयन्ति । अत एवम्भूतस्यात्माज्ञानस्य कल्पितस्य पूर्वमे-
वात्मनाहारस्यादेव वस्तुतो निवृत्तस्यासतो निवृत्तये सर्वे वेदा-
न्ताः प्रयुक्ताः स्वयम्प्रकाशस्वरूपे आत्मन्यज्ञाननिवृत्तिविप्रतिरेकेण
कृत्वाऽन्तराऽभिरूपणात् तदाकारवृत्त्युत्पादनेनैव वेदान्तानां तद्वि-
षयत्वोपपत्तेः । न चात्मनः स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वे विप्रतिपत्तिः । तथा
हि आत्मा इतरानपेक्षप्रकाशः स्वसत्तायां प्रकाशाव्यभिचारि-
हवात् संविद्ब्रह्मालोकवद्वा । तस्मात्स्वयम्प्रकाश आत्मेत्यभिप्रे-
त्यौक्तं ज्योतिरिति । सैन्धवघनवद्विज्ञानघनैकस्वभावतया
shada). For since no other effect than the destroyal of Nes-
science can be supposed to be wrought in the self-
luminous Self, it follows that the Upanishads have the
Self (tat) as their subject-matter just in so far as they pro-
duce (in the minds of those who study them) a modification
(vritti), of the Self (tat), (i. e. effect an intuition, sākshātkāra,
of the identity of Brahman and Self).

Nor can there be any controversy as to the self-luminous
charactr of Self. We explain :—the Self is not dependent
on another for its light because the light of Self invariably
accompanies the existence of Self (so, where Self is, there
light is); as is the case with consciousness (samvit) or the light
(of the sun). Hence the word *light* was used (verse 1, p 1),
meaning thereby that the Self is self-luminous : that is to
say, the essence of Self is self-illumination because the
Self is one mass of Intelligence, as a lump of salt (is self-
salted). And thus runs the Śruti passage :—‘In that state
Bṛihad : Up. IV. 4. 9. the Self is its own light.’

An opponent may argue that at one time our consci-
ousness takes the form ‘I know the Self ; at another time,
the form ‘I know not the Self ; and thus the self-luminousness
of Self is contradicted by the fact of *cognisability* and *non-*
cognisability (of Self) declared in the above states of
consciousness. He proceeds to explain—if, in accordance
with the consciousness ‘I know the Self it be ad

स्वयं ज्योतिः स्वरूपमित्यर्थः तथा च श्रुतिः अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयं-
ज्योतिर्भवतीति । ननु कदाचिदात्मानमहं जानामीत्यनुभवः कदा
चिदात्मानमहं न जानामीत्यनुभवः तथा चैतदनुभवद्वयोपस्थापि-
तज्ञातत्वाज्ञातत्वाभ्यां स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वमात्मनो विरुद्ध्यते ।
तथा हि यद्यात्मानमहं जानामीत्यनुभावानुरोधेन ज्ञातत्वं
ज्ञानकर्मत्वमात्मनः स्वीक्रियते तदा ज्ञातमवत्स्वयम्प्रकाश-
त्वानुपपत्तिः । तदेव हि स्वयम्प्रकाशं नाम यत्केनापि रूपेण
कस्यापि ज्ञानस्य कदा चिदपि कर्मतां न भजते । अन्यथा
पारिभाषिकमेव स्वयंप्रकाशत्वं स्यात् । यदि च नामहं न
mitted that *cognisability* means 'the fact of S-Ilf being the
object of the cognitive act' (so, being *illuminated* by the cogni-
tion, *jñān*), then the self-luminous character of Self cannot
be maintained, for in this case the Self is like not-Self (which
needs to be illuminated by cognition). Hence only that is self-lumi-
nous which never, under any form whatever, becomes the
object of any cognition whatsoever. If any other meaning
be attached to the term (*anyathā*), self-luminousness becomes
a mere technicality (without logical connotation). Again,
if in accordance with the consciousness 'I know not myself'
the *non-cognisability* (of the Self) be granted, even then the
self-luminous character of the Self is overthrown ; because
we cannot be conscious of one and the same object as both
present and *not present* in consciousness simultaneously, for
there is a contradiction here. Since our consciousness does ;
not take this form—'when the object is in consciousness, even
then it is not in consciousness.'—; nor this form—, when it
is not in consciousness, then it is in consciousness.'
How, therefore, (concludes the opponent) is the
self-luminous character of Self proved ? We reply ;
this contradiction cannot be urged against us as a
fault, for in reality the Self is by nature different
from both the *cognised* and the *non-cognised* Śruti confirms
Kena Up. I 3. our view, thus:—'That (Brah-
man) is other than known : it is higher also than the
unknown'

जानामीत्यनुभवानुदोषेन। ज्ञातस्त्वमेव स्वकीक्रियते तथापि स्वयंज्यो-
तिषद्भवतिः न ह्येकस्मिन्नेव वस्तुनि युगपद्भाति न भाति चेत्पु-
नरितुं शक्यं विरोधात्। नहि यदा भाति तदानीमेव न भातीत्य-
नुभवः यदा न भाति तदानीं च भातीति । तत्कथं स्वयंज्योति-
ष्ट्वमात्मन उपपद्यत इति नैव दोषः ज्ञाताज्ञातविलक्षणस्यैवात्म-
त्वात् तथा च श्रुतिः अन्यदेव तद्विदितादयोगविदितादधीति ।
आत्मानमहं जानामीत्यनुभवस्य का गतिरिति चेत् विशि-
ष्टविषयत्वमेव न ह्येकस्मिन्नुभवे निर्विकल्पकमज्ञानानामन्द-
कवावृत्तं वस्तुस्वरूपमात्रं भातीत्यनुभवः येनात्मनो ज्ञानकर्मत्वं
भवेत् अपि तूपाधिबिग्रिष्टमेव तस्य च ज्ञानकर्मत्वेऽप्यविरोधः ।

What then (the opponent asks) is the process of the consciousness. 'I know Self.' It consists, we reply, in this consciousness making known the Self as conditioned. For in 'I know Self' we are not conscious of Self, the reality as it is in own nature, unconditioned and free from Nescience and pain (anānanda*), in which case (you could urge against us) that the Self might be the *object* of the cognitive act (and, therefore, not self-luminous); but we are conscious of the Self as conditioned by attributes (upādhi), and there is no contradiction in holding that the *conditioned* Self (a-ya) is the *object* of the cognitive act. For the conditioned Self is not self-luminous, since it is only of the pure unconditioned Self that self-luminousness is maintained. The consciousness 'I know not the Self' is indeed a proof of the self-luminous character of Self. To explain : it is this very consciousness which makes known the Nescience that conceals (lit. has as its object) the Self. Accordingly, it must be held that in this same consciousness the Self, concealed by Nescience, is present. If this were not so, the form of the consciousness (tat) would merely be 'I know not.' Hence the consciousness 'I know Self,' having declared the Self which shines forth by reason of its own self-luminous character the 'not' in (*I know not Self*) declares with regard to

न हि तस्य स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमस्ति । शुद्धस्यैवात्मनस्स्वयंप्रकाशत्वा-
ङ्गीकारात् मानहं न जानामीत्यनुभवः आत्मनस्स्वयंप्रकाशत्व-
साधक एव तथा ह्ययं ह्यनुभवः आत्मविषयमज्ञानं विषयीकरो-
ति । तथा चैतस्मिन्ननुभवे ऽज्ञानवदात्मापि भातीति वाच्यम्
अथवा न जानामीत्येव तदाकारस्स्यात् अत आत्मानमहं
जानामीति स्वयंप्रकाशतया भासमानमात्मानमुल्लिख्य नेत्यज्ञा-
नलक्षणमावरणं तत्र विषयीकरोतीति युगपद्भासमानत्वाभासमा-
नत्वे स्वयंप्रकाशस्याविरुद्धे इति मानहं न जानामीत्यनुभववत्ता-
देव स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमात्मनस्सिद्धम् । ननु घटं न जानामीत्यना-
त्मन्यपीदृशानुभवोस्तीति तस्याऽपि स्वयंप्रकाशत्वप्रसङ्ग इति
चेत् अयं कोयं घटो नाम यस्य स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमापाद्यते
the Self (tatra) the concealment which is Nescience : hence
the simultaneous *shining forth* and *not shining forth* of the
self-luminous are not contradictory. hence on the very stren-
gth of the consciousness 'I know not self the self-lumi-
nousness of Self is established.

The opponent may here urge that since a similar consci-
ousness holds good in regard to the not-Self, sc. 'I know
not the earthen jar,' it should follow that the jar also is self-
luminous. Pray declare what you mean by this said jar,
whose self-luminous character you urge against us. Do you
mean that it is the substrate (yatra) in which are observed
certain attributes, e. g. *jariness* &c ? If so, then having care-
fully pondered what the *own nature* of the jar is, set it forth
as discriminated from aught else. You may say that it is a
special kind of whole consisting of certain parts, e. g. the two
halves of the jar &c. Not so, we reply for the relation of whole
and part and other attributes pertaining to the jar are different
(from the jar) ; these are not the *nature* of the jar itself. The
own nature of the jar you must declare to be something
different from these. The opponent may reply :—The *own*
nature of the jar as something different from these attribu-
tes I am unable to specify Whence this *nature*, we ask

घटत्वादयो घर्मा यत्र प्रतीयन्ते ज्यमेवेति चेत् किमस्य स्वरूपं
तत्सम्बन्धगनुभूय इतरविविक्ततया प्रदर्श्यतां कपालाद्याः कथावय-
विविशेष इति चेत् न अवयवावयवित्वाद्यो हि घटसंबन्धा-
ग्रन्थे न त्वेते एव घटस्वरूपाः । एतदभ्यत् स्वरूपं वाच्यम्
एतदभ्यत्स्वरूपं विशिष्य वक्तुं न शक्नोमीति चेत् कथमशक्तिः
अननुभूयमानत्वात् वा निर्विशेषत्वाद्वा नाद्यः घटस्वरूपस्य
सर्वजनीनानुभवमिदृशत्वात् द्वितीयेपि वक्तव्यं निर्विशेषमनुभूय-
मानं घटस्वरूपं तत्किं स्वतो अनुभूयते स्वभिन्नेन मानान्तरेण
वा अन्त्येनिर्विशेषत्वव्याघातः न हि निर्विशेषं वस्तु मानान्त-
रविषय इति संभवति चक्षुरादेः सार्वलौकिकस्य प्रमा-
णस्य सविशेषवस्तुविषयत्वनियमात् । तस्मान्निर्विशेषं सक-

Is it because the nature of the jar is not present to consci-
ousness or because it is a simple (undifferenced) entity ? The
first alternative will not hold ; for the nature of the jar is a
fact of common experience (sc. all know what is meant by
jar). On the second alternative too you must declare whe-
ther this simple undifferenced nature of jar, present to
consciousness, is self-cognised, or cognised through some
source of knowledge other than the nature of the jar (*sva*).
If you say through some source of knowledge other than the
nature of the jar (*antyo*), the simple undifferenced character
(of jar, *per se*, as maintained above) is overthrown ; for a
simple undifferenced entity *cannot* be made known through
a source of knowledge different from itself, since all human
instruments of knowledge, so, the eye &c., are of necessity
confined to making known a *differenced* entity (*i. e.* one
qualified by attributes). Hence (you must admit) the *own*
nature of jar remains as a simple, self-presented entity, not
made known by any of the instruments of knowledge, sc.
speech, mind &c. Now you must consider whether this *own*
nature of jar is different from the Self or not ? Different,
you say ? Not so, we reply ; for the *nature* of jar being an
attributeless something, there is no attribute which
might serve to establish a difference (between the jar

लवाद्यानसाद्यविषयं स्वभासमानं वस्तु घटस्वरूपमिषवशिष्यते
तत्किमात्मनो भिद्यते न वेति विचारणीयं भिद्यते चेन्न भेदकध-
र्माभावात् निर्विशेषत्वात् धर्मिप्रतियोगिनोरुभयोरपि स्वयंप्रकाश-
त्वेन तद्विशेषितस्य भेदस्य प्रमाणेन ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वाच्च तस्मात्स्व-
यंप्रकाशात्मस्वरूपमेव घट इति स्थितम् । एवं पदार्थान्तरम-
प्यात्मस्वरूपमेवेत्यनात्मना आत्मसिद्धौ नास्त्येव । कस्य स्वयंप्रका-
शत्वमापाद्यते तुल्यन्यायादिति अतः स्वयंज्योतिः स्वभाव आन-
न्दघनो ऽमङ्गोदासीन एव अनाद्यनिर्वचनीयाविद्यासंबन्धात्
द्वैताकारेण भाति रज्जुरिव सत्पदस्रक्काद्यात्मना परमार्थतस्तु न
द्वैतं नाद्वैतमात्मैव केशलो विज्ञानघन इति सिद्धम् ।

per se and the Self) And further since both the (Self and the jar *per se* which are in this case the) substrate, dharmi and counter-entity pratiyogi (respectively of their mutual difference) are self-luminous, the difference between them cannot be made known (lit. grasped) by any of the recognised sources of knowledge. Hence we have proved that the jar in its own nature is the self-luminous Self. In the same way it may be proved that other things are in essence the Self hence the not-Self is indeed not different from Self. For of which of the two (Self or not-Self) is self-luminousness affirmed (by you), since the argument (for self-luminousness) is equally strong in both cases? Hence we have proved that the Self, which is by nature self-luminous, pure bliss, unrelated and without desire, *appears* in the form of the manifold through its connection with eternal, *inexplicable* Nescience: just as a piece of rope (seen in the dark) at one time appears to be a snake, at another time, a stick or something else: but in reality neither duality nor non-duality is, the Self pure Intelligence. alone is.

१५ आत्मार्थं सर्वसंज्ञो भानुभासक उच्यते ।

नित्यो ऽयमविनाशित्वादुपादेयः कथं भवेत् ॥ २५ ॥

मन्वेदिकामुष्मिकमकनसांसारिकसुखतत्त्वाधनकलापाद्विमु-
खस्यानादिमवसंश्रितपुण्यनिबन्धपितकलषस्याशेषविषयदोषद-
र्शनासादितोद्वेगस्य परमपुरुषार्थकामिनो मुमुक्षोः कथम-
यमुपादेयः स्यात् । तत्र यद्यप्ययमात्मा नित्यः वि-
नाशस्यामयीरहितत्वात् आत्मात् आत्मविनाशस्य ग्रहीतुमश-
क्यत्वाच्च स्वसत्ताकाले ग्राह्यभावात् प्रत्येकाले ग्राह्यभा-
वात् । न च परिच्छिन्नत्वादस्यानित्यत्वमनुवेयम् आत्मत्वादा-

15. This Self is in relation with (as the substrate of) all

An opponent argues that the Self as taught in Vedānta cannot be the highest aim of man: pleasure and the absence of pain are the only aims.

things. It is said (of it in the Veda) that sun-like² it illumines (all thing-) It is eternal, for it is imperishable. How then can this Self be accepted (as the

goal of human endeavour) ?.....X V.

An opponent now urges that the Self cannot be accepted as the aim of man by one who, when his sin has been destroyed by the store of merit acquired by him during a beginningless round of transitory lives, is pained at seeing defects in all earthly objects; and turning his face away from transient pleasure, present and future, together with the means of obtaining such, desires the highest aim of man, i.e. emancipation. (Thus the opponent maintains) although (he admits that) the Self is eternal

तस्मात् स्य ररिच्छित्तः यत्र आहुः । यच्चामोति यदादत्ते यच्चामोति विद-
यानिह । यच्चास्य संततो भावस्तस्मादात्मेति कथ्यते ॥ व्यापकस्या-
पि गगनादेरनित्यत्व दृष्टमिति चेत् न व्यापकत्वापरिज्ञानात् सर्व-
for there is no means" of destroying Self (—inasmuch as Self is not a
product, *kārya*) nor is the destruction of Self conceivable,
for while Self is, the thing to be known (*grāhya*, sc. non-exis-
tence of Self) is not ; and while the non-existence of Self is,
the knower (*grāhaka* sc. Self) is not. Nor (continues the
opponent) can the non-eternal nature of Self be inferred
from its finitude : for to Self belongs self-hood, and Self
is infinite. Hence the sages declared :—'Since in this world
it pervades things, grasps and enjoys them, and since of
it the presence is unbroken, hence it is termed *ātmā*.'

But as a matter of fact (some one may argue) ether &c.
(viz., time and space), which (like Self) are pervasive (infinite),
are also non-eternal. Not so. for such an argument un-
plies a misapprehension of the meaning of *pervasion*. Per-
vasion means relation with all things—*complete* relation
with everything—in short, the being the substrate of

* The gloss expands, technically,—समवायिकारणनाशो वा असमवायिकार-
णनाशो वा द्वयनाशनाशयोर्परिच्यते—sc. by the Naiyāyikas—न च अ-
कार्यस्य आत्मन उभयमस्ति । आकार्यत्वं च अनाद्यदृष्टप्रवाहाधारत्वादिति
प्रतिवाक्तमिति—of pp. 2,3 supra —To annihilate Self, we must destroy either the
samavāyikarāṇa, i. e. the material of which Self is composed, or the asamavāyī-
karāṇa, i. e. the contact or the parts which make up the Self. And this would be
possible only if Self were a product, *kārya*, which Self is not.

१ सर्वात्मना is closed by नि शेषतया 'without a remainder.' अधिष्ठानं by
सत्ताप्रदे ; further on, आत्मनः सर्वधिष्ठितत्वं नाम अध्यस्तस्य सत्तास्कृति-
प्रदम्भम् ।—the substrate gives existence to that which it pervades, and makes it
appear in consciousness' sphere, अनुगत = उद्योग ; अनुगत = व्यापक,
Ierra en vyāpti is not to be taken in the Nyāya sense of *nyāyabhedha* or *nyāyabhedha*

संबद्धत्वं हि व्यापकत्वं सर्वस्मिन्सर्वात्मना संबद्धमवसननुगता-
नासविष्टानमिति यावत् न ह्यन्येनान्यत्सर्वात्मना व्याप्यते
व्याप्यस्वरूपाऽपत्त्यप्रसङ्गात् व्यापकस्वरूपविनिर्मुक्तस्वरूपा-
भावात् अन्यथा सर्वात्मना व्याप्यऽसंभवात् । न च
कालदेशवस्तुऽपरिच्छिन्नेष्यात्कति प्रमाणान्तरापेक्षा भानुव-
त्स्वयंप्रतिभासत्वात् सर्वजगदवज्ञासकत्वेन श्रुतौ प्रसिद्धत्वात्
तमेव भ्रान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभा-
तीति श्रुतेः । तथापि सुखदुःखाभावेतरत्वादनुपादेशत्वमेव ।

finite (non-pervasive) things. Nor can one finite be *completely* pervaded by another finite, for it would follow from this that the pervaded thing was in itself non-entity, since it has no character apart from that of the pervading thing otherwise (sc. if it had an independent character) *complete* pervasion could not take place. Nor is there need of any other source of knowledge to make known the Self, unlimited though this is as to time, space and substance; for, like the sun, Self is self-illuminated; for, Self is declared in Śruti to illumine the whole world, thus—'When the Self shines, every thing shines after it by its light all this is lighted.'

Nevertheless (continues the opponent) the Self cannot be accepted as the aim of man, because it is something different from pleasure and the absence of pain (which are the only aims).

of two or more things, but in the further sense of that final and complete pervasion of the manifold by the One Extant or Self (atman) on which Vedānta texts are for ever insisting. The Self alone as the *m* appears is unreal in itself, because measurable apart from the Self *anurashanīya*.

ननु किमिदमनुपादेयत्वं आदानक्रियाऽविषयत्वं वा इच्छा-
विषयत्वविरहो वा स्वकृतिसाध्यत्वविरहो वा एतद्विशेषितसुख-
दुःखाभावेनरत्वं वा विशेषमेव वा अन्यद्वा । नाद्य इष्टापत्तेः
सुखदुःखाभावेनरनुपादेयत्वापत्तिश्च न हि सुखं वा दुःखाभावो
वा आदानक्रियया विषयीक्रियते । न द्वितीयः इच्छातद्विषय-
त्वयोरप्युपादेयत्वापत्तेः ।

Now what (we ask) is this unfitness to be accepted as the aim of man ? Does it consist (a) in the not being an object for the act of acceptance (in the literal sense of taking by the hand) ? Or (b) in the not being an object of desire ? Or (c) in the not being something which one can bring about (sādhyā) by volition ? Or (d) in the being different from pleasure and the absence of pain, as qualified above in (e) * ? Or (f) simply in the being different from pleasure and the absence of pain, without the above qualification † ? Or (g) does this unfitness consist in anything else ?

The first (definition) will not avail the opponent, for from it follows what we are quite prepared to admit (viz., that the Self cannot be handled) : and further will follow (what he is not prepared to admit) that pleasure and the absence of pain are not to be accepted as the aim of man, because neither of these is the object of the act of handling.

Nor will the second definition ‡ avail, for from it will follow that both to *desire* and to *the being the object of desire*

* एतदिति एतेन स्वकृतिसाध्यत्वविरहेण इति । gloss

† i.e. that Self is not a product (sādhyā) to be willed into existence.

विशेषमेव इति सुखदुःखाभावेनरत्त्वमात्रमित्यर्थः । gloss

‡ The obscure argumentation of the text (of which a re-statement largely based on Nānīdikshita's gloss is attempted below) is urged against a Naiyāyika who holds that not the Self but pleasure and the absence of pain constitute the sole end of man. Challenged to give a satisfactory explanation of his statement that the Self is not to be accepted

belong fitness to be accepted as the aim of man. Nor can it be argued that what is to be accepted as the aim of man is the desired object itself as characterised by occasional and accidental attributes, sc. desire and the being the object of desire.

For from this would follow that pain also is to be accepted as an aim. For only that which is known can be an object of desire : (and pain is known), because the

as the aim of man, he is supposed to offer a number of definitions of such *unfitness* ; but he is met on his own ground, and in each definition thus offered some one flaw or another is exposed. So much by way of apology for the inevitable pedantry of the following.

Now, if *unfitness* to be a human aim consists in the thing not being an object of desire, then, contrariwise, *fitness* consists in the thing being an object of desire. Next suppose that the emotion of desire has found expression in a proposition e. g. 'I desire pleasure.' This proposition discovers (at least for the Naiyāyika) three elements, viz., the desired object or *vishaya* : the desire, *ichehha*, and the being an object of desire, *ichehha-vishayati*. The two latter are qualifying or adjective elements to the *vishaya*, which in the above proposition, stands, not per se, but in relation to desire, sc. *sakne ichhehha-vishayatā varttate*. But now it is for the Naiyāyika to say whether he regards those adjective elements as *viśeṣaṇa*'s i. e. distinguishing attributes 'which must be present with and inhere in (as forming a constituent part of) the object' (for this defn., cf. Ved. paribh. Pandit Vol. vii, p. 450). If so, both the *ichehha* and the *ichehha-vishayatā* will have to be accepted as human aims along with the *sukha* to which they are both present and essential. And this of course he cannot maintain. To escape this difficulty he is supposed to argue that *ichehha* and *ichehha-vishayatā* are *upalakṣaṇa*'s, i. e. occasional and accidental attributes, as 'the crow perched on Chandra's house yesterday, though not there now, serves to point out the house, and is therefore only an *upalakṣaṇa*,' (cf. Ved. paribh. supra). Now the absence of pain is universally desired, and this is based on the common consciousness that absence of pain is desirable - in the latter again pain is a part of what is known and since only what is known can be desired, pain too must be an object of desire.

ताभ्यामुपलक्षितं विषयस्वरूपमिति चेन्न दुःखस्याप्युपादेयत्वापत्तेः
ज्ञानविषयस्यैवेच्छाविषयत्वाद्विच्छाजनकस्य च ज्ञानस्य सवि-
कल्पकत्वेन दुःखाभावाविशेषणदुःखविषयत्वात् । विषयैकदेश इति
चेन्न सुखे तदाभावात् इच्छाविषयविशेष्यस्वरूपमात्रमुपादेयमिति
चेन्न अहं स्वर्गी स्यामित्यत्रात्मनोऽपि तथात्वापत्तेः । न तृतीयः
स्वकृतिसाध्ययोरपि दुःखतत्साधनयोरनुपादेयत्वात् । न चतुर्थः
विशेषणवैधर्मात् । न प्रज्ञमः साध्याऽवैशिष्ट्यात् । अ-
न्यस्य निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् दुःखतत्साधनतादात्म्यस्यानभ्युपग-

knowledge which gives rise to desire (for the absence of pain), inasmuch as it implies a knowledge of certain attributes in the thing desired (savikalpakatvena), implies a knowledge of pain as the counterpart of the absence of pain. Nor can it be held that only a part of the (desired) object (is the aim of man), for in the case of pleasure this is absent (so, a part of the pleasure is not desired). Nor that the subject portion only of the thing desired is to be accepted as an aim; for in such a case as, 'May I possess heaven' the Self would have to be admitted as an aim (which the opponent will not admit). Nor will the third definition avail; for pain and the instruments of pain, although these are things which one can bring about by volition, are not accepted as the aim of man. Nor is the fourth definition valid, because the qualification (inserted therein) is useless (since the highest aim of man is admittedly not the means of obtaining pleasure, but pleasure itself). Nor is the fifth definition valid, for the probandum (sādhya) is here identical (with the probans, hetu).

Nor is it possible to unfold any other definition, because the view that pain and the instruments of pain are

* The only view open to the opponent is to declare that Self is not the aim of man because it is identical with pain

मपराहतत्वात् । न च सर्वात्मकत्वव्याघातः सर्वाधिष्ठानत्वस्यैव
 सर्वात्मकत्वस्यार्थत्वात् न हि सत्यस्य मिथ्यातादात्म्यमस्ति
 सत्यत्वविरोधात् । तथा आनुपादेयत्वस्यैव निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात्
 किमिदमनुपादेयत्वमात्मनोऽनिष्टमापाद्यत इति चेन्न इतरानुप-
 सृज्यतत्वस्यैवोपादेयार्थत्वात् तच्च सुखदुःखाभावाद्येव अन्येषां
 तदुपसृज्यतत्वात् सुखदुःखाभावेतरश्चात्मा भावरूपत्वेन दुःखा
 भावानात्मकत्वात् । सर्वशून्यात्मकत्वे दुःखाभावात्मकत्वमप्य-
 स्तीति चेन्न विज्ञातुरात्मत्वात् न च शून्यं विज्ञातु
 न च विज्ञानं शून्याश्रयमभावस्य भावधर्मकत्वानुपपत्तेः ।
 identical with Self is already set aside as being held by
 nobody.

Nor may the opponent argue that thus (sc. by denying
 the identity of the Self with pain) the all pervasive
 character of Self is overthrown, for what we mean by
 this all pervasive character is that the Self is the substrate
 of all things (cf adhīsthāna, p 67 note) For the identity
 of the real (satya) with the unreal, (mithyā) cannot be
 affirmed as subversive of reality.

And as this very *unfitness* to be accepted as a human
 aim cannot itself be explained (by the opponent), what,
 we ask, has he proved against us (anīṣṭa) as regards the
 unfitness of the Self to be the aim of man? Nor so, (replis
 the opponent); for that something is fit to be accepted as
 the highest aim of man implies the independence of that
 thing as regards other things. And this independence
 belongs only to pleasure and the absence of pain; for to
 these all other things are subordinate (as aims). And
 the Self is something different from pleasure and the absence
 of pain, for since Self is a *positive* entity (bhāvarūpatvena)
 it cannot be the *negation* of pain. And it cannot be
 urged that since Self is the void (or blank pervading)
 all thing, it can be the negation of pain, for self-hood
 belongs to the cogniser. Nor is the void a cogniser; nor
 does cognition reside in the void; for a mere negation
 cannot (as substrate) have a positive entity as its attribute

आरोपितो धर्मधर्मिभाव इति चेत् तर्हि आरोप्यस्याधिष्ठानं वाच्यम् न हि निरधिष्ठानो अस्तीति । शून्यमेवेति चेत् तर्हि शून्यवैकल्यादियमेव सर्वं सर्वं प्रतीयात् न च तथास्ति सर्वेनैव सर्वस्य प्रतीतिः । किं च सर्वस्यारोपितत्वे आरोपाधिष्ठानस्य पूर्वमेव सिद्धिर्वाच्या ना च स्वत एवेति कथं शून्यं स्यात् न हि शून्यं स्वतः सिद्ध्यति अन्यथा परिभाषानाश्रयत्वापत्तेः तस्माद्भाव-रूपत्वादेव दुःखाभावात्मात्मकत्वम् । न च दुःखात्मकत्वं स्रगादि-विषयज्ञानाज्जन्यत्वात् दुःखस्य च तज्जन्यत्वात् अन्यथा तद-र्थितया तदुपादानानुपपत्तेः । जन्याजन्ययोश्चाभेदानुपपत्तेः ।

If it be argued that this relation of substrate and attribute is falsely imagined, then some substrate for this false surmised must be affirmed, for there is no error without a substrate (of reality). If it be said that this very void is the substrate, then all men should be conscious of all things as blended with this void (which, as substrate, should appear identical with the things surmised in it) : but such is not the case, for all things are known as existent only. Further, on the view of the universe being erroneously surmised some proof of the existence of the substrate of the surmised previous (to the surmised) must be declared. If it be said that this proof proceeds from itself alone, then a void cannot be the substrate ; for a void is not self-proved for to say that it is self-proved (anyathā) would be to convert it into a mere technicality (or synonym of Self). Hence Self as a positive entity cannot be the negation of pain. Nor is the Self pleasure, for it does not follow as an effect from the knowledge of garlands and other pleasurable objects. And pleasure is an effect from such knowledge : if it were not, then the pleasurable objects could not be accepted (desired) through a desire for pleasure. And the Self is not pleasure,) because the identity of a product (sc. pleasure) and a non-product (sc. Self) is impossible. Nor is it the relation only between pleasure (and the Self) that is brought about as a product by the accepta-

न च सुखसंबन्ध एव तेन जन्यः सुखं मे जातमिति प्रतीतिः
 सुखात्मनोः संबन्धस्य समवायस्याजन्यत्वाच्च । न च स्वात्माऽ-
 संबन्धे स्वतन्त्रे सुखे प्रमाणमस्ति त्वया चाङ्गीक्रियते त्वया-
 प्यात्मतादात्म्यापन्नस्य नित्यसुखस्यैव स्वीकारात् । किं च
 सुखात्मनोस्तादात्म्ये ऽहं सुखमिति प्रतीतिप्रसङ्गः न च तदस्ति
 तस्मात्सुखदुःखाभावान्यत्वादनुपादेय एवात्मा । न च ताभ्या-
 मन्यः पुरुषार्थोऽस्ति येनात्मा सुमुक्त्यामुपादेयः स्यात् । न
 चात्मत्वमेव परमपुरुषार्थताप्रयोजक तथा लोके व्यवहाराभा-
 वात् । सुखं मे स्याद् दुःखं ना मूदिति आत्मसंबन्धिसुखदुःखा-
 भावयोरेव काम्यमानत्वात् । न चात्मा नम स्यादिति काम-
 नास्ति न चाऽकाम्यमानः पुरुषार्थः ।

nce of pleasurable objects (*tenu*) ; for consciousness takes
 the form, 'pleasure has been produced for me' and further,
 because the relation between pleasure and Self technically
 termed *samavāya*, *intimate*, is not a product (it is conside-
 red *niitya*, eternal in the *Nyāya*). Nor is there evidence for
 pleasure independent of (as) not in relation with the Self,
 nor do you admit such ; for what you admit is eternal
 pleasure only, identical with Self. Moreover, if Self and
 pleasure were identical, our consciousness ought to take the
 form 'I am pleasure'—which is not the case. Hence Self
 is indeed not to be accepted as an aim ; because it is differ-
 ent from pleasure and the absence of pain. Nor apart from
 these two is there any other human aim, so that Self might
 be accepted as an aim by those desiring emancipation. Nor
 can it be held that self-hood constitutes the highest aim of
 man, since this is not the common experience of the world ;
 for pleasure and the absence of pain, relating to ourselves,
 are the only desirable things :—thus 'may pleasure be mine ;
 may pain cease for me.' Nor does desire take the form,—
 'may Self be mine', and that which is not desired is not a
 human aim

न चायमलौकिकः पुरुषार्थः । लोकव्यवहारानुलुब्धनेनैव वेदेन पुरुषार्थप्रतिपादनात् । अन्यथा* एलैकिकत्वात्स्वर्गस्यापि सुखरूपता न स्यात् । किं च किमयं लोकोत्तरो येनैहिकं पार-
त्रिकं च ससाधनं सर्वं पुरुषार्थं परित्यज्याऽऽजन्मब्रह्मचर्याद्याशेष-
दुःखजातेनात्मानमवसादयन्नलौकिकः पुरुषार्थायमात्मेति वदन्नेव
कृतार्थः स्यात् । तथा च रागिणीतं । धरं वृन्दावने शून्ये शृगा-
लत्वं य इच्छति । न तु निर्विषयं मोक्षं मन्तुमर्हति गीतम् इति ॥

Nor can it be said that this (Self) is a super-sensuous aim ; for the Veda declares the aim of man without running counter to human experience. If this were otherwise, paradise (svarga) also, as being something super-sensuous, could not have (for men) a blissful character. Moreover, how strangely has this (Vedāntin opponent) transcended human experience, that, setting aside all human aims in this and in the next world, together with the means of attaining them, and harassing himself with all that complex of pains from birth onwards through the various stages of student-ship &c., to the end of life, he should rest satisfied in the bare statement that the Self is a transcendental aim ! To our view conforms (tathācha) the song of the lover — 'Better be who desires to be a jackal in the lonely Vrindā forest† : nor can one accept emancipation in which no objects remain to be desired, O Gautama !'

* पुरुषार्थत्वात् var lect.

† cf. Gadādhara's Mukti-vāda :

धरं वृन्दावने शून्ये शृगालत्वं ब्रजाम्यहम्
न च वशीकर्त्री मुक्तिं मे कदाचन

किं च यद्ययमात्मा पुरुषार्थः स्यात् कथं तर्ह्यप्रयत्नलब्धमा-
त्मानमुपेक्ष्य वैषयिकसुखलोभात्तत्तत्काम्यतीर्थादौ स्त्रियन्ते प्रा-
णिनः न च ते भ्रान्ताः शास्त्रेणापि तदनुमोदनात् । न लोकावद-
नात्तात न वेदवचनादपि । सतिरुक्तमस्तीया ते प्रयागनाथं
प्रतीति ॥ कुष्ठाद्युपहृताश्च दुःखाभावमुद्दिश्य स्त्रियन्ते इति तु
सर्वजनीनम् । तत्किमनात्मैवोपादेयः । कः संशयः । सुखदुःखाभा-
वयोस्तत्साधनानां च पुत्रकलत्रगृहक्षेत्रगोहिरण्यादीनामुपादेयत्व-
स्याधिगीतत्वात् । नन्वैहिकामुष्मिकसकलसुखतत्साधनजानमुपेक्ष्य
केवलमात्मानमेवोद्दिश्य श्रवणादावपि के चन प्रवर्तन्ते एवेति चेत्ते

Moreover, if this Self is the aim of man, how is it that living beings disregard the Self which is to be attained without difficulty, and through a desire for sensuous pleasure go to die at one or other of the favourite tirthas ? Nor can it be said that these men are deluded, for even the Śāstras approve their action : thus, 'Dear one ! thy resolve to die

Matsya Pu, IV 23.

at Prayāga thou shalt not yield

through word of man or Veda' And it is a common fact that lepers and others, seeking rest from pain, choose to die. What then, (the Vedāntin asks) is something other than Self to be accepted as the aim of man ? Assur-
edly ; for the acceptance of pleasure and the absence of pain and the means thereto, viz, sons and home, cattle &c., as aims, is without reproach.

Now it may be urged that some men disregarding all present and future pleasure and the means thereto, and keeping in view the Self alone, enter on *hearing* and the other prescribed means. Well then, according to the maxim that compliance with the opinion of the many is right, let these men be considered the deluded ones for they are few indeed. It may be urged that the Vedā

तर्हि भ्रान्ता भवन्तु बहुलामनुग्रहे न्याय्य इति न्यायात् द्वित्रा
एव हि ते । विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्मेति सुखरूपत्वमप्यात्मनः श्रुतौ
श्रूयत इति चेत् श्रूयतां नाम न ह्येतावता ऽऽत्मा पुरुषार्थः न हि
सुखमित्येव पुरुषार्थः स्वसंबन्धितयैव तस्य पुरुषार्थत्वात् अन्यथा
शत्रुसुखस्यापि पुरुषार्थत्वापत्तेः न हि सुखं सुखस्य पुरुषार्थः ।
सांसारिकमपि सुखं नानादुःखसंभिन्नमनुपादेयमेवेति चेन्न गत्य-
न्तराभावात् न हि भिन्नकक्षिया स्थान्यनधिश्रयणम् । आयाति
चेत् दुःखं परिहर्तव्यं । सुखं तूपादेशमेव । कथं तत्प्राप्त्यज्ञानार्थं
श्रवणादिविधिः दुःखाभावार्थमेव । एवमात्मनोऽपुरुषार्थत्वे प्राप्ते
ब्रूमः ॥

declares that the Self is pleasure in the passage 'Brahman is Intelligence Bliss.' This may be granted; but by this is not meant that Self is the aim of man: for pleasure in itself is not an aim but only as being in relation with one's Self. Otherwise the pleasure of an enemy also would become an aim. Nor is pleasure the aim of pleasure (which the Vedāntin identifies with Self.) It may be urged that worldly pleasure, mingled as it is with all kinds of pain, certainly cannot be accepted as the aim of man. This objection is to be set aside, because no other resource (than this sorrow-mingled pleasure) is open to man: nor does the fear of beggars deter one from putting the cooking pot on the fire. But (you say) pain comes. Away with it then! But pleasure is indeed the aim of man. Why then for the sake of a knowledge of the Self are injunctions as to *hearing* &c. prescribed in the Veda? Simply to bring pain to end.

To the view thus laid down, viz, Self is not the aim of

१६ आत्मा सर्ववस्तूनां यदर्थं सकलं जगत् ।

आनन्दादिभिः स्वतन्त्रोऽसावनादेयः कथं वद ॥ २६ ॥

यदव्यक्तस्तु सत्सर्वं यदुमेदे नरशृङ्गवत् ।

सत्ता सर्वपदार्थानामनादेयः कथं वद ॥ २७ ॥

यद्वशे प्राणिनः सर्वे ब्रह्माद्याः कृमयस्तथा ।

ईशानः सर्ववस्तूनामनादेयः कथं भवेत् ॥ २८ ॥

यच्चक्षुः सर्वभूतानां मनसो यन्मनो विदुः ।

यज्ज्योतिर्ज्योतिषां देवो नोपादेयः कथं विभुः ॥ २९ ॥

मोदप्रमोदपक्षाभ्यामानन्दात्मा तमो गतः ।

जीवयत्यखिलान् लोकाननादेयः स्वयं कुतः ॥ ३० ॥

16 That which is the Self of all things ; for the sake of which the whole world is , that ocean of bliss, independent of aught else ;—pray declare how this Self is to be rejected as the aim of man.....XXVI.

How is that to be rejected which is the Existence of all things ; that from which all that is regarded as distinct is sheer non-entity like the horns of a man ?XXVII.

How is that to be rejected under whose control are all living things from Brahmā down to insects ; the ruler of all things ?.....XXVIII.

How is that to be rejected which the wise know to be the eye of all things , the mind of the mind, the light of lights, the bright, pervading one ?XXIX.

How is that to be rejected, the Self which is Bliss, which, when it has gone to darkness on its two wings of joy* and great joy, gives life to all the worlds ?.....XXX.

यस्यानन्दसमुद्रस्य लेशमात्रं जगद्गतम् ।

प्रसृतं ब्रह्मलोकादौ सुखादिभ्यं कः परित्यजेत् ॥ ३१ ॥

हैरण्यगर्भसैश्वर्यं यस्मिन्दृष्टे नृणायते ।

सीमा सर्वपुमर्थानामपुमर्थः कथं भवेत् ॥ ३२ ॥

यत्कामा ब्रह्मचर्यन्त इन्द्राद्याः प्राप्सुरपदः ।

एवस्वभोगं त्यज्यन्त्येष न पुमर्थः कथं नृणाम् ॥ ३३ ॥

यद्विद्वत्ताफलाः सर्वा वैदिक्यो विविधाः क्रियाः ।

यागाद्या विहितास्तस्मिन्नुपेक्षा वद ते कथम् ॥ ३४ ॥

That ocean of Bliss of which only a small portion belongs to this world ; that sea of pleasure which pervades the world of Brahmā and the rest, who would reject..... XXXI.

That which being known, the majesty of Hiranyagarbha is estimated as nothing , * how can that which is the utmost limit of all human aims be not the aim of man ?..... XXXII.

How can that not be the aim of men through desire for which Indra and the others†, happy as they were, entered on pupilage and abandoned each his own sphere of happiness ?..... XXXIII.

All the various actions, sc. sacrifices &c., prescribed in the Veda, have as their result the desire to know that Self (yat)‡ pray then declare how you can reject that Self XXXIV.

* of Taill. Up. II, 3. 4. and Max Muller's note, *in loco*.

† cf. Chānd. Up. VIII, 7 et. seq.

‡ The true aim of Vedic sacrifice is not the securing of a transient Paradise (svarga) for the sacrificer, but that purification of his mind whereby he may gain intuition of Self which is Bliss eternal. Paradise is but the half-way house, as it were to reach which he engages a sacrifice who knows not this highest truth

यद्दृष्टिमात्रतः सर्वाः काभाद्या दुःखमूलाः ।

विनश्यन्ति जणेनासाधुपादेयः कथं न ते ॥ ३१ ॥

आह्लादरूपता यस्य सुषुप्ते सर्वसाक्षिकी ।

तत्रोपेक्षा भवेद्यस्य तदन्यः स्यात्पशुः कथम् ॥ ३२ ॥

मत्पमितरानुपखर्जनतत्पमुपादेयत्वं तच्छात्मन्यैव विश्रान्तं
सुखदुःखाभाद्येऽपि तदर्थत्वादित्यथा परसुखदुःखान्नाशयेऽप्युपा-
देयता स्यात् तस्मादात्मैव परमपुरुषार्थः सुखदुःखाभावात्मक-
त्वाच्च । न च भावरूपस्यत्मनो दुःखाभावात्मकत्वानुपपत्तिः ।

How can that not be your aim by the mere knowledge
of which all desires &c, the causes of pain, perish ins-
tantly ?..... XXXV.

Is he not a beast who rejects that Self which as Bliss is
vouched for by all living beings in the state of dreamless
sleep ? ... XXXVI.

Grant then (as the opponent holds) that fitness to be

His objections met in detail :
which is absolute Bliss, remains as
the highest aim of man,

accepted as the aim of man con-
sists in the thing being indepen-
dent of aught else. But this

independence abides only in the Self ; for pleasure and the
absence of pain are for the 'sake of Self (tat). If this were
not so, one might accept as one's aims the pleasure and abse-
nce of pain pertaining to another. Hence Self is the highest
aim of man ; and further, because Self is pleasure and the
absence of pain. Nor can it be urged against our view that
Self as a *positive* entity cannot be the *negation* of pain,

अवेद्यं दोषो यद्यात्मनि दुःखं पारमार्थिकं स्यात् न त्वेवमस्ति
किं तु अज्ञानकणिकणासमुद्भूतदेहाद्यभिमानविषदं द्वायवर्तिरा-
गादिलक्षणहालाहलविषज्वालाप्रतिबद्धस्वात्मदृष्टिः सवितरि
तमोवज्जिदुःखेपि स्वात्मनि शौरदाद्यनेकभेदमिन्ननरकसमुदायस-
मुद्भूतदुःखौघमारोपयत्येव केवलम् । आरोपितस्य चात्मावो
नाविष्टानादतिरिच्यते अधिष्ठानादभेदेनैवारोपितत्वाद्भेदेन च
तस्यासत्त्वात् असन्निधेयस्य च सत्त्वात् । तस्माद् दुः
खात्माव एव परमपुरुषार्थ इति यो मन्यते तस्याप्यात्मैव
परमपुरुषार्थः तस्याशेषसंसारदुःखनिवृत्तिरूपत्वात् । असाध्य-

This would be a weak point in our position, if to Self pain pertained as something absolutely real : but such is not the case. But the man whose vision of Self has been overcome by the heat of that deadly poison sc. his passions, lurking in that poison-fang, sc. the false consciousness of his body, sense-organs &c. (as identical with Self)—which issues from the hood of that serpent Nescience ;—such a man merely surmises in the Self, to which in reality no pain belongs, all those pain belongs, all which issue from the various hells, raurava and the rest ; just as one might surmise darkness in the sun. And the negation of a falsely surmised thing is no other than the substrate itself (in which that thing was falsely surmised, for only as identical with the substrate was it surmised ; and because, as distinct from the substrate, it is non-entity ; and because the negation of non-entity is entity. Hence even the thinker who holds that the cessation of pain is the only aim of man has the Self indeed as his highest aim ; because Self (tasya) is the cessation of all this world of pain.

तथादात्मनोऽपुरुषार्थत्वमिति चेत् न । साध्यत्वेन पुरुषार्थत्वस्य निरस्तत्वात् । स्वतःसिद्धदुःखाभावमेद्दिश्य मुमुक्षुप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिरिति चेत् न । ब्रह्मात्मसाक्षात्कारानन्तरं प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेरिहत्वात् । तत्फलस्य जातत्वात् । पूर्वं त्वशेषदुःखाभावरूपब्रह्मात्मसाक्षात्कारेणैव सफलत्वात् । ज्ञानमपि न साध्यं वृत्तेरारोपितत्वात् चैतन्यस्यात्मत्वादिति चेन्न अस्य परामर्शस्य ज्ञानोत्तरकाशीनत्वात् ।

Nor can it be argued that Self, inasmuch as it is not something that can be brought about as a result, cannot be the aim of man ; for it has been disproved* that a human aim consists in something to be brought as a result. Nor can it be argued that the aspirant to emancipation would not engage (in *hearing* and the other prescribed means), if he were to have in view the absence of pain (so, the Self) which is self-established (i. e. already exists independent of his efforts). For it accords with our view that activity (on the part of the aspirant) should be impossible after he has gained intuition of Self as identical with Brahman : because the result of his activity (*tat*) has been brought about ; whereas, previous to this, his activity is fruitful only through his intuition of Self as identical with Brahman, which is the cessation of all pain. Nor is it to be urged that knowledge also is not something to be brought about as a result, because the mental modification (*vritti*, which is supposed to give rise to the intuition) is something falsely imagined, and because knowledge (*chaitanya*, Brahman) is the Self. For this judgment (as to the falsity of mental activity) is subsequent to the rise of (perfect) knowledge (so, the intuition of the identity of Brahman and the Self).

* निरस्तत्वाद्वाध्यकारणेति शेषः । Gloss. cf. Ved. Sn. 1 1 4 Bhashya in loco.

दुःखाभावापि न कैवलः पुरुषार्थः दृष्टदुःखेपि दिष्ये भोग्य-
 सुखतोभेन प्रवृत्तिदर्शनादिति चेन्न आत्मन एव परमानन्दरूपत्वेन
 सुखस्यापि सत्त्वात् । न चान्न विप्रतिपत्तिः परमप्रेमरूपदत्त्वेन
 सुखरूपत्वस्य सिद्धत्वात् असुखात्मनि प्रेमादर्शनात् । न च
 सुखस्य जन्यत्वात् जन्याजन्ययोर्रात्मसुखयोरभेदानुपपत्तिः जन्य-
 त्वासिद्धेः । न च सुखं मे जातमिति प्रतीत्या तत्सिद्धिः शुभादृ-
 ष्टवशादात्मस्वरूपसुखानिव्यञ्जनयोग्यान्तःकरणवृत्त्युदयेनान्यथा-
 सिद्धेः । न चाऽहं सुखमिति प्रतीत्यापत्तिः विद्वांसं प्रतीक्षापाद-
 नात् । अविदुषस्त्वध्यस्ताहङ्कारदेहादेवात्माभिमानात् तत्र
 चात्मन सपसर्जनतयैव स्फुरणात् ।

Nor is it to be argued that the absence of pain is not
 alone the aim of man, because, as a matter of fact, through
 the greed for pleasure to be enjoyed, activity follows in regard
 to an obviously painful object. For the Self in its charac-
 ter of the highest Bliss is pleasure also. Nor is there any
 contradiction here, for we have proved that Self, as the
 object of the highest love, is pleasure (cf p. 10), since love
 for a Self which is not pleasure is unknown. And it must
 not be urged that because pleasure is something produced,
 the identity of a product (sc. pleasure) and a non-product
 (sc. Self) is impossible : for it has not been proved that
 pleasure is a product. And it cannot be urged that the
 consciousness 'pleasure has been *produced* for me' is a proof
 of this ; for the above consciousness was brought about in
 another way, sc. through the rise of a mental modification
 capable of manifesting (i. e., removing the veil of Nescience
 from) pleasure which is the Self,—(and this was possible)
 through the merit acquired by the individual in his former
 lives. Nor is it to be argued that (if Self and pleasure are
 identical) our consciousness should take the form ' I am
 pleasure. ' For, as against him who knows the truth, this
 is merely to affirm what he himself maintains ; but such
 consciousness does not accrue to him who knows not the
 truth, because he falsely identifies the Self with his body and
 with his consciousness of ' I ' (ahamkāra), which again have
 been falsely surmised (in the Self) : and because in his case
 the Self appears in consciousness (sc. I am happy) as
 subordinate to his body and ahamkāra (tatra)

अत एव ज्ञानसुखादिगुण आत्मेति तार्किका श्रान्ताः ।
 न च दुःखेपीयं गतिः उमा दुःखस्य सुषुप्त्यादौ व्यभिचारित्वे-
 नात्मस्वरूपत्वानुपपत्तेः । प्रमाणाभावाच्च सुखात्मकत्वग्राहक-
 श्रुतिविरोधाच्च । तथा आत्मतत्त्वमेव परमपुरुषार्थताप्रयोजकं ।
 न च लोकोत्तरत्वोपालम्भः महानुभावैरेव व्यासवशिष्ठादिभिर्म-
 ह्वाराजैश्च ऋषसादिभिरैहिकानुष्ठानकसकलसुखतत्त्वाधनस्यात्म-
 लिप्सयैवोपेक्षितत्वात् । न च बहूनुग्रहो न्यायः देहात्मानिमाने
 तदभावात् । न च सुखरूपत्वे अप्यात्मनः स्वसम्बन्धिसुखाभावाद-
 पुरुषार्थत्वं सम्बन्धस्यात्माऽभेदाद्विश्यकत्वात् ।

Hence also the Naiyāyikas are deluded who hold that the Self has knowledge, pleasure &c. as attributes. Nor can it be said that the line of argument (adopted above in regard to pleasure) will hold equally well in regard to pain. For since pain is absent from the states of dreamless sleep &c., it cannot be the Self (which is all pervasive) : and because there is no evidence (to support the argument advanced in regard to pain) ; and because Śruti, declaratory of pleasure as the Self, contradicts this position. Accordingly, our view is that Self-hood alone constitutes the highest aim of man. Nor can the reproach that our position transcends human experience find place ; for mighty rishis like Vyāsa and Vasishṭha and mahārājas like Rishabha, through a desire to obtain Self, put aside all pleasure, here and hereafter, together with the means of obtaining such. Nor can the maxim that compliance with the majority is right apply here (to exclude the few like Vyāsa and the rest) ; for this maxim does not hold (even the opponent will admit) in regard to the false identification of the Self with the body (by the ignorant majority).

Nor can it be argued that even if the Self is pleasure, it cannot be the aim of man, on the ground that there is no such thing as pleasure in relation with itself (sc. pleasure viewed as Self). For the relation desired (uddēśyakatvāt), is that of identity of Self (with pleasure).

सुखं ह्यत्यन्तमुपादेयं कथं मे प्रियतमे आत्मन्यभेदेन प्रवि-
शेदिति कामयमानो भेदभ्रमस्य प्राबल्यवादभेदं कर्तुमशक्नुवानः
सम्बन्धमात्रेण संतुष्टयति । न च सम्बन्धः स्वतः पुरुषार्थः सुखदुः-
खाभावेतरत्वात् । यत्तु सुखस्य सुखं न पुरुषार्थ इति तस्य सुखे
अनात्मत्वादीपनिबन्धनत्वात्* । न च कुष्ठाद्युपहतानां मरण-
नुपपत्तिः तत एवात्मनः सुखरूपत्वसिद्धेः । ते हि परमप्रियतमे
आत्मनि दुःखकारणं देह इति समुपेक्षन्ते न त्वात्मानम् । पार-
लौकिके सुखे कामनादर्शनात् । एतेन काम्यतीर्थादौ मरणं व्या-
ख्यातम् । मरणस्यापि देहपरित्यागरूपत्वात् ।

For pleasure is accepted as an absolute aim. 'How may pleasure enter into the relation of identity with my be-
loved Self'—the man, who thus desires and is unable to id-
entify Self with pleasure because his mistaken notion (of
Self and pleasure being distinct) prevails, is content to de-
sire merely the relation (between Self and pleasure). Nor
can it be said that this relation is in itself the aim of man,
for it is something other than pleasure and the absence of pain
(which alone the opponent regards as the aims of man).
But as regards the opponent's statement that pleasure can-
not be the aim of pleasure, that was due to his falsely sur-
mising that pleasure is not Self. Nor can it be urged that
(on the view of Self and pleasure being identical) lepers
and others would not choose death, since the very fact of
this choice proved that Self is pleasure ; for, thinking that
the body is the cause of pain to the beloved Self these men
set at nought the body and not the Self :—(they do not
disregard the Self) as is proved by the fact that they do
desire pleasure in the world to come. For this reason death
at one or other of the favourite tīrthas is praised (in the
Sāstras), since death too is an abandonment of the body.

आत्मन एव पुरुषार्थत्वे मुक्तसंसारिणोरविशेषोपतिरिति चेत् न ज्ञानाज्ञानाभ्यां विशेषात् । अज्ञानी हि भ्रान्तः कर्ता भोक्ता संसारी जरामरणधर्मा इत्येवमात्मानं जानाति विद्वांस्तु तद्विरुद्धाकर्त्रभोक्तसंसारिजरामरणजन्मादिशून्यस्वप्रकाशसच्चिदा-मन्दपरिपूर्णस्वभावाशनायाद्यतीताश्चूळान्गुनेतिनेतिसत्यज्ञाना-दिलक्षणसर्वजगदधिष्ठानभूतमात्मानमागमाचार्यस्थानुसवैकवाक्य-तया साक्षात्कृत्याशेषदुःखनिदानमज्ञानं तत्कार्यं च बाधित्वा देशकालवस्तुपरिच्छेदशून्यपरिपूर्णानन्दविग्रहः स्वमहिम्ना प्रति-ष्ठितः परमपुरुषार्थो भवति । न च ततः परं कामयितव्यमस्ति सर्वेषां कामानामात्मप्राप्तिर्हीनत्वात् ।

Nor can it be urged that if Self is the sole aim of man, it follows that there is no difference between an emancipated soul and one that is still in the bonds of transmigration. For there is a difference between them due to their knowledge and ignorance respectively. For the ignorant one being deceived, regards his Self as agent and enjoyer, as in the bonds of transmigration and subject to decay and death. But he who has knowledge, when he has done away with Nescience as false, the cause of all pain, and its products, on gaining intuition of the Self through the unanimity of the Vedas, of his teacher and his own experience—the Self which is the substrate of the whole world, which, per contra, is neither agent, nor enjoyer, nor bound in transmigratory ponds ; nor subject to birth, decay and death ; (but which) is self-luminous Existence, Intelligence Bliss, absolute in its own nature, described (in Sruti) as beyond hunger &c ; as neither great nor small ; as *not this, not this* ; as Existence, Intelligence &c.,—then this one who has knowledge becomes the highest aim of man (*sc.* the Self), established in his greatness, the absolute Bliss, unlimited as to space, time and substance.

Nor beyond this is aught to be desired, for all desires find their goal in the attainment of Self

१७ नन्वात्मसाक्षात्कारः श्रुतिजन्यः कथं स्यात् इन्द्रिय-
जन्यस्यैव ज्ञानस्य साक्षात्कारत्वात् शब्दस्य च परोक्षज्ञानजनक-
त्वस्वाभाव्यात् । न चापरोक्षे आत्मनि शब्दस्याप्यपरोक्षज्ञानज-
नकत्वमेव युक्तमिति साम्प्रतम् । करणस्वभावस्यान्यथाकर्तुमशक्य-
त्वात् अपरोक्षयोग्येऽपि बहून्यादौ शब्दादिना परोक्षज्ञानस्यैव
जननाच्च । न च परोक्षमपि ज्ञानमभ्यस्यमानमपरोक्षं भवतीति
युक्तम् अनुमित्यादौ तथा ऽदर्शनात् उत्तरोत्तरज्ञानस्यापि शब्द-
त्वाविशेषात् । न च नास्त्वपरोक्षज्ञानम् अपरोक्षमस्याज्ञान-
तत्कार्यस्यानुच्छेदसङ्गात् । तस्मान्नास्त्येवात्मन्यपरोक्षज्ञानम् ।

17. An objection : How can intuition of Self be effected

Objections :—(a) Veda can effect through Śruti, for only to know-
only *mediate* knowledge of self : ledge effected through a sense-
organ does intuitional character belong ; and because it is the
nature of verbal communication (śabda) to bring about non-
intuitional (mediate) knowledge. Nor is it correct to say that
the power to bring about intuition of the Self, which is self
presented, justly belongs to verbal communication also. For
the nature of an instrument of knowledge cannot be chan-
ged, and because through verbal communication (and infer-
ence &c.), only a mediate knowledge of fire and like objects
is effected, though these are fit objects for immediate know-
ledge. Nor is it right to hold that mediate knowledge also,
when repeated, becomes immediate ; for such is not obser-
ved in regard to inferential knowledge, &c, since verbal
character belongs equally to each succeeding cognition. Nor
may an opponent reply,—Well then, away with intuition of
Self ! For (if there be no such thing as intuition) it will
follow that there can be no destruction of Nescience and
its products which are forms of *intuitional* error, (since
intuitional error can be removed only by *intuitional* right
knowledge). Hence (concludes the opponent of p. 66)
there is no intuitional knowledge of the Self.

अत्र वदन्ति । अथणाद्यभ्यासजनितशब्दज्ञानसमुद्भूतभाव-
नाप्रचयसुखिवमन्तःकरणमेवात्मसाक्षात्कारे करणं न च साधना-
धीनसाक्षात्कारस्य स्रुतपुत्रसाक्षात्कारवदप्रानाण्यम् । शब्दप्रमा-
णमूलत्वेन विश्वासात् । न च यतो वाचो निवर्त्तन्ते अप्राप्य
मनसा सहेति विरोधः आगमगम्यत्वे ऽपि तुल्यत्वात् तस्य
वाक्यस्य लौकिकशब्दवैदिकसंस्कारासंस्कृतमनोग्राह्यत्वनिषेधपर-
त्वात् ।

With regard to this point some (Vedāntins)* maintain

(b) Veda plus mind necessary for that the instrumental cause of
immediate knowledge of Self. intuition of the Self is indeed
the internal organ, assisted by the store of mental impres-
sions springing from *verbal* knowledge (*sc.* knowledge
through *Śruti*) which knowledge was effected through cons-
tant practice of *hearing* and the other prescribed means.
Nor is it to be argued that intuition which is dependent
on (a store of) mental impressions is untrustworthy, as is
the intuition of one's dead son (—such is the force of these
mental impressions that the father *seems* to see
his dead son before his eyes—). For trust is to
be placed in this intuition of the Self, since it based
on the Veda as its authority (*śabdapramāṇa*). Nor
can it be urged that this view is contradicted by the pas-
sage—'from which (Brahman)
speech, with the mind, turns away unable to reach it.'
For even if it be held that Self is made known by the Veda,
the same contradiction will result (in regard to the above
passage, where *speech* is said to turn away from Brahman).
And there is no contradiction) because the above passage is
intended to deny that the Self can be made known by *human*
utterance, and by a mind unpurified by Vedic purifications
(*sc.* hearing, pondering, &c the Veda-word).

* The view of Vāchaspati Mīra cf. Bhāmati pp 86, 114.

तन्न । आगमस्यैवात्मन्यपरोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वात् तं त्वौपनि-
षदं पुरुषं पृच्छामीति श्रुत्वावात्मन्येवौपनिषदत्वविशेषणश्रवणात् ।
तच्चचेतराविषयत्वे सति तन्मात्रविषयत्वे समञ्जनम् अन्यथा
प्रमाणान्तराव्यावर्तकत्वे विशेषणवैयर्थ्यात् । लौकिकस्यापि
वाक्यस्य दशमस्त्वमसीत्यादेरात्मन्यपरोक्षज्ञानजनकत्वस्यैव दूष-
त्वात् । प्रमाणस्वभावहानिः स्यादिति चेन्न । प्रमेयानुसारित्वात्
प्रमाणस्वभावस्य प्रमेयस्य च नित्यापरोक्षत्वात् ।

The above view must be rejected ; for the Veda alone brings about intuitional knowledge of the Self, since in the passage

Met It is the character of the object to be known (prameya) that determines the character of the instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa), and not *vice versa*. Self (Brahman) being an eternally self-presented entity, all knowledge of it must be *immediate*, and such knowledge of it the Veda can afford, if the sentences be taken in their *implied* and not in their *literal* sense.

Self, while it is not made known through any source but the Upanishads (itarāvishayātve) is made known through them alone ; otherwise the qualification is unnecessary, if it does not exclude other sources of evidence for the Self. (And) because it is a fact of experience that human utterance too, so Thou art the tenth man, &c.* does indeed bring about intuition of one's Self (when this is regarded as dwelling within one's body.)

Nor is it to be argued that (as a consequence of our view) the special character of the pramāṇa would be lost (so. in bringing about intuition, the śabdapramāṇa would cease to be what it is and would become pratyakshapramāṇa) : for the character of a pramāṇa depends on the object to be known† ; and the Self, the object in this case, is eternally (self-presented).

* cf. Panchadasi. Pandit Vol. VIII. p. 589

† cf. Ved. par. h. Pandit Vol. VII pp. 467 et seq.

न च ज्ञानगतो धर्मो ऽपरोक्षत्वं यत्साक्षादपरोक्षः ब्रह्माय-
नात्मा सर्वान्तर इत्यात्मनोऽप्यपरोक्षत्वश्रवणात् । किं तदपरो-
क्षत्वमिति चेत् वस्तुतः प्रमात्रव्यवहितत्वमेव । तच्च प्रमातरि
विश्रान्तं यावद्यावत्प्रमातुर्विप्रकृत्यते सावत्तावत्परोक्षत्वात्कर्षद-
र्शनात् तथा चापरोक्षस्वभावे आत्मनि परोक्षज्ञानं जनयन्वेदो
भ्रान्तिमेव जनयेत् अन्यथास्थितस्यान्यथाबोधनात् । मोक्ष-
साधनीभूतस्य चात्मसाक्षात्कारस्य मनोजन्यत्वे व्यभिचारिक-
सृजन्यतया ऽप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गः ।

Nor is it to be urged that intuitional character is an attribute only of the cognition (and not of the thing cognised) ; for intuitional character is declared of the Self also
Brihad. Up. III. 4. 1. in the passage—' the immediately presented, the positively presented Brahman, the Self which is within all '

What then, it may be asked, is this immediacy (or intuitional character of the object)? It consists in the object cognised not being really divided off from the cogniser, (i. e. the object is *directly* cognised, without the intervention of any second cognition) And this *not being divided off from the cogniser*, has its end in the cogniser* ; for it is a common fact that the farther the object cognised is removed from the cogniser, the more is its mediate (non-intuitional) character increased. And thus, if the Veda gives rise to mediate knowledge of the Self , which is by nature immediately presented, it gives rise to error, for it makes known a thing as other than it is (sc. the Veda, on this supposition, declares as mediately known the Self, which is really immediately known). And if intuition of Self, which is the means to final emancipation, is effected through the mind, its untrustworthiness follows, since it is effected through an instrument which does not always attend (vyabhichāri) right knowledge (sc. the mind is sometimes the instrument of error).

* J vs the cognise and Brahman the cognised become one of Ved pa ubh
Pandit Vol IV pp 306 et seq.

न च वेदसूक्ततया मानाद्यम् अपरोक्षतया वेदेनानवबोध-
नात् बाह्यनमभातीतत्वश्रुतिव्याप्तिपाचय । न च लौकिकविषयत्वं
मुख्ये बाधकाभावात् । न च श्रुतिविषयत्वे ऽपि समानो दोषो
लक्षयैव तद्बोधनात् ॥

१८ ननु तत्त्वतयादिवाक्ये लक्षयैव न युक्ता भागलक्षण्या
रुक्देशपरिग्रहे अनुपार्यपरित्याग प्रसङ्गात् ।

Nor can its trustworthiness be urged on the ground that it is based on Veda; for (your contention is that) the Veda does not furnish intuitive (but only mediate) knowledge of the Self. And because your view (that mind is the organ of intuition of the Self) contradicts the Śruti passage, which declares that Self is beyond speech and mind. Nor can you urge that this passage refers to a worldly mind (unpurified by *hearing* &c.), for there is no reason why the primary meaning of the passage should be rejected. Nor can you urge that even if the view that Self is made known by Veda be adopted, the same fault will apply, so that of contradiction in regard to the above Śruti passage. For (we hold that) Self (tat) is made known through the relation technically termed *implication* (*lakṣhanā*)

18. Here it may be objected that *implication* does not

* Objections :—(a) to take the mahāvākya 'that thou art' in an implied sense is to surrender the paramount authority of Veda to that of perception, inference and the other pramāṇas. apply to such sentences as 'that thou art'; for if a part of the meaning of the words be accepted through what is technically termed *bhūgalakṣhanā* (where-

by a part of the meaning is abandoned and a part retained*), the abandonment of what is directly enounced in Ś u i f o vs as a consequence

न च पदयोरैकविभक्त्यन्तनिर्दिष्टयोः सामानाधिकरण्यपरा-
मर्शानन्तरं पदार्थयोरभेदे वाक्यार्थस्तावत्प्रतीयते स च विरुद्ध-
स्वभावयोः संसार्यसंसारिणोर्जीवपरमात्मनोर्न संभवतीति मुख्या-
र्थानुपपत्त्या लक्षणा युक्तेति साम्प्रतं श्रुतिसिद्धे अनुपपत्त्यभावात् ।
न । च विरुद्धस्वभावयोर्भेदग्राहिसामान्यतरविरोधेनाविरुद्धयोर-
शयोरभेदे बोध्यतइति वाच्यम् । श्रुतिविरोधेन भेदग्राहिप्रसा-
णस्यैवाप्रामाण्यमात् अन्यथा लक्षणाया उपपत्त्यद्वितीयप्रत्यया-
त्मबोधनं न स्यात्सकलभेदग्राहिप्रत्यक्षादिविरोधात् ॥

Nor can it be urged against this view that as soon as it is observed that two words standing with the same case-affix refer to a common subject, the identity of the things denoted by the two words—which identity is the meaning of the whole sentence—is perceived; and since this identity is impossible in the case of *jīva* and *Paramātmān*, two things with opposed attributes, *sc. jīva* is the transmigrating Self, and *Paramātmān* is the non-transmigrating Self, the primary (or direct) meaning (of such sentence s) becomes impossible, and therefore *implication* may rightly apply to them. For impossibility (contradiction) cannot hold in regard to the meaning (or thing) established in a *Śruti* passage (*sc. that must be when Śruti declares*)

Nor can it be argued that the identity of the two non-opposed parts (of *that* and *thou*, *sc. pure Intelligence*) is made known (by *Śruti*) by reason of the contradiction resulting from the exercise of the other sources of evidence (perception) inference &c which declare a difference between the two naturally distinct things (*sc. jīva* and *Brahman*) For the source of evidence which declares for a difference is itself untrue worthy as being in opposition to *Śruti*. Other-
wise (*sc. if perception, inference, &c. are not to be set aside by Śruti*) a knowledge of the impartite, One without a second, the Self within all things, could not result from *Śruti* even by implication, as being contradicted by perception inference &c. which make known difference (duality) in all its forms*.

* *Bheda* commonly divided into *saṁdhiya*, *vidhiya* and *avagata*, for which terms *L. Panchadāś* *Pāṇḍ* : *Vo* *V* *I* *66*

किं च वेदान्ते तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यमेव प्रधानमितरत्त्वसर्वं तदु-
पकरणमेव तथा च प्रधानवाक्ये एव कथं लक्षणा तत्रासुपवेतार्य-
त्वेनेतरत्रैव सा युक्ता । गुणे त्वस्याद्यकल्पनेति न्यायात् । अत्र
के वित् । तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्ये लक्षणेन तावन्नाङ्गीक्रियते । न च
विरुद्धयोर्जीवपरमात्मनोः साधनाधिकरणानुपपत्तिः रज्जुवर्ष-
योरिव एकस्य बाधेनापि तदुपपत्तेः । न चानयोर्मध्ये कस्य बाध
इति विनिगमकाभावे यदि परमात्मन एव बाधमाशङ्क्येन तदा शा-
स्त्रनपुरुषार्थे जीवे पर्यवसितमिति न प्रमाणं स्यादिति वाच्यम् ।

Moreover, in the Vedānta, such sentences as 'that thou art' &c. are *primary* to which all others are merely *ancillary*. And so, implication cannot apply to a primary sentence; it applies only to secondary sentences (*itaraiva*), since these do not have their objects in constant connexion with the primary sentences (*tatra*); according to the maxim that 'the assumption of an irregularity (such as that of putting aside the *literal* for an *implied* meaning) is to be made only in regard to a secondary sentence.

In regard to this some teachers hold that in a sentence

(a) implication unnecessary; for by the method termed *bedhas nirvadhātānya*, i. e. by the recognition of jīva or personal sentences as false, the identity enounced in the mahāvākya may be recognised. (The opponent states this view only to reject it, with him jīva is real, cf pp 9-15 *supra*).

such as 'that thou art' im-
plication is not admitted.
Nor can it be argued that
(according to their view)
the relation of identity (se-
that of referring to one
and the same substrate) cannot attach to jīva and
Paramātmā opposed as they are. For this relation is
possible when one of the two things has been proved false,
as in the case of the rope and the snake mistaken for
it. Nor is it to be objected that since in answer to the
question,—Which of the two, jīva or Paramātmā, is to
be rejected as false?—no compelling reason for the adop-
tion of one or other alternative is forthcoming, one might
urge that the Paramātmā should be rejected as false, in
which case S'uti (Sāstā) would terminate with (teaching
the reality of) jīva which is not the aim of man and would
therefore cease to be a source of nitya knowledge.

न च । ब्रह्मसोक्तयोर्वैयधिकरणयापत्तेः सोक्तार्थिप्रवृत्तपनुपपत्तेश्च
न ह्यन्यस्य सोक्तार्थमन्यो यतते न वा स्वभावात् पुरुषार्थः । न
च दुःखनिवृत्त्या दुःखाभाव एव पुरुषार्थः । कस्यायं पुरुषार्थः
स्यात् स्वस्यैव बाधितत्वात् । न च जीवात्मा असत्यः अनेन
जीवेनात्मनेति सत्येन परमात्मना अमेदश्रवणात् नान्येतोऽस्ति
द्रष्टेत्यादिना भेदप्रतिषेधाच्च । न च स्वतोऽनंभारिस्वभावस्य
परमात्मनः समारिस्वभावजीवात्मनस्तानुपपत्ति अविद्यद्युपाधिस
म्बन्धाच्च सोनीलिसवदुपपत्तेः ।

But the above view (say others) is to be rejected , for
from it follows that bondage and emancipation do not refer
to the same individual (so the *bonded* one is the unreal jīva the
emancipated one is Brahman) also that striving after eman-
cipation on the part of an aspirant is impossible ; for none
strives after the emancipation of another, nor can his own
destruction be the aim of man . Nor can it be urged that
because there is an end to pain (when one is destroyed), the
absence of pain is indeed the aim of man . For to whom
can this be an aim, since the man himself (or jīva) is
(by supposition) set aside as false ?

And jīva is not unreal, for its identity with the real
Self (the Highest Self) is declared in the passage, ' let me
Chand Up. VI. 3 2. enter with this living Self
(jīva)'

And because a difference between them is denied in
Brahm Up. III. 7. 23 the passage, ' there is no other seer
but that one ' ;

Nor may it be objected that to the Highest Self, which
is by nature beyond the bonds of transmigration, cannot
pertain the character of jīva, which is by nature subject to
those bonds . For this is possible through the connexion
(of the Paramātman) with certain adjuncts such as Nesci-
ence &c, just as dark colour is falsely ascribed to ether

न च रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो भूवेति वाक्यादाभावरूपत्वं जीवस्येति वाक्यं तत्र हि तत्तन्मनुष्यत्वाद्याक्रान्ततत्तच्छरीरसादृश्यस्यैव प्रतिरूपपदेन विवक्षितत्वात् । नपतु वा प्रतिबिम्ब-
स्तथापि नासत्यः प्रत्यभिज्ञानेन बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बयोरभेदप्रहास्य
कथं तर्हि भेदव्यवहारः । एकस्मिन्नेव स्वरूपे सर्वकल्पनारहिते
सुखचन्द्रादौ बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बस्वरूपमिति त्रिविधव्यवहारस्यो-
च्यनुप्रविष्टत्वारोपानन्तरं दर्शनात् । तस्मात्तत्त्वमस्यादिप्रकृत-
बाधायां खानानाधिकरणमिति कल्पना वेदवाक्या न न्याय्यम् ।
अतो लक्षणया परिपूर्णवृत्तिचिदानन्दप्रत्यगात्मावबोधनसु
पपन्नमिति ।

Nor from the passage, 'He (*Īśvara*) became like unto every form,' can it be maintained that *jīva* is a reflexion ; for by the word *pratibūpa* is meant only the likeness (of the Self) to all bodies whatever, as possessing all attributes human and the rest. Or granting that *jīva* is a reflexion it is still not unreal ; for the identity of the reflected object and the reflexion is recognised (and the reflected object is real). How then, it may be asked, does the consciousness of these as different arise ? The reply is that in regard to the own nature of a thing (*svarūpa*) which is real, pure and without any attributes, (cf p 64) e. g. a human face or the moon, a three-fold consciousness of reflected object, reflexion and own nature of the thing is observed to arise after a connexion between the own nature of the thing and certain limiting adjuncts has been imagined. Hence the hypothesis, that in regard to such sentences as 'that thou art' community of reference (i. e. identity of *that* and *thou*) obtains after one or other of the two has been rejected as false is beyond the tenor of the Veda and irregular (for, as shown above, both *Paramātmān* and *jīva* are real).

Hence it has not been proved that knowledge of the Self, the absolute Existence, Intelligence Brahman is from such sentences through implication.

६६ अमीउरले ।

विरुद्धोपरभेदो हि न वेदेन प्रसीयते ।

अमन्यगतिकत्वेन सानान्तरस्य बाधनम् ॥ ३९ ॥

यदप्रोक्तं सुखयर्थानुपपत्त्यभावात् छल्लेति तत्र विरुद्धो-
परभेदः क्वचित्प्रमाणेन दूष्यते न च सानान्तरस्य वेदेन बाधित-
त्वानुपपत्तिः न हि बाधकसिद्धेय बाध्यते किं तु स्वविषयसि-
द्धान्त्ययानुपपत्त्या ।

19 To this it is replied :—

The identity of two opposed things is not indeed made known by the Veda. The rejection of the other sources of evidence (so, perception, inference) takes place, when no other course is possible (than that of their rejection in favour of Veda)...XXXVII.

What was said in regard to this point, viz. that since

Reply - the authority of percep- there is no impossibility (con-
tion, inference, &c., must be mainta- tradiction) attaching to the
ined so long as these can be recon- contradiction) attaching to the
ciled with Veda this is possible by primary meaning, implication
taking the *implied* meaning of Veda. will not apply (to such senten-
ces as ' that thou art '), cannot be accepted. For the identity
of the two opposed things, viz. jīva and Paramātman is
overthrown by a trustworthy source of evidence, since no
genuine source of evidence makes known the identity of two
opposed things. Nor can it be argued that there is no im-
possibility (in regard to the primary meaning), since the
Veda overthrows all the other sources of evidence. For a
thing (so, cognition) is not rejected as false merely by saying,
it must be rejected, but it is rejected because in no other
way can the establishing of its object (so that which it makes
known) be saved from contradiction

इह तु वृत्त्यन्तरेणापि तदुपपत्तेर्लक्ष्यार्थे ऽनुपपत्तिरेव अन्यथा
 सर्वत्र लक्षणोच्छेदमशङ्कः । लोकेपि निश्चितमाभास्ये एव लक्षणा ।
 तथा च तादृशवाक्यधारेण विरोधिमानान्तरस्य धारितत्वा
 दनुपपत्त्यभावात् लक्षणा स्यात् ।

न च लक्ष्यार्थस्याशङ्कस्य वाच्यार्थेन सञ्जन्यानुपपत्तिः
 स्वतोऽशङ्कस्याप्यविद्यान्तःकरणाद्युपाधितसर्गस्याविद्यापधारेति-
 तस्य दिवान्धपरिकल्पितसञ्चितस्यः ससर्गदुष्पत्तेः ।

But whereas in the present case, the thing to be proved
 (that, sc. that the sentence 'that thou art' teaches the ide-
 nity of jīva and Brahman) can be proved in another way,
 sc. through implication, contradiction does certainly attach
 to the primary meaning of such a sentence (i e. the Vedic
 sentence 'that thou art' does not overthrow the other
 sources of evidence) Otherwise (i e. if perception and
 the other sources of evidence, which contradict the literal
 meaning of a sentence, are to be rejected in favour of the
 literal meaning) it will follow that implication will be alto-
 gether done away with - for, as concerning worldly usage
 also, implication obtains only in the case of a sentence whose
 authority is certain—(if the sentence itself be of doubtful
 authority, no attempt is made to explain its implications).
 And so, when the other sources of evidence, which contradict
 the literal meaning of a sentence, are rejected as false
 because they are contradicted by such a sentence, it follows
 that there will be no contradiction in regard to the sentence
 (i e. it will have to be understood literally) and there-fore
 no implication will obtain in regard to it.

And the connexion of the unrelated (or Self), which
 is the implied meaning of the words, with the literal mean-
 ing, is not impossible; for there can be a connexion
 surmised by Neuterhood between two things which is itself
 unrelated and certain limiting adjectives, sc. Neuterhood, inter-
 nal origin &c just as words that cannot see by day mean that
 that a connexion exists abstr. to the sun &c

कल्पितसम्बन्धेन लक्षणा पारमार्थिकी न स्यादिति चेत्
नेचैर्वाच्यम् अद्वैतविरोधेनैव द्वैतस्यासत्यत्वेऽप्यद्वैतवादिनां
सिद्धा न्ताविरोधस्याऽतिरूपवत्त्वात् ।

न च लक्ष्यपदार्थे, सूक्ततामसङ्गः पदार्थप्रतिपादकविज्ञानमा-
नन्दं ब्रह्मेत्यादिनैव तत्पदार्थप्रतिपादनात् तत्र च लक्षणाभावा-
न्मानवस्था न च ज्ञानत्वादिसामान्यवैशिष्ट्ये निर्दुर्मकलक्ष्यपदा-
र्थसिद्धिः नानेपाधिसम्बद्धव्यक्त्यतिरिक्तसामान्यानभ्युपगमात् ।

An opponent may here object that if (as supposed above) implication is to apply through a falsely surmised connexion, then such implication cannot be *real* (and, therefore, the resulting intuition of Self will be false also). Do not speak so loud (we reply) as if announcing something new ! For it is abundantly clear that there is; nothing repugnant to the grand tenet of Monists in maintaining (as we do here) the falsity of duality, just because duality is contradictory of Monism (non-duality).

Nor will silence follow in regard to the thing implied (by the words *that* and *thou*, cf. p. 93) , for the meaning of the word *that* is made known by such passages as ' Bra-
hman, which is Intelligence, Bliss ' which are explanatory of the word. And since implication does not attach to the words Intelligence &c. in the above passage (tatra, sc. these words make known Brahman, *directly*, by *abhidhā*) there is no endless series of implications (cf. p. 93). Nor can it be argued that since (in the above passage) an attributive relation (*vaiśiṣṭya*) is made known (between Brahman) and certain class-attributes (*sāmānya*), sc. *the possessing intelligence* &c. the thing implied, viz. the attributeless (Brahman) cannot be proved by such passages. For the Vedāntins do not admit any such thing as class-attribute (generality) distinct from the individual thing, which is in relation with many imitating adjuncts

अनुगतव्यवहारस्यानुगतव्यक्त्यैवोपपत्तेः प्रतिविम्बेषु विम्ब-
यत । त्वमर्थस्तूक्तविषया काश्चादिपदेन वक्तुं शक्य एव ।

न च साक्षिणि विप्रतिपत्तिः सर्वप्रमाणव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रस-
ङ्गात् अज्ञातस्याप्रमाविषयस्य साक्षिण्यतिरेकेण निद्रुताकात् प्रमा-
णसिद्धत्वे ऽज्ञानस्य निवृत्तिर्न स्यात् तच्चात्वे वा प्रमाणवैयर्थ्यात्
प्रमाणकृतातिशयाभावात् असनिद्रुस्य प्रमाणविषयत्वविरोधात् ।

Since a persistent consciousness* is due simply to the in-
dividual which persists in (or pervades) the consciousness ;
just as the one reflected thing, so the moon, pervades the
many reflexions of the moon (and so gives rise to the per-
sistent consciousness ' This is the same moon reflected in
the many waters').

And the thing implied by the word *thou* can be declared
by such words as *witness* &c, in the manner already shown
(by bhāgatyāgalakṣhaṇā cf. p. 91).

' Nor can there be any controversy as to the existence
of the Witness : for (if the Witness exists not) it follows
that there is an end to the exercise of all sources of evidence ;
since, in the absence of the Witness, an *unperceived* object, so
one not declared in any true cognition, could not be proved to
exist, (and if no *unperceived* object exists, the *pramāṇas*
have nothing to energise in regard to) If it be held that
Nescience is proved by a source of evidence, then there can
be no destruction of Nescience ; (for no *pramāṇa* can destroy
the thing which it makes known, and Nescience is in this
case the thing made known). Or if this be granted (so,
that Nescience is not destroyed), then a source of evidence
is useless, for in this case no special result (*atīśaya* =
ajñānavṛtti) has been effected by it (*pramāṇakṛita*, so,
the object would still remain *unperceived*, *ajñāta*). (Nor
can it be said that an unperceived object is proved by error,
i. e. its unperceivedness is a mistake simply), for such an
object (being nothing) cannot be vouched for by any *pramāṇa*.

* For *anugatavyavahāra* and the *Vaiśhika* proof of *sāmānya*, see note p.
108 in m.

तथाच प्रमाणप्रवृत्तेः पूर्वमेवाज्ञातत्वेन साक्षिसा माधितमेव प्रमेयं
प्रमाणं विषयीकरोतीति युक्तम् अतो नात्र विप्रतिपत्तिः । तथाच
सुरेश्वरः ।

प्रमाणप्रमाणं वा प्रमाणास्तस्यैव च ।

कुर्वन्त्येव प्रमां यत्र तदसम्भावना कुतः ॥

न च पदयोरेकार्थत्वनेकार्थत्वविकल्पः एकार्थत्वे ऽपि
वाक्यप्रमाणजन्यस्यैव ज्ञानस्य सिद्धमनिवर्तकत्वात् । न चैकप-
दवैधर्मे तेन विना विरोधानाद्येन लक्षणया ऽखण्डवाक्यार्थस्य
प्रतिपादयितुमशक्यत्वात् पदमात्रस्य प्रमाणत्वाच्च

Accordingly, the right conclusion is that a source of
evidence makes known an object (prameya), which, as
something unperceived, had been vouched for by the Wit-
ness, even previous to the exercise of the source of evidence.
Hence there is no conflict as to the existence of the Self
(atma). And thus Sureśvara declares: 'How can that

Tant Up Bhashyavartika, p. 167. not exist in regard to which
sl. 19. ed. Apte Poona 1889 (yatra) sources of evidence,
false sources of evidence and counterfeit cognitions, all alike
declare truly (so. all these testify to the Witness or eternal
Cognition *per se*, without which they could not be)'.
Nor is there any uncertainty as to whether the two

words ('that' and 'thou') mean only one thing or more
than one thing, for even if the two words denote one thing,
it is only the knowledge effected through a sentence as a
source of evidence that can destroy the erroneous notion
that the two things meant by the words are distinct (z. e.
there must be the two words to make up the requisite sen-
tence) Nor is one of the two words useless, since in the
absence of the second word there would be no contradiction
as to the literal meaning, and, therefore, the Indivisible
(Brahman) which is the thing meant by the sentence
could not be made known through implication. And because
a word alone is not a source of evidence.*

* A word serves only to recall an object previously known and does
not testify to its reality of Ved pa-iti where smṛti (recollection) is
excluded from pramāṇa (right knowledge)

न च प्रधानवाक्ये लक्षणानुपपत्तिः इतरानुपसर्जनार्थप्रतिपादक-
त्वमेव हि प्रधानत्वं नाम तच्च लक्षणया मुख्यया वेत्यन्यदेतत्
न च न्यायविरोधः यत्र प्रतिपाद्यस्यार्थस्य शब्दशक्तिगोचरत्वं
तत्र न्यायावतारात् ।

२० ननु कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वसुखित्वदुःखित्वाद्यनेकसंसारधर्मेभ्यो
निष्कृष्टस्य प्रत्यगात्मनो ऽवस्थाप्रयानुगतस्य शुद्धस्य चिदशस्य
परमात्मनो जगत्कर्तृत्वादिभ्यो निष्कृष्टेनाऽकाशाद्यनुसूतेन
शुद्धेन परिपूर्णमच्छिदानन्दस्वभावेनाभेदो लक्षणया बोध्यते
इति प्रतिपादितम् । तथा च सर्वो भेदो न निराकृतः

Nor is implication impossible in regard to a primary sentence. For the primary character of a sentence consists in the sentence making known something which is independent of something else. And this primary character is independent of the question whether the sentence is to be understood literally or through implication. Nor does this view contradict the maxim (sc irregularity is to be assumed in regard to a *secondary* sentence only) for the maxim applies where the thing made known is made known by the power of the words (i. e. literally).

20. Here it may be objected that what has been esta-

Objections by a bheda-vādin (who maintains that duality is real as given in perception, inference &c) : (a) Veda, while it teaches the identity of Jiva and Paramatman, does not teach the unreality of the world ; for the own nature of a thing, svarupa, constitutes bheda, difference, and is vouchered for by all the pramanas :

blished is that (from such a sentence as ' that thou art '), through *implication*, the identity is made known of the Self within (pratyagātman),—or that portion of pure Intelligence which pervades the three states

(of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep), and is free from the various attributes of the transmigratory spheres, sc. agency &c, and the absolute Existence, Intelligence, Bliss,—or pure Intelligence, which pervades all products beginning with ether. and is free from the various attributes, sc. *the being the cause of the world, &c*

स्यात् अनात्मभेदस्य तदवस्थत्वात् । न चात्मपरमात्म-
 नोर्भेदग्राहकप्रमाणवदनात्मभेदग्राहकस्यापि प्रत्यक्षादेरप्रामाण्य-
 भवेति साम्प्रतं दृष्टान्ताभिद्धेः न ह्यात्मपरमात्मनोर्भेद-
 ग्राहकं जानमस्ति तयोः स्वयंप्रकाशत्वेन जानाविषयत्वात्
 विशिष्टविषयस्य जानस्य विशेषणभेदोचरत्वेनान्यथासिद्धस्या-
 त्मपरमात्मभेदासाधकत्वाद्विशेष्यभेदग्राहकेण तत्त्वमस्यादिप्रमा-
 णेन बाधितत्वात् न चानात्मभेदग्राहकस्य प्रत्यक्षादेर्वाचकमस्ति ।

But in this way all *difference* (duality) has not been overthrown, for there still remains a difference constituted by the not-Self, (which remains as the difference, or negation, of the Self affirmed above). Nor is it correct to say that perception, inference &c, which make known a difference between not-Self (and Self), are untrustworthy, just as the evidence which declares a difference between Self and the Highest Self is untrustworthy, since the confirmatory example (now adduced) cannot itself be proved. For there is no evidence declaratory of the difference between Self and the Highest Self, inasmuch as these two are self-luminous and cannot therefore be made known by a source of evidence. And because a source of evidence which makes known certain subjects as qualified by attributes, and which has fulfilled its function already (*anyathāsiddhasya*) by making known the difference between these attributes, cannot make known a difference between Self and the Highest Self* (or the subjects). And because such a source of evidence is overthrown by another source of evidence, sc. the sentence ' that thou art,' which makes known the identity of the (two) subjects (*that* and *thou*) Nor can it be urged that there is something to overthrow perception, and the other *pramāṇas* which make known a difference between Self and not-Self

न चानात्मस्वरूपगोचरत्वेऽपि प्रत्यक्षादेर्न भेदगोचरत्वं चर्मिप्रति-
योगिभेदानां ग्रहे क्रमयोगपद्यादिविकल्पप्राप्तावन्योन्याश्रयात्मा
अयानवस्थाप्राग्लोपाविनिगम्यत्वाद्यनेकदोषप्रासादिति वाच्यं ।

अतिरिक्तभेदागोचरत्वेऽपि स्वरूपभेदगोचरत्वस्य दुरपहृव
त्वात् न च स्वरूपं भिन्नमिति प्रतीत्यनुपपत्तिः राहोः शिरः
आत्मनश्चैतन्यमिति वदुपपत्तेः ।

Nor again that perception, inference &c ; although they
make known the not-Self *per se*, do not make known a differ-
ence (between Self and not-Self) ; because, whenever there
is a knowledge of a difference (bheda), and of a locus (dharmi)
in which the difference resides, and of a counterentity (pra-
tiyogi) there arises the doubt whether these are known
successively or simultaneously, and either alternative is
exposed to the vices of a see-saw, or self-dependence, or an
infinite regress, or omission of a former supposition as useless,
or of absence of a reason to compel the adoption of one of
two alternatives &c *

(The above objections are not to be urged) because,
even if perception and the other pramāṇas make known no
difference other than that of the own nature of a thing, it
cannot be denied that they do make known the difference
(constituted by) the own nature of thing (svarūpa). Nor is
it to be argued that (if svarūpa is itself a bheda) the com-
mon experience 'this svarūpa is different from that svarūpa'
becomes impossible (which experience implies that svarūpa
is the locus in which a bheda resides) ; for this experience
may be explained as certain other experiences, viz the head
of Rāhu ' (which is all head), ' the intelligence of Self '
(while Self really is intelligence), are explained (i e. by
the assumption of an attributive relation between things
that are really identical)

* For the general form of the argument of pp. 40-45 supra current
defn. see — अन्योन्यस्य अवयवहितान्योन्यापक्षित्वम् अन्योन्याश्रयः ॥ उत्तरो-
त्तरेणैव पूर्वपूर्वकार्यसम्भवे पूर्वपामन्यथानिद्धिः प्राग्लोपः ॥ (उत्तरोत्तरेण =
कारणत पूर्वपूर्व ॥ पूर्वस्य कारणस्य) एकतरपक्षप त्रियुक्तिविरोधो विनिगम-
न विरह ॥ विनिगमन निश्चयकारणम्

न च भेदस्वरूपशब्दयोः पर्यायत्वापत्तिः स्वव्यवहारे इतर-
सापेक्षत्वनिःपेक्षत्वाभ्यां विशेषात् न चाभेदे तदनुपपत्तिः एकस्मि-
न्नापि देवदत्ते पितृत्वादिव्यवहारार्थं पुत्राद्यपेक्षादर्शनात् न च प्राप्त-
प्राप्तविवेकेन सापेक्षत्वमेव भेदोऽस्त्विति वाच्यं तस्यापि स्वरूपान्न-
तिरेकात् न च स्वरूपाद् यस्य भेदस्तस्य निःस्वरूपत्वापत्तिः
अन्यथा स्वरूपमेवाखण्डमिति वाच्यं घटात् घटस्य भेदेऽप्यघटत्वा-
दर्शनात् ।

Nor does it follow on this view that the terms svarūpa and bheda are synonyms . for there is a difference of usage in regard to the term sva (which stands both for svarūpa and bheda) according as dependence on other things (so. pratiyogi and anuyogi) is intended (when the term bheda is used), or independence (when the term svarūpa is used). Nor can it be said that this difference of usage, is impossible, if svarūpa and bheda are identical (abheda); for it is observed that in regard to the individual Devadatta our experience of him as a father depends on his having a son. Nor must it be argued that only that which is known through induction* as dependent on something else is bheda. For this dependent bheda is identical with svarupa. Nor must it be argued that from this it will follow that that which is different from svarupa† is itself destitute of svarupa, otherwise svarupa becomes a unity indivisible (akhanda, in regard to which no predication of difference whatever would be possible cf. p. 64.) For even when a difference between two earthen jars is perceived, the jariness (or svarupa) does not cease to be perceived.

* Prapta, apraptaviveka (a nyāya of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā) = discrimination of matter which has been already established from that which has not been thus established . In this case the ghaṭasvarūpa is prapta so when ghaṭa is known, its svarūpa is also known, prapta , and ghaṭasvarūpa as bheda is aprapta, because something else must be known in order that ghaṭasvarūpa may constitute a difference between the ghaṭa and that other thing तथा च प्राप्ताप्राप्तविवेकात्सापेक्ष एव पदार्थ (thing) भेदशब्दवाच्योऽस्तु न स्वरूपे स्वरूपस्य निरपेक्षत्वात् । glo-8.

† If svarūpa is bheda, then pata as different from ghaṭa must be nihavarupa or a mere nothing. If pata also possesses svarūpa, then svarūpa ceases to be a bheda and becomes a unity indivisible. स्वरूपात्

घटस्वरूपात् यस्य तस्य, पटस्य

न च घटादेकस्मात् घटान्तरे किं विद्वैद्यम्येन सत्येवेति वाच्यं स्थितस्यापि तस्योक्तदोषेण भेदत्वानङ्गीकारात् न च वैधर्म्यं सत्येव स्वरूपं भेद इति वाच्यम् । अनात्मस्वरूपाणामपि वैधर्म्यव्याप्तत्वात् ।

मनु कैश्चिदुक्तं यथायथं त्रितयमेव भेदो यथा घटादौ स्वरूपमन्योन्याभावे वैधर्म्यं च सात्वत्यादौ च द्वयमेव वैधर्म्योक्तात् अभावे स्वरूपमेवेतरासम्भवादिति तत्र स्वरूपभेदस्यावश्य-

Nor must it be argued that the one jar possesses special attributes (or individuality)† different from those of the other jar. For though this possession of special attributes exists, it is not admitted as a *bheda* because of the already mentioned vices which result in regard thereto.

Nor can it be argued that svarupa is a *bheda* only in the case where this possession of different attributes is found. For the svarupas of things B, C, D, other than A (anātmasvarupa) are also pervaded by this *vaidharmya*.

But the view of some teachers is to be rejected sc. that *bheda* is rightly three-fold ; to jars &c. i. e. to substances, qualities and action pertain svarupa, anyonyābhāva (the non-existence of one thing in another) and *vaidharmyā*, to class-generality (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and intimate relation (*samavāya*) pertain only the two, svarupa and anyonyābhāva, because to these three (as being void of attributes,) *vaidharmya* cannot attach ; to negation (*abhāva*) pertains only svarupa, for to it the other two cannot apply. †

‡ *Vaidharmya*, here = *talīvyakṛtva*, individuality, or that which makes this jar what it is, as distinct from jñāti, class generality or jariness, which inheres in all jars alike.

* *atmasvarūpa* = *ghaṭasvarūpa* : *anātmasvarūpa* = *pañcasvarūpa*.

† cf *khaṇḍakhaṇḍa lakṣhya* p 111 (Benares 191)

कत्वात् इतरघोश्च ऽयमिचारात् भेदव्यवहाराप्रयोजकत्वेनाङ्गी-
कारवैयर्थ्यात् एकाकारव्यवहारस्य चैकरूपविवयसाध्यत्वनियमात्
न च स्वरूपभेदपक्षे स्वस्मादपि स्वस्य भेदः स्यादिति वाच्यं
स्वस्य प्रतियोगिकोटिनिवेशेनान्यस्य धर्मिणो विरहात् धर्मिको-
टिनिवेशेन वा प्रतियोगिनेऽभावात् न च भेदस्वरूपयोः परस्प-
रान्तर्भावेनान्यतरपरिधेयापत्तिः । भेदस्य स्वरूपानतिरेकात् ।

(The above view is rejected) because svarupabheda is essential, and the other two fail to apply in all cases. For it is useless to maintain the two latter in that they are not the cause of a perception of difference; and because the rule is that a consciousness whose form remains unchanged has been brought about by an unchanging object, i. e. by one whose form remains unchanged.* Nor can it be urged that on the view that svarupa is a bheda (i. e. the cause of a perception of difference) it follows that svarupa should make known a difference between itself and itself (svasya svasmāt). For if svarupa (svasya) be inserted in the place of (i. e. be regarded as) the *counterentity*, there remains no *locus* for the difference; again, if svarupa be regarded as the *locus*, no *counterentity* remains. Nor does it follow that of the two, svarupa and bheda, one or other must remain by a process of exclusion, since one must fall within the other. For bheda is not something different from svarupa.

* एकाकरेति । यथा घटोऽयं घटोऽयम् इति व्यवहारं अनुगतं घटत्वं सामान्यमेव प्रयोजकं न व्यक्तिरनुगतत्वात् । अन्यथा जातेरसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् ।
gloss. While individual jars vary (techn — are *ananyagata*, non-pervasive), the form of the perception in each case is unchanged, thus, *this is a jar, this is a jar*. This unchanged form of perception must therefore be due to an unchanging, pervasive cause (*anyagatam prayojakam*) so, to the *samanya* (class-attribute) jar-ness. The *Vaisheshika* thus proves the existence of *samanya* as a separate category. Applying the above argument the text urges that the unchanging element in regard to a perception of difference is *svarupa*.

न च स्वरूपभेदः किं भिन्ने भेदव्यवहारप्रयोजको ऽभिन्ने वेति विकल्पावकाशः उपस्थितवस्तुमान्ने धर्मिप्रतियोगिज्ञानापेक्षानपेक्षाभ्यां भेदाभेदव्यवहारयोजनीयमानत्वात् ।

नन्वज्ञानकार्यत्वं प्रपञ्चस्य पूर्वमुक्त तत्कथं प्रत्यक्षाद्यनुरोधेन भेदाशङ्का इति चेत् न तस्यैवानिद्वेर्ब्रह्मकार्यत्वस्य बहुशः अवघात् सदेव सांख्येदमय आसीत् यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मनः आकाशः आकाशः संभूतः यथाग्नेः हुद्रा विस्फुलिङ्गा एवमेतस्मादात्मनः सर्वे देवाः सर्वे लोकाः सर्वे एते आत्मानो व्युच्चरन्तीत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः जन्माद्यस्य यत इति न्यायाच्च ।

Nor is there room here for the doubt whether bheda in the form of svarupa is the cause of the perception of difference in regard to a locus A *different* from or *identical* with (counterentity B).

For in regard to an object merely as presented the consciousness of its difference from or identity with (something else) is effected by the necessity for the knowledge of (i. e. by the presence or absence of a desire to know) the locus and counterentity.

Again, it may be objected that it has already been

(b) the Vedantic tenet that the world is a product of Nescience : i. e. is false, is in fact opposed to many Vedic passages.

shown (pp. 38 40 supra) that the world is a product of Nescience : hence the argument for duality (i. e. bheda or the world as different from Self), based as it is on the authoritativeness of perception and the other sources of evidence (anurodhena) can find no place.

This objection is set aside ; because it is not proved that the world is a product of Nescience (tasya), since many Śruti passages declare the world to be a product of Brahman :—

Ch. Up. VI 2. 1.
Taitt Up III. 1.
" " II. 1.

‘ In the beginning, my dear, the existent was *this*,’ ‘That from which these beings are born,’

‘From that Self (Brahman) sprang ether’, ‘ As small sparks come forth from fire, thus do all Devas, all these beings come forth from that Self and so also the extra declares ‘ From

नन्वज्ञानकार्यत्वमपि बहुषु श्रूयते सृष्टयुनैवेदमावृतमानीत-
द्देदं तस्यैव्याकृतमसौत् इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुषप ईषते मायां तु
प्रकृतिं विद्यात् नावदासीन्नोसदासीन्न आसीदित्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः
मायामात्रं तु कारहर्न्येनानभिद्वयकस्वरूपत्वादिति न्यायाच्च
एवं तर्हि श्रुतीनां परस्परं विरोधान्नोभयमपि कारणमस्तु किं
तर्हि जगत्कारणमिति चेत् यथायोग्यं परमावदादिकमेव । तस्मा-
दनात्मभेदे प्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धे जागृत्तु कथमद्वैतमिद्धिः तदयं संग्रहः ।
आत्मोऽभेदप्रमित्यापि नाद्वैतं ते प्रसिद्ध्यति ।
अनात्मभेदमसिद्धेः प्रत्यक्षादेः प्रमाशतः ॥

Bṛihad Up. II, 1 20	which (Brahman) the produc-
Ved. Su. I, 1. 2.	tion, &c of this (world).'

Again it may be objected that in many Śruti passages
(c) discrepancy of Śruti passages the fact of the world being a
in regard to the cause of the world. product of Nescience is declared,
thus:—'This was encompassed by death.' Now all this
was then undeveloped.' 'Indra of many forms goes along
by his magic powers.' 'Know that the material cause of the
world is Māyā.' 'Non-entity was not, entity was non, dark-
ness, (Nescience) was'—and it also follows from the reason
laid down in the sūtra, 'On the contrary, it (the dream-
word) is Māyā merely, for its nature is not presented
fully.'—thus, then, since the Śruti passages contradict each
other, let it be granted that neither Nescience nor Brahman
is the cause of the world. What then is the cause?
Reply —ultimate atoms, or any other appropriate cause
(sc. pradhāna, matter &c as proposed by various thinkers).
Hence since duality, lit. the difference of not-Self from Self,
which has been proved to be real by perception and the
other means of evidence is on the alert (against all
attacks) it is not possible to prove (Vedantic) Monism (sc.
Self).

२१ मैवं श्रुत्यभिप्रायापरिज्ञानात् न हि तत्त्वमस्यादिश्रुत्या
अनात्मानं पृथक् स्तापयित्वा शुद्धांशयोरभेदो बोध्यतइति श्रुत्य-
भिप्रायः किं तु प्रत्यक्चैतन्ये कूटस्थे जागराद्यवस्थात्रयं कर्तृ-
त्वाद्यनर्थजातं च व्यभिचारि सर्वं तत्रैवानुगते साक्षिण्यव्यस्तनि-
त्यन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां तदतिरेकेण तत्स्वरूपं नास्तीति निश्चित्य
शुद्धेन प्रत्यगात्मना ब्रह्मणो ऽभेदनिष्कार्यं ब्रह्मण्यपि जगत्कर्तृत्व-
परोक्षत्वादि आकाशादिकं च जगज्जातमननुगतमनुगते तस्मि-
न्मूर्च्छिदात्मन्यध्वारोपितमसद्भ्रान्त्यैव प्रतिपन्नमित्यन्वयव्य-
तिरेकाभ्यामध्वारोपापवादमश्रित्य प्रवृत्तं सृष्टिवाक्यमनन्तरप्र-
वृत्तेन नेतिनेतीत्पादिवाक्येन चाश्रययति । ततः शुद्धो-
त्तरत्वंपदार्थयोर्लक्षणांशयोर्निरेक्षतानात्मसम्बन्धयोर्भेदे ऽभेदे वा

Wherefore the opponent's view may be summed up
thus :—Your view of Monism is not proved even by the
certain knowledge that Self is identical with Brahman. For
through perception and the other sources of evidence the
existence of the not-Self as distinct from Self is assured.

21. The above view is to be rejected because the oppo-
nent has not understood the meaning of the Śruti passa-
ges. For the import of these is not that such a passage
as 'that thou art' establishes the not-Self as something
distinct, and then goes on to declare the identity of the two
pure (attributeless) portions (sc. Intelligence or Brahman
underlying what is meant by 'that' and 'thou'). But when
an aspirant of the highest order (paramajjñāsu, sc. one who
desires intuition of Brahman as the Self within) is convinced
that the three states of waking, dreaming and dreamless
sleep, and the complex of evils beginning with agency—all
of which fail to attach (vyabhūchān) to the unchanging Self
within—are erroneously summed up in that very Self (tatraiva),
the pervading Witness; that, therefore, by the inductive
method of conjoint presence and absence, it is proved that

प्रमाणमपश्यन्संदिहानः संसारो गराजानुचरगर्भवासाद्यनेकरो गम-
मुद्भूतदुःखव्रातानुभवासादितो द्वेगः ब्रह्मलोकप्रभवमपि सुख विष-
मिष मन्वमानस्तरति शोकमात्मविदिति श्रुत्वा संसारदायानल-
प्रसूनसन्तापशमनामृताब्धिमात्मविद्यारमजानानः परमजिज्ञासुः
स्वरूपापरोक्षदर्शिन परमकारुणिकं गुरुमुपसर्पति

the world as described above (tat) has no existence of its own (svarupa) apart from the Self (tat) : and further when, in order to prove the identity of Brahman with the pure (attributeless) Self within, he ascertains beyond doubt that *the being the cause of the world and the not being positively presented* and other attributes, and also the whole world beginning with ether—all of which are not pervasive as regards Brahman also—are surmised to exist in that pervasive Self which is Existent (sat, real), Intelligence,—are unreal (asat) as being surmised through error, (and this he can do) in accordance with the method of conjoint presence and absence, and by having recourse to the method of unreal predication and annulment of the same in accordance with such negative passages as 'Brahman is not this, not thus' which find place immediately after passages setting forth the creation of the world. Then, finding no certain evidence for the identity or nonidentity of the two entities which are implied by the words *that* and *thou*, and from which all relation with the not-Self has been removed (by the processes described above), the aspirant begins to doubt; and being pained by his experience of all those pains which spring from the many diseases of gestation onwards and which attend on transmigratory life (as servants) on a rājā, and deeming as poison even that pleasure which accrues in the world of Brahmā, and not knowing that a knowledge of Self is the nectar sea that quenches the fire of the world conflagration, as declared in the passage, 'He who knows Self passes beyond sorrow', he approaches his most merciful guru who has attained to intuition of the Self

तेन च शुद्धयोस्तरवंपदार्थयोरभेदे तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्येन नि-
त्यनिर्दोषेण बोधिते स्वयमेवाद्वैततरवं साक्षात्कृत्य साक्षात्कृत्य
स्वानन्ददत्तं जातनारामो भवति अतः अत्यभिप्रायापरिज्ञानवि-
जृम्भितमेतत् यदनात्मभेदेनाद्वैतज्ञतिरिति ।

यच्च स्वरूपं भेदः प्रत्यक्षादिगोचर इति तदतितुच्छं प्रत्य-
क्षादेरसद्विषयत्वेन स्वरूपागोचरत्वात् स्वरूपस्य भेदत्वानुपपत्ते-
श्च । कुत इति चेत् शृणु किं शुद्धं सर्वधर्मविनिर्मुक्तं स्वरूपं
भेदः किं वा विशिष्टम् ।

And being taught by the guru, by means of that eternal
faultless sentence 'that thou art', that the two *unrelated*
(*suddha*) things implied by the words *that* and *thou* are really
identical, the aspirant himself attains intuition of the one
reality without a second, and becomes self-contained in that
Bliss which is his own nature, and delights in his Self (alone).

Hence the statement, that (Vedantic) Monism is over-
thrown by the fact that not-Self exists distinct from Self,
was made through misunderstanding the meaning of *Sruti*.

And as to the opponent's statement that *svarupa* is a
his view that the *own nature* of a *bheda* made known by percep-
thing is *difference* is self-contradictory: tion and the other sources of
evidence,—that is utter nonsense. For since perception
&c make known the unreal (*asa*) they cannot make known
svarupa or that which is. and further, because *svarupa*
cannot be proved to be *bheda*. Why not, you ask? Then
listen, and say whether you mean that *svarupa*, pure and
simple, sc. destitute of all attributes, is *bheda*; or as qua-
lified by attributes.

आद्ये व्यवहारहेतुत्वमपि तस्य नास्तीति वक्तव्यं तथाच सर्वव्यवहारानास्पदं सर्वधर्मविनिर्मुक्तमस्थूलानन्थादिशास्त्रसिद्धं सदात्मकं ब्रह्मैव नामान्तरेण प्रत्यक्षादिगोचर इत्युक्तं स्यात् न च तदप्युपपद्यते न चक्षुषा गृह्यते नैव वाचा नान्यैर्देदैस्तपसा कर्मणा वेत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधप्रसङ्गात् द्वितीये विशेषणविशेष्ययोर्भेदे विशिष्टं स्वरूपान्तरं भेद इति वाच्यं तथा च तत्राप्यन्यत्तत्राप्यन्यदिति यैव दुरुत्तराऽनवस्था जभेदे वा विशिष्टस्वरूपासिद्धिः ।

If the first, then you will have to declare that such svarūpa could not be the cause of any experience (vyavahāra*), and thus you would have to declare that what is made known by perception &c. is indeed Brahman under another name, so, bheda—(Brahman) which is not the object of any experience whatever, which is free from all attributes, which as proved by Śruti is neither great nor small, which is the Existent. But this will not hold good as being contradicted by the Śruti—‘It is grasped not by the eye, nor by speech nor by the other devas (senses), not by penance or work.’

Ma Up. III. 1 8.

On the second alternative so, that svarūpa, qualified by attributes, is bheda, if it be maintained that subject and attribute are different, then you will have to declare (as the cause of this difference) a second qualified-svarūpabheda and for the second a third, and so you will not escape the vice of an infinite regress. If subject and attribute be regarded as identical (abhede vā) then your *qualified* svarūpa does not exist ! Nor again is your *qualified* svarūpa made known by perception and the other sources of evidence ; for it is attributeless, as is the svarūpa of a thing in itself, since the attribute colour does not pertain to a *coloured* object, and so with other attributes.

* व्यवहारः = ज्ञानजन्यप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिः action, or cessation from action, consequent on knowledge.

न वा विशिष्टं स्वरूपं प्रत्यक्षादिगोचरः तस्यापि शुद्ध-
वस्तुस्वरूपवर्तिर्न कदाचित् न हि रूपादिविशिष्टे रूपादयः
सन्ति । न च विशिष्टं नाम किञ्चिद्वस्तुवस्ति विशेषणविशेष्यस-
म्बन्धातिरिक्तस्य तस्याननुभवात् तेषां च प्रत्येकसमुदायाभ्यां वि-
शिष्टव्यवहाराजननात् न च सम्बन्ध एव विशिष्टं विशेषणविशेष्य-
तत्सम्बन्धा इत्यत्र सम्बन्धे ऽपि तद्व्यवहारादर्शनात् । विशे-
षणविशेष्ययोस्तद्व्यवहाराभावप्रसङ्गात् न च वस्तुस्वरूपं भेद-
इति शङ्कितुमपि शक्यं तस्य विदारणारम्भे भेदस्य वस्तुस्वरूप-
नाशरूपत्वाच्चाशत्प्रतियोगिनेरभेदासम्भवात् न हि पटविदा-
रणां पटस्वरूपं वस्तुस्वरूपातिरिक्तस्य च भेदस्य तस्य निःस्वरूपस्य
निराश्रयस्यासिद्धिरेव ।

Nor is your *qualified svarūpa* an entity at all, for it is unperceived apart from subject, attribute and the relation between these ; and because a qualified (determinate) judgment in regard to these three (i. e. one in which these three are combined) cannot be effected through them singly or taken together. Nor is it *relation* simply that constitutes (your) *qualified svarūpa*, for when all three are present to the mind, thus, *subject, attribute, and relation*,—no determinate is observed to result, although the relation (between subject and attribute) was present to the mind. And because it would follow that there could be no determinate judgment in regard to the subject and attribute (if relation by itself were the qualified svarūpa).

Nor can it be argued at all that *the thing itself* is *bheda*: for since *bheda* (*tasya*) implying *tearing asunder* consists in the destruction of the thing itself, it is impossible for the destruction and its counter-entity (so the thing which is destroyed) to be identical. For the tearing of a piece of cloth is not the cloth itself : in fact, apart from the thing itself, or piece of cloth, this character-less, baseless tearing cannot be affirmed at all (*asiddhi*). Nor can that which is divided *bhinnā* sc. destroyed, be the substrate of anything: otherwise a *broken jar* might be regarded as a receptacle for water.

न हि भिन्न आश्रयो भवति अन्यथा चवस्तोपि चटो जलाधारः स्यात् अभिन्ने त्वाश्रये भेदो विरोधादेव न वर्तते ।

तस्माद्व्यवस्थितानात्मविचारेण सर्वथा प्रत्यक्षादेरात्मानात्म-भेदगोचरत्वं नास्तीति सिद्धम् ।

२२ यदुक्तं जगत्कारणत्वविषयश्रुत्योरज्ञानब्रह्मगोचरयोर्मिथो विरोध इति तत्र

ब्रह्माज्ञानाज्जगज्जन्म ब्रह्मणोऽकारणत्वतः ।
अधिष्ठानत्वमात्रेण कारणं ब्रह्म गीयते ॥ ३८ ॥

दृश्यत्वाद्यनुमानसिद्धानिर्वचनीयस्य जगतोऽनाद्यनिर्वचनीया अविद्यैव कारण न ब्रह्म तस्य कूटस्थस्य कार्यकारणविलक्षण-त्वात् तदेतद्ब्रह्माऽपूर्वमनपरमनन्तरमबाह्यम् अयमात्मा ब्रह्मस-वानुभूयति श्रुतेः ।

But if the substrate or thing in itself is undivided, *bheda*, division, cannot reside in it—for that would be a palpable contradiction !

To conclude this discussion of the not-Self. We have proved that perception and the other sources of evidence in no way declare a difference between Self and not-Self.

22. Thus, we must reject the statement that the two sets of S'ruti passages, which deal with the cause of the world and declare, the one that Brahman is, the other that Nescience is, the cause contradict each other.

Through Nescience, Brahman is (said to be) the cause of the world , for to Brahman causality does not pertain. Brahman is said to be cause as being simply the substrate (of Nescience which is the cause of the world) XXXVIII.

Nescience, eternal ab ante, inexplicable (cf. note p. 28), is indeed the cause of the world, which is inexplicable and which is proved by reason of its visibility &c. Brahman is not the cause ; for the unchanging one (Kūṭastha) is neither cause nor effect, as declared in the S'ruti passage— 'This is the Brahman, without cause and without effect,

Bṛhad Up. II. 5. 10. without anything inside or out- side this Self is Brahman, omniscient.'

कथं तर्हि ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वं श्रुती प्रसिद्धं जगत्कारणत्वाधि-
ष्ठानत्वेन कारणत्वोपपत्त्यात् ब्रह्मकारणश्रुतेरन्यार्थत्वाच्च एकते-
वाद्वितीयमिति श्रुतेरद्वितीयत्वं तावद् ब्रह्मणः सिद्धं तत्कथं
सम्भावयतामिति कार्यकारणयोरभेदस्तावत्लोकप्रसिद्धः ब्रह्मापि
जगत्कारणमिति कथमसम्भावना स्यादित्यद्वितीये सम्भावना-
शुद्धिमात्रप्रयोजनत्वात्तस्याः न चाज्ञानमपि जगत्कारणं श्रुत्या
विवक्षितं । तस्य समनिमित्तमात्रत्वेनैवोक्तत्वात् कार्यकारणवादस्य
वेदान्तबहिर्भूतत्वात् विषयस्यैव वेदान्तवादत्वात्

How then is Brahman declared in Śruti to be the cause of the world? Because to Brahman as the substrate and cause of the world causality is by a metaphor ascribed. And because the Śruti passage declaratory of Brahman as the cause has a further purport. From the Śruti passage—
(In the beginning) there was that one only, without a
Ch. Up VI. 2. 1. second,—is proved the unrela-
ted nature of Brahman. But how is a notion of the unrela-
ted Brahman (tat) possible? The well-known fact of com-
mon experience, sc. that cause and effect are identical, (steps
in to meet this difficulty)—thus it is not impossible to con-
ceive of Brahman also as the cause of the world. And so
the above passage (tasyāḥ) finds its purport in merely
making possible (for us) a notion of the unrelated Brahman
(sambhāvanābuddhi cf. p. 47 supra). Nor does
Śruti imply that Nescience also is the cause of the world.
For causality is affirmed as simply due to error (sc.
the notion of cause depends on that of duality, which
again is the outcome of Nescience). For a theory of cause
and effect (as implying duality) lies outside the Upanishads
in that these confine their teaching to that of *illusory mani-
festation** (vivartta). And because the statement that

* The Vivarta-vādins or Māya-vādins or Vedāntins of Sankara's school hold that the cause only appears to pass, but never really

किं जगत्: कारणमिति पृष्ठे प्राप्तावतिभानिवृत्तिनाशप्रयो-
जनतया अज्ञानं कारणमित्यसिहितत्वाच्च ।

२३ मन्विदमज्ञानं कार्यसकार्यं वा आद्ये किमस्य कारणं
अज्ञानं ब्रह्म वा आद्यः तेनैवे तज्जनने आत्माप्रयात् अज्ञाना-
न्तरानुसरणे त्वनवस्थादिप्रसङ्गात् न द्वितीयः ब्रह्मणोऽकारणत्वात्
अनिर्माक्षप्रसङ्गाच्च ।

Nescience is the cause of the world is made with the view
merely of obviating the awkward -ilence (apratibhā)* that
ensues when one is asked the question, What is the cause
of the world ?

23. Now arises the question whether this Nescience

Objection : The Nescience of the is, or is not, a product. If a
Vedānta is inexplicable nonsense. a product, what is its cause ?

Nescience or Brahman ? Not Nescience ; for the vice of
self-dependence follows on Nescience being produced by
Nescience If recourse be had to a second Nescience (as
a cause of this Nescience), an infinite regress and the
other vices result. Nor can Brahman be the cause ;
because causality does not pertain to Brahman, and
because emancipation would become impossible (on the
assumption of Brahman being the cause of Nescience,
since the eternal Brahman as cause would ever bring
about Nescience).

passes into a second state, so the effect which is therefore only an *illusory*
manifestation (vivartta) of the cause the rope, lying on the road at night,
appears to be a snake. The world is an illusory manifestation of Brah-
man, the only Real, due to Māya the *inexplicable* power of Brahman.

For ārambhā—, paripāma-vādin and cognate terms *vide* Pandit Vol.
VIII p 488 Panchadasi, note, also Chap. XIII sl 6 *et seq* of the latter.

* cf. Nyāyavivartti p 261.

द्वितीये त्वनादितावस्याऽभिहितप्रसङ्गे ब्रह्मवत् । न च कल्पितत्वाकल्पितत्वाभ्यां विशेषः कल्पनासामग्र्यभावेन कल्पनानुपपत्तेः न चातादिरयमवस्थासुः भव्यासत्वासिद्धेः विद्यावाच्यत्वात्तत्सिद्धिरिति चेन्न अन्योभ्यामग्राह्यत्वात् । न चैते दोषा वस्तुनो वस्तुत्वापहारकाः कल्पितस्य चाज्ञातस्य किमेते कुर्युः स्वत एव तस्य वस्तुत्वाभावात् अत एवोक्तमलङ्कारोद्घातमस्माकं यद्युक्तिप्रमाणाभ्यां दुर्घटत्वं सुघटत्वे कल्पितत्वं दुर्घटं भवेदिति वाच्यं कल्पितत्वस्यैवाद्याप्यसिद्धत्वात् धर्मिण एवासिद्धेः ।

Again, if this Nescience is not a product, then, as in the case of Brahman, there would be no cessation of this positive entity (bhāvasya), eternal ab ante. And it cannot be urged that there is a difference between Nescience and Brahman, in that the former is falsely surmised (i. e. is unreal). For erroneous surmisal is impossible, in the absence of certain means whereby the surmisal is effected.* Nor (to escape the difficulty can it be urged that) this false surmisal is eternal ab ante, for the fact of there being false surmisal at all is not established. It is proved (the Vedāntin may urge), because true knowledge proves the surmisal to be false. Not so; for this involves a logical see-saw, (so. if there be false surmisal, it is proved false by true knowledge; and, if it be proved false by true knowledge, it is false surmisal). Nor can it be urged (by the Vedāntin) that these logical fallacies serve to disprove the reality (vastutva) of the thing under discussion (vastunah) and can effect nothing in regard to Nescience which is falsely surmised; for Nescience itself is not real: hence it has been declared (the Vedāntin continues) that what we Vedāntins prize highly in our system is this, viz. that Nescience is hard to prove by argument and pramāṇa: if by these it were proved easily, the falsity (kalpitatva) of Nescience would be hard to prove. The above argument is to be rejected, because the unreality of Nescience is not yet proved, since there is no *proof* for the subject itself (so. Nescience, in which the *attribute* of unreality may be supposed to reside).

* The means are (a) similarity of two things of which one is mistaken for the other, (b) a previous mental retentum by which one of the two

अनु केयं सिद्धिः उत्पत्तिर्ज्ञप्तिर्वा नाद्यः अनादेस्तदभाव-
इत्येष्टत्वात् न द्वितीयः साक्षिसिद्धत्वेन तदभावात् । नैवम् अज्ञा-
नस्य साक्षिसिद्धत्व साक्षिणोः उपप्लव्यभङ्गप्रसङ्गात् सम्बन्धं विना
चाप्रकाशकत्वात् । न च पारमार्थिकसम्बन्धाभावे ऽपि कल्पितः
सम्बन्धो ऽस्त्येवेति वाच्यं सम्बन्धसम्बन्धितानस्य तस्य कल्प-
कत्वे आत्माश्रयान्योन्याश्रयकूटस्थत्वहान्यसङ्गतवक्तृभिः साक्षा-
त्प्रसङ्गानां यथायथं प्राप्तेः ।

(The Vedāntin again interposes with the question) What do you mean by *proof*? Production (sc. the production of an effect from a cause)? Or cognition (implying *pramāṇa*, instrument of cognition)? The first meaning will not serve your purpose, for, in regard to a thing eternal *ab ante* (as Nescience is) the absence of proof i. e. of *production* (*tat*) is precisely what I am prepared to admit. Nor the second meaning; for there is absence of proof, i. e. of cognition (*tat*) because Nescience is proved by the Witness (and not by any *pramāṇa*). Again, no, (replies the opponent). For if Nescience is proved by the Witness, the unrelated character of the Witness is overthrown; and because the Witness could not make known (lit. illumine) Nescience without entering into relation with it. Nor may the Vedāntin urge that though a *real* relation (between the two) is impossible, a relation may be falsely surmised. For either the relation or the related things must be the surmiser of such surmisal, and thus would follow, in order, the faults of self-dependence, logical see saw, loss to the Witness of its unchanging character and overthrow of its unrelated character, and the impossibility of final emancipation.

things is now recollected; (c) some defect either in the object or in the instrument of knowledge. The gloss continues—न चात्माज्ञानयोः सादृश्यमस्ति निरवयवत्वात् । न वा पूर्वसंस्कारो दोषो वास्ति तयोरज्ञानपूर्वकत्वेन ————— रित्यर्थः । Both (b) and (c) presuppose Nescience

न चाविद्याऽध्यासवत् तत्सम्बन्ध्याऽध्यासस्याप्यनादित्वेना
विद्यादिहेतवजन्यत्वे ऽपि तत्तन्त्रतया तन्निवृत्तौ निवृत्तिः स्या-
दिति वाच्यं तस्यानादेरुपपत्तौ निरपेक्षस्य साक्ष्यधीनज्ञानस्या-
ज्ञानानपेक्षतया तत्तन्त्रत्वानुपपत्तेः न च सम्बन्धिज्ञानाधीनं
सम्बन्धज्ञानं लोके दृष्टमिति वाच्यं तस्य प्रत्यक्षादिसिद्ध्य
तत्सापेक्षत्वेऽपीह सम्बन्धिनोऽप्यज्ञानस्य साक्षिसम्बन्धसापेक्ष-
रूपूर्तिरूपत्वेन वैपरीत्यात् न च सम्बन्धः स्वस्थित्यर्थं सम्बन्धि-
नमपेक्षते इति वाच्यं लब्धसत्तास्पृर्तिकस्यैव स्थित्यपेक्षणात्
हेतवनपेक्षत्वे इतरानपेक्षस्थितिकस्यैव

Nor may the Vedāntin urge that just as that erroneous
surmisal which is itself Nescience is eternal *ab ante*, so if an
erroneous surmisal of connexion with Nescience be regarded
as eternal *ab ante*, then although this surmisal of connexion
is not the product of Nescience &c. as the cause, yet by
being dependent on Nescience (tat), it will come to an end
on the cessation of Nescience (tat). For this erroneous surmi-
sal of connexion which is eternal *ab ante*, sc. independent of
production (i. e. of a producing cause), and a knowledge of
which depends on the Witness, could not be dependent on
Nescience (tat) as in no way standing in need of Nescience.
Nor may be urged that the common fact of experience is
that the knowledge of relation depends on the knowledge of
the things related. For although the knowledge of a relation
as given by perception &c. depends on a knowledge of
the things related (tat), yet here the reverse is the case, since
Nescience, though it is one of the related things, must
be in relation with the Witness in order to be known at all.
Nor may it be urged that for the sake of its own persistence
a relation demands some related thing. For only that which
exists and is present in consciousness needs to persist. And
because that which is independent of a cause does persist in-
dependent of aught else. (The Vedāntin assumed above
that the sambandhādhyāsa was uncaused).

न चाज्ञानस्य ग्रहप्रागभावरूपस्य ग्रहानुपलम्भादुपलम्भ इति
 वाच्यं नित्योपलम्भरूपस्यात्मनोऽनुपलम्भानुपपत्तेः भावरूपजगदु-
 पादानस्य चाज्ञानस्याभावरूपत्वानुपपत्तिश्च तथा चाज्ञानस्यैवा-
 भावात् कथं तज्जगत्कारणत्वेनोपन्यस्यत इति ।

नैवम् ।

प्रश्नस्य ज्ञानपूर्वत्वादाक्षेपे प्रतियोगिधीः ।

अवश्यं भाविनी पूर्वा विरोधः स्यादित्यन्यथा ॥ ३९ ॥

कथमज्ञानसिद्धिरिति वदन्प्रवृत्तयः किमयमज्ञानस्वरूपवि-
 चयकः प्रश्नः किं वा तत्स्वरूपाऽऽक्षेपः तत्स्वरूपसाधकप्रसाह-
 प्रश्न एव वा अयम् । आद्ये भज्जाते स्वरूपे प्रश्नानुपपत्तेः प्रश्ना-
 त्पूर्वमज्ञानस्वरूपसिद्धेरवश्यभावात्तत्रैवाज्ञानस्वरूपं सिद्धमिति
 कोत्र प्रश्नः ।

Nor may it be urged that Nescience, which is the antecedent negation* of knowledge, is known through the non-perception* of knowledge. For there can be no non-perception of the Self, which is itself eternal perception. Nor can Nescience, which is the material cause of a *positive* entity, so. the world, have itself a *negative* character.

And thus since Nescience does not indeed exist, how was it declared to be the cause of the world ?

Not so (replies the Vedāntin): Because knowledge must precede a question; and for a negation a previous knowl-
 edge of the thing denied is essential. Otherwise contradiction follows from question and negation (itah)...XXXIX.

The opponent who puts the question, How is Nescience

Met. Nescience, though inexp- proved? must be asked whe-
 cable by any pramāṇa is vouched for ther his question concerns the
 by the Self or eternal Witness. nature of Nescience, or is a
 denial of Nescience, or asks for the evidence (pramāṇa) which
 proves Nescience. In the first case, if the nature of Nesci-
 ence were unknown, his question would be impossible;
 for since a knowledge of the nature of Nescience is necessary
 previous to the question, that nature is known already to
 the opponent (tava) and therefore the question is unnecessary.

* For *prāgabdhā* and *anupalabdhi* (or the sixth pramāṇa of the Vedāntins) cf. Ved. paribh. Pandit Vol VII pp 318 326

न च सामान्यज्ञानाद्विशेषजिज्ञासा युक्ता उक्तदोषात् न चाक्षेपो युक्तो ज्ञानज्ञानस्य प्रतियोगिज्ञानपूर्वकत्वनिवर्तनेन ज्ञानस्वरूप-
सिद्धेः पूर्वमेव वृत्तत्वात् न च अतोपस्थितस्याज्ञानस्याक्षेपो न्याय्यः
यतः केन कुत्र अम इति पृष्ठे परीक्षशब्दाभासेनाज्ञानविषयक
इत्येवोत्तरं तथा च अमस्य स्वसमानविषयकाज्ञानोपपादकत्वाद-
ज्ञानविषयकापराज्ञानस्वीकारेऽनवस्था दुर्बारा । इन्त तर्हि
एकाज्ञानासहिष्णुतया ज्ञेयं प्रयुज्जानस्यानेकाज्ञानस्वीकरणे मदा-
नमतस्य स्वव्याघातगौरववैयर्थ्यादिदोषनपश्यतः स्वपक्षनिर्वाहो
व्याहृत एव ।

And he may not reply that the desire for special know-
ledge, following on general knowledge, is proper ; for the
fault mentioned above (sc. the desire is unnecessary) applies
here. Nor is a denial of Nescience proper ; for, in accord-
ance with the rule that the knowledge of a negation must
be preceded by a knowledge of the counterentity (or thing
denied), a knowledge of the nature of Nescience (the thing
now denied) must have existed previous (to the denial of
Nescience). And he may not reply that of Nescience as
something known through error (*i. e.* false) a denial is proper.
For when asked the question,—By what, and in regard to
what, is this error effected?—his only reply will be, This
error relates to Nescience and is effected by means of the
false words uttered by some one else. And thus since the
error is effected through Nescience which relates to itself,
a second Nescience relating to the first Nescience is admitted,
which gives rise to an inevitable regressus in infinitum.
Alas, then, for the opponent who denies Nescience and,
because of his impatience of (our theory of) a single Nesci-
ences, assumes a plurality of Nesciences, and in his
pride fails to see the defects of this view sc. contradiction,
omnibousness &c,—the free course of his view is indeed
overthrown !

न चैवं कश्चित्वापि प्रमाणाक्षेपयोः खरबासुत्पः पर्यनुयोग इति
 वाच्यम् अज्ञाततया साक्षिसिद्धेऽज्ञाननियुत्पद्यर्थे प्रमाणप्रश्नस्य
 प्रमाणादर्शनेन स्वरूपतिरस्काररूपस्य चाक्षेपस्य कर्तुं शक्नुते वात् ।
 अस्तु तर्हि नमापि सक्षिसिद्धेऽज्ञाने प्रमाणप्रश्नः समक्षः एवं
 तर्ह्यज्ञानसाक्षियोः सम्बन्धोऽपि वाच्य अन्यथा साक्षिणः साध-
 कत्वमुपपत्तेः तथा ऽज्ञानतत्सम्बन्धयोरमादित्वमपि वाच्यम्
 अन्यथा पूर्वमुक्तस्येदानीं संवारीयलम्भः स्यात् न च पूर्वमप्य-
 ज्ञानान्तरमेवेति वाच्यम् अज्ञानपरम्परातः एकस्यैव लघुत्वात्

Nor may he retort that thus a similar objection will apply to any question or denial of ours in regard to anything whatever. For we may well put a question in regard to an object, which as something unknown is vouched for by the Witness, in order to destroy the Nescience investing that object; or we may make a denial, i. e. a rejection of the reality (svarūpa) of that object because no pramāṇa for the said object is observed to exist. Well then (replies the opponent) my question as to the pramāṇa for Nescience, which is vouched for by the Witness, may be considered to the point also. Very well then (we reply), you must admit a relation between Nescience and the Witness otherwise the Witness could not be a voucher for Nescience. Likewise you must admit that Nescience and the relation of the Witness with it are eternal *ab ante* if not, a soul emancipated previous to this relation being formed would now be conscious of the world. Nor can it be said that even previous to this relation there was another Nescience (which as cause brought about a connexion between the second Nescience and the Witness); for it is easier to assume a single Nescience rather than a series of Nesciences.

तच्च यद्येन विना अनुपपन्नं तत्सर्वं सम्बन्धितव्यमनादित्व-
मनिर्वचनीयत्वं भावरूपत्वं विविच्यशक्तिकत्वमेकत्वमन्यद्वा य-
त्किञ्चिदपेक्षितं स्वोपपादकत्वेन सर्वं कल्पयामीत्यपि वाच्यम्
तथाच प्रमाणप्रश्ने अनर्थक एवाज्ञानस्य साक्षिणैव सिद्धत्वात्
न चाज्ञानविषयाज्ञाननिवृत्त्यर्थं प्रमाणप्रश्ने युक्त इति वाच्यं
तदभावात् अज्ञानस्य प्रमाणेन ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वाच्च तेन तस्य
विरोधात् । तदयं तमेदीपन्यायः तथाहि ।

अज्ञानं ज्ञातुमिच्छेद्यो मानेनात्यन्तमूढधीः ।

स तु नूनं तमः पश्येद्दीपेनोत्तमतेजसा ॥

Hence also it must be granted that Nescience which cannot be accounted for save through something else, so, through relation (of Nescience with the Witness) its own eternalness *ab ante*, inexplicability, its character as a positive entity and as a unity possessing manifold powers, or through any other character which may be necessary to account for Nescience (*sva*), leads us to infer (*kalpayati*) all these characteristics.

Thus the question whether there is any *pramāṇa* for Nescience is quite useless, since Nescience is vouched for only by the Witness. Nor can it be urged that the question whether a *pramāṇa* for Nescience exists may be rightly put with a view to destroy the Nescience relating to Nescience. For there is no such thing as Nescience relating to Nescience; and because Nescience cannot be cognised through a *pramāṇa*, since Nescience and *pramāṇa* are contradictory, so, *ajñāna* is put an end to (*nivartitya*) by *pramāṇa* (*nivarttaka*). Hence the well-known illustration of darkness and the lamp :—thus, “That dullest of dull-heads who would cognise Nescience by means of a *pramāṇa*, would forsooth go looking for darkness with a brilliant lamp !”

तथा चाज्ञानं कथमिति प्रष्ट्रिवात्माज्ञानमुपपादनीयमिति
स्वानुभवसिद्धे कथंताऽनुपपत्तिरेव । कुतस्तर्हि मे मुक्तिः कर्तृ-
त्वाद्यशेषानर्थव्रातप्रसवखीजस्यात्माज्ञानस्य स्वानुभवसिद्धत्वात् त-
त्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यजन्यापरोक्षब्रह्मात्मसाक्षात्कारेण।ज्ञानवाधादे-
वेति गृह्यते ।

२४ मनु को ज्यं बाधः तत्र पूर्वप्रत्ययस्य व्यधिकरणप्रकार-
कारवनिश्चय इत्यन्ये तत्र अन्यथाख्यात्यनङ्गीकारात् अज्ञानस्या-
वाधापत्तेश्च । सविलासाज्ञाननिवृत्तिरित्यस्मदीयाः केचित् तद-
प्यापातरमणीयं प्रत्येकसमुदायाभ्यामव्याप्तेः ।

Well then, (some one may ask) how is Nescience proved ?
The questioner himself must prove the Nescience which
relates to his Self : thus the question of *How* is impossible
in regard to Nescience which is proved by one's own con-
sciousness. Whence then emancipation for me (he may ask),
since my own consciousness is a proof of that Nescience
which relates to Self, and which is the seed whence grows
all that complex of evils beginning with (the false notion of)
agency &c ? Know then (we reply) that emancipation follows
on the destruction of Nescience through an intuition of the
identity of Self with the immediately presented Brahman—
(intuition effected) by means of the passage 'that thou art.'

24. What is this *destruction* of Nescience ? Some
Bādha, destruction of error, explained according to the Vīdāntic anirva-
chanyakṛti, to the rejection of other current views, e. g. akhyāti,
asatkṛti, &c. teaches (Naijāyikas) define it as the conviction that a
previous cognition had (as its predicate portion) a predi-
cate which (really) belonged to another subject. This defi-
nition we reject because we do not admit the technical
anyathākhyāti or mistaken cognition ; and because it would
follow on this view that there was no destruction of Nescience.

Some of us Vedāntins* hold that it is the cessation of Nes-
cience together with its products. This view too commends
itself at first sight only, for the definition fails to apply to Nes-
cience and its products, if these are taken singly or together.

* The view of the Paṇḍhapādikāvivaraṇa-अज्ञानस्य स्वकार्येण वर्त-
मानेन प्रविलीनं वा सह ज्ञानेन निवृत्तिश्च ।

किञ्च कियं निवृत्तिः ध्वंसमात्रं वा ज्ञानसाध्यः स एव वा पदार्थो-
न्तरमेव वा आत्मस्वरूपं वा । माद्यः मुद्गराद्याघातजन्यघटादि-
ध्वसेतदवयवहारात् । न द्वितीयः उत्तरज्ञानसाध्यपूर्वज्ञानध्वसे
तथात्वाप्तेः ज्ञानमात्रध्वसे ऽतिव्याप्तेश्च । न तृतीयः तद्ध्वं-
साव्यापनात् तदनिवृत्तावद्वैतक्षतेः । न चतुर्थः तस्य नित्यसिद्ध-
त्वेन ज्ञानवैयर्थ्याप्तेः । तस्माद्वाच्यस्यैव निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात्
कथमज्ञानतत्कार्यबाधान्मोक्ष इति ।

अत्र ब्रूमः ।

साक्षात्कृते त्वधिष्ठाने समनन्तरनिश्चितिः ।

अध्यस्यमानं नास्तीति वाच्य इत्युच्यते बुधैः ॥ ४० ॥

Further, what is meant by this cessation ? Is it to be defined as destruction merely ? Or as destruction effected by knowledge ? Or as something else ? Or as the Self ? Not as the first ; for in regard to the destruction of a jar effected by the strokes of a pestle the word *bādha* (*tat*) is not applied. Nor the second ; for then *bādha* would apply to the destruction of the earlier cognition effected by the later cognition, and because the definition extends too far to destruction of cognition merely. Not as the third ; for the definition will not apply to the destruction of that (something else supposed to be destruction, since a thing cannot be its own destruction) and if there is no destruction of this something else, Vedāntic Monism is overthrown. Not the fourth ; for since Self is eternally established, it follows that knowledge (in regard to Self) is unnecessary.

Hence, since the very term *bādha* cannot be explained how is it possible that emancipation should follow on *bādha* of Nescience and all its products !

To this objection we reply:—

The wise have declared that *bādha* is conviction, expressed in 'the falsely surmised object is *not*' following immediately on an intuition of the substrate (in which the thing was surmised) XL.



शुद्धेऽधिष्ठाने विपरीतमध्यस्य प्रवर्तमानस्य निवर्तमानस्य वा यदधिष्ठानविषयकं बाधकज्ञानं परीक्षमपरीक्षं वेत्तपक्षं तदनन्तरमिदमिह कालत्रयेऽपि नास्तीति योऽयं निश्चयः स एव बाध इति सर्वजनानुसवसिद्धम् । न चान्यथाख्यातिबाधेऽप्यस्यार्थस्यार्थात् पर्यवसानमस्तीति बाधयं तत्राध्यस्यमानस्यान्यत्र सत्त्वाभ्युपगमात् एवं ब्रह्मात्मसाक्षात्कारे जाते अज्ञानं तत्कार्यं च सर्वं यावत् किञ्चित्त्राध्यस्तं तत्सर्वं तत्र कालत्रयेऽपि नास्तीति यो निश्चयः स्यामुभयसिद्धः स एव तस्य तत्र बाध इत्युच्यते अत एव प्रतिपक्षोपाधौ निषेधप्रतिषेधित्वमनिर्वचनीयत्वमिति सम्प्रदायविदां लक्षणमपि समञ्जसम् ।

If after a man has falsely surmised something in regard to an unrelated substrate, whether he energise or not in regard to the surmised object, there arises for him a knowledge, be it mediate or immediate, concerning the substrate and destructive of the surmised object, then after this knowledge there comes to him the conviction—this surmised object is not in time present, past and future,—which conviction is what the word *bādha* means, as vouched for by the common experience of men.

And it cannot be urged that this meaning (of the word *bādha*) applies also to the *anyathākhyāti* view as shown by the context. For this view holds that the surmised thing (e. g. silver) exists elsewhere (while it is being surmised in the nacre—which the *Vedāntin* denies).

Thus, when intuition of the identity of Brahman and the Self has been attained, there arises the conviction, vouched for by one's own consciousness, that Nescience and its products, absolutely everything surmised to exist in Brahman (*tatra*) as substrate, do not exist in Brahman even in trinal time—this conviction is termed the *bādha* of Nescience (*tasya*) in regard to Brahman the substrate (*tatra*). Hence also the definition of *inexplicability* given by those who know the traditional teaching is adequate: it runs thus :—*inexplicability* consists in the being the counterentity to a negation made in regard to the substrate of that which is erroneously surmised.*

* cf. *Chitsukhi*, Paandit Vol. IV p 484, and *Yed. paribh.* Vol. V. p. 660.

न चांतरकालीननिषेधप्रतियोगित्वेऽपि वर्तमानातीतकालयोः
समवाय त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वमनिर्वचनीयत्वमिति वाच्यं
अनिर्वचनीयत्वापगिज्ञानात् न हि कादाचित्कत्वभात्रेणानिर्वचनी-
यत्वं भवति पराभिमतसदस्यस्यापि घटादेस्तथात्वात् न चाविद्य-
कत्वेन विशेषः कारणस्य नामान्तरकरणापत्तेः न च ज्ञानवाच्य-
त्वेन विशेषः तस्यापि सतो नादितत्त्वप्रतित्यनुपपत्तेः न च सकल-
कार्यकारणवाचक्यस्य नादतीतिप्रत्ययस्य भाषान्तरं सूचयन्मयथा

Nor can it be urged that in the above definition the negation cannot hold as to *trinal* time ; for, although the negation concerns future time, the surmised object did exist in time past and present. This objection is due to a misunderstanding of the term *inexplicability*. For *inexplicability* is not constituted merely by the *temporary character* (of the object), since temporary character (*tathātva*) belongs to jars and like objects, although such objects are regarded by non-Vedāntins (*para*) as real things. Nor can it be urged that (between real objects like jars, &c. and unreal objects like the snake and silver of the stock example) there is a difference, constituted by the qualification of *being products of Nescience* (in the case of the snake and silver). For what follows from this objection is that a new name, *sc.* Nescience, has been given to the cause (of things). Nor is there a difference (between these two classes of things) constituted by the fact of the (latter class) being destroyed by knowledge. For it would follow that in regard to this difference also (*tasyāpi*), if it were something real, the certain knowledge of its non-existence could not arise. Nor can it be urged that some further destruction must be sought for this conviction of the non-existence (of the world)—which conviction (the Vedāntins teach) is destruction of all causes and effects : otherwise (*sc.* if this conviction be admitted as real, *sat*) Vedantic Monism is overthrown (*i. e.* there would in this case be two realities, *viz.*, Brahman and the conviction that the world is false).

अद्वैतत्वमिति वाच्यम् ब्रह्मातिरिक्तसर्ववाचस्पत्यस्य तस्य स्वा-
न्तर्भावेनैव तथात्वात् न च ब्रह्मातिरिक्तमस्ति नास्ति वेति विक-
ल्पावकाशः अनिर्वचनीयत्वेन परिहृतत्वात् । अख्यात्यात्मस्यात्य-
न्तस्यातिवादिषु अन्यथायव्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः अन्यथाख्यातिवादिनैश्च
दर्शितत्वात् नेह सत्यते अन्यगौरवभयात् अनात्मविचारत्वाच्च

For this conviction (*tasya*) consisting in the destruction of *all that is not Brahman* is destruction inasmuch as it includes itself * (within the *all*). Nor is there room for the doubt whether the (world as) distinct from Brahman is or is not; for we have overthrown this doubt by showing the *inexplicability* of the world (cf. pp 38, 39.)

And because the holder of the *anyathākhyāti* view has shown that neither error nor the destruction of it can be satisfactorily accounted for on the views of *akhyāti*, *ātma-khyāti* or *asatkhyāti*, † no attempt has been made here to discuss these views for fear of extending our book; and because this discussion does not directly treat of the Self.

* ब्रह्मण्यव्यस्यमानं सर्वं कालत्रये नास्तीति निश्चयस्य अस्ति रूपद्वयमेकं वाधात्मकम् अपरमव्यस्यमानत्वम् । तत्राव्यस्यमानत्वेन रूपेण स्वाविषयत्वम् । वाधत्वेन विषयित्वमिति नात्माश्रय इत्यर्थः तथा च नाद्वैतक्षतिरिति भावः । N. D.' gloss.

† Nānā likshita thus states and refutes these views, borrowing some times even the words of the Bhāmattī (Biblio. Ind : pp. 11-18) :—

ननु अविविक्तव्यवहारप्रसज्यकं स्मरणादगृहीतमेदं ग्रहणमेव अमत्वेन व्यवह्रियते न च तद्विषयोऽनिर्वचनीयः पुरोवर्त्तिनः सत्यत्वात् । तथा नेह रजतम् । इति बाधप्रत्ययोऽपि व्यवहारमात्रं बाधते न अमविषयस्य कालत्रयाभावं बाधयति । तत्कथमनिर्वचनीयवाद इत्यख्यातिवादिनो मन्यन्ते । “The holders of the *akhyāti* view maintain as follows :—that same perceptive cognition, whose difference from recollected knowledge is not cognised, and which brings about the indiscriminate experience—‘*this* (naore) is *silver*’—where the knowledge of naore is not discriminated from that of silver—is commonly regarded as *erroneous cognition*. And the object declared by this cognition is not (what the Vedāntins technically term) *anirvachaniya*, *inexplicable*; for the object lying before us does exist. And so too the knowledge of destruction conveyed in *this is not silver* puts an end to the activity merely (which followed on the earlier cognition—sc. *this is silver*—) but does not (as the Vedāntins declare) certify to the non-

existence, in time present, past and future, of the object (sc. silver) made known in the erroneous cognition (—this is silver—). Hence the anirvachanīyakhyāti view of the Vedāntins ; sc. that, at the time of error, anirvachanīya, or unreal silver is produced, is untenable.”

The akhyāti view of the Prābhākara, it may be remarked, follows from their siddhānta that all cognition, jñāna, as being self-luminous, self-evidencing, svaprakāśa, is true, yathārtha. Thus the consciousness expressed in idam rajatam is not (as is commonly supposed) erroneous cognition, bhrama, for both its factors, the one perceptive and embracing the idam, the other memorial and embracing the rajatam, are true. But here is akhyāti, non-discrimination, of the two factors as distinct. Such non-discrimination is of course due to some defect (doṣha) visual or otherwise, and to the co operation of the similarity between sūkti and rajata which awakens the mental retentum, saṃskāra, of the rajata previously cognised. Cf. Bhāmati. p. 15.

He continues :—अख्यातौ तावद् ग्रहणमेव स्मरणादगृहीतभेद बाध्याभेद-
व्यवहारप्रसञ्जकत्वात् अत्र इति व्यवस्थापितम् । तदसत् । ग्रहणस्मरणे भासते
न वा । न चेत्तर्हि न स्तः । त्वन्मते ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वादभासने स्वरूपाभावनि-
यमात् । भासते चेत् कथं तर्हि तयोर्भेदाग्रहो भेदस्य स्वरूपत्वात् । अत एव
न अभेदव्यवहारप्रसञ्जकत्वम् । ततः कथं अमव्यवस्थापनम् । तथाबाधव्यव-
स्थापनमप्यनुपपन्नम् । यत्र त्यक्तपणस्य व्यवहारएव नोदेति तत्र नेदं
रजतम् इति ज्ञानस्य बाधकत्वं न स्यात् । तस्मादख्यातौ अम-
बाधव्यवस्थापनादुपपत्तिरिति । “On the akhyāti view error is thus
accounted for—*perceptual* cognition, whose difference from *memorial*
cognition has not been perceived, is error, in that it leads to the
experience of the thing hereafter to be rejected, sc. silver, as identical
with the thing perceived, sc. nacre. This is wrong. Do the two,
sc. the *perceptual* and *memorial* cognitions, appear in consciousness or
not ? If not, they exist not. For since you hold that knowledge is self-
luminous (self-evidencing), it follows necessarily that when knowledge
shines not, it exists not (svarūpa = satta). If both the above cognitions
shine forth in consciousness, then non-perception of the difference
between them is impossible, for this difference does exist as cognition
(svarūpatvāt = jñātātmatvatvāt). Hence also (to the *perceptual* cog-
nition) does not belong (as you maintain) the power of bringing about
the experience of *identity* (of silver and nacre) Therefore it is impos-
sible, on this view, to account for error. So too your grounding of *bādhā*,
or destruction of error, is contradictory. For where, in the case of
a desire less man no activity follows (on his error in regard to
the nacre) the cognition expressed in this is not a yet would not be

the destroyer of his error (because you hold that this cognition destroys only the activity in regard to the silver ; and therefore this man, having no desire for silver, would remain inactive and still continue to regard the nacre as silver). Hence, on the akhyāti view, neither error nor the destruction of it can be satisfactorily accounted for."

आत्मख्यातिवादिनोऽपि न रजतमव्यस्तम् इत्याहुः किं तु संप्रयोगमन्तरेण अपरोक्षत्वात् संविदात्मकत्वेनान्तरस्य रजतस्य बहिष्ठवेन प्रतीतिर्ममः । नेदं रजतम् इति बाधोऽपि न रजतासत्त्वमावेदयति किं तु तत्र इदंताऽपरपर्यायं बहिष्ठवं प्रतिषेधति धर्मिधर्मभयानिषेधापेक्षया धर्ममात्रनिषेधे लाघवात् इत्येवं संगिरन्ते । " The holders of the ātmakhyāti view also declare that the silver is not erroneously surmised (as the Vedāntins hold), but that since the silver is immediately perceived without any intercourse (of sense-organs &c. with it), it consists of knowledge (samvit = vijñāna) : that of this internal silver (as thus constituted) there is a cognition under the form of externality : that this cognition is false. Further that the bādha, expressed in 'this is not silver,' does not certify to the non-existence of silver but denies in regard to silver (tatra) externality, which externality is another synonym for this-ness ; because the denial of the attribute, so, this-ness or externality, is, in accordance with the law of parsimony, preferable to the denial of both the subject, sc. the silver, and the attribute, so its externality."

आत्मख्यातावपि किं ज्ञानाकारता बाह्ये अध्यस्यते ज्ञानात्मनि रजते वा बहिष्ठवम् । नाथः विज्ञानवादिमतं बाह्यस्य अलीकत्वादसत्त्वेन अधिष्ठानत्वात्पक्षेः । तथात्वे वा इदं रजतमसत् इति प्रतीतिः स्यात् । ननु सत् इत्युल्लेखाभावात् असदेव इति चेन्न । तथात्वे रजतार्थिनः प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यात् । अथ रजते बहिष्ठवं समारोप्यते । तर्हि तस्याप्यसत्त्वात् तद्विषयज्ञानस्य अपरोक्षता न स्यात् । असत्ख्यात्यापत्तेरयं । रजतस्य ज्ञानाकारत्वे प्रमाणाभावाच्च । न च नेदं रजतम् इति बाधपक्षे एव लाघवाद्बुद्ध्युद्गीतो रजतस्य बाह्यत्वनिषेधेन अर्थादान्तरत्वमावेदयति इति साम्प्रतम् । इदं हि सन्निहितत्वम् । तच्चक्षुषिदं तर्हि असन्निहितमेव रजतं स्यात् तस्य प्रतिपत्तात्मकं सन्निहिततमत्वं कुतस्त्यम् । न च संप्रयोगमन्तरेण अपरोक्षत्वात् तस्य ज्ञानात्मकत्वम् । दोषवशाद्देशान्तरवर्तिन एव रजतस्य इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षोपपत्तेः । संप्रयोगमन्तरेण इति तत्र । बाधो नोभयमपि निषेधति किं तु तयोस्तादात्म्यम् । तस्मिंश्च निषिद्धे इदं पुरोवर्तिनि स्थास्यति रजतं रजतत्वं च देशान्तरे रजते च इति तन्मतं प्रमत्वा व्यवस्थापनमनुचितमेव । " According to the ātmakhyāti view also, either the form of knowledge is erroneously imposed on external (silver), or externality is imposed on the silver which really consists of knowledge ! Not the first alternative ; for since according to vijñānavāda

(sensationalism) no external object exists, it is impossible to regard the silver as a substrate (in which something might be surmised), for it exists not. Or even if the former alternative be admitted, our perception ought to take the form 'this silver is unreal' (and this form it does not take). And against this it cannot be argued that since the term *real* is not applied (to the silver under discussion) the silver must of course be *unreal*. For if this were the case, one would not attempt to grasp the (unreal) silver. Then, the other alternative remains, *sc.* externality is imposed on the silver (which is nothing more than a sensation). In this case, since externality also exists not, the knowledge of it could not be perceptual (for perception deals with *satvishaya* or an existing object), and because on this view would follow *asatkhyāti* or perception of blank non-entity; and because there is no evidence to prove that the silver consists of *jñāna* *sc.* is a sensation. Nor is it correct to say that the knowledge of *bādha* conveyed in 'this is not silver,' accepted in accordance with the law of parsimony, declares by implication the *internal* character of the silver, in denying its externality. For *this-ness* is *nearness* (*this* represents the object immediate, *most nearly* perceived); and if *this-ness* be denied (of the silver, cf. ^{supra}), then the silver must be something distant: however then could that maximum of nearness, which constitutes the knower, pertain to silver (which the *vijñānavādin* declares to be *internal*)? Nor does the silver consist in knowledge, because it is immediately perceived without any intercourse of sense-organs &c.; for the qualification *without any intercourse* &c. is unproved, since intercourse with sense-organs (—though of the *alaukika*, kind, technically termed *jñānalakṣhanā pratyāśatti*) due to some defect visual or otherwise, must be admitted in regard to silver existing elsewhere.

Nor is it correct to say that the *bādha* expressed in 'this is not silver' denies external *this-ness* and not the silver. The *bādha* denies neither, but it does deny the identity of the two. And when this identity is denied, the *this-ness* will continue to exist in the presented object, *sc.* the *naśa*, and the silver and the silver-ness will exist in some other place and in some silver respectively. Hence the grounding of error and its destruction according to the *ātmakhyāti* view is quite untenable."

It would appear from *Bhāmati* p. 15, that the *ātmakhyāti* view belongs to both the *Sautrāntikas* as well as to the *Vijñānavādins*.

अस्तव्यातिवादिनोऽपि न अनिर्वचनीयं रजतम् इत्याहुः किं तु निस्तत्त्वमसत्त्वं रजतम् । प्रकाशम् मासते अत एव बाधाऽपि रजतास

तस्माद्वाचकप्रत्ययोत्तरवचस्तस्य त्रैकालिकासत्त्वनिरचयो वाच
इति सिद्धम् । तथा च सुरेश्वरः ।

सत्यसत्यादिवाचयोत्तरसम्यग्धीक्षणसमावृतः ।

अविद्या सह कार्येण नासीदस्ति सविष्यति ॥

It has therefore been proved that bādha is the conviction as to the non-existence in trinal time of that which was surmised, consequent on the knowledge of a bādha, or d stroyer of the surmise. And thus Sureśvara declares :—
‘Nescience with its products was not, is not, nor will
Bhāṭ Up bh. c. hyavārtika, III. 183. be, whenever perfect know-
ledge is produced’ from sentences as ‘that thou art.’**

स्वमेव बोधयति नेदं रजतमिति । The asatkhyātivādins (Śūnyavādins or Māh-
janikas) also maintain that the silver is not anirvachanīya but a blank non-entity.
That the silver appears to consciousness is due solely to cognition, which can
illumine (i. e. make known) non-entity. Hence even bādha makes known the
non-existence of silver thus—‘this is not silver’ ”

यत् अस्तत्ख्यातौ अमंदव अस्तत्प्रकाशनसमर्थं ज्ञानं भासयति इति तद-
प्यस्त । अस्ततोऽपरोक्षप्रतीत्यदर्शनात् । सामर्थ्यस्य च कुत्र सामर्थ्यम् इति
विषयसापेक्षत्वेन विषयस्य अस्तत्तच्च कार्यज्ञाप्यविकल्पासङ्ख्यात् अस्ती एव
अस्तत्ख्यातिः । यदपि बाधो रजतास्त्वमेवावेदयति इति तदप्यन्यथाख्यातिवा-
दिमतं पूर्वमेवात्मख्यातिनिराकरणप्रसङ्ग एव परिहितम् । ततो न ख्यात्यन्तरं
युक्तमित्यर्थः ।

‘Then also the statement, on the asatkhyāti view, that cognition which can
illumine non-entity, makes the non-existent silver shine forth in consciousness, is
incorrect. For immediate perception of a non-entity is unknown. And since
power implies an object—thus, power in regard to what?—and since in regard to
a non-existent object it cannot be affirmed either that it is an existing effect (kārya)
or logical effect (grāhya) so something made known), it follows that the
asatkhyāti view is wholly erroneous. And the statement that bādha declares the
non-existence of silver has been already refuted by the anyathākhyātivādin,
when treating of the ātmakhyāti view.”

* The verse runs thus :—

कल्याणवैद्यैव सत्पक्षे सा चानुभवसंग्रया ।

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थसम्यग्धीजन्यमावृतः ॥

१५ अथ कथं विद्याया अविविद्यावाचकत्वम् विरोधादिति चेत्
कस्तर्हि नयो विरोधः किमेककालानवस्थितत्वमुक्तैकदेशानवस्थि-
तत्वम् । आहोस्त्वत् सध्यघातकत्वम् अथवा साक्षात्साक्षात्त्वक-
त्वम् । नाद्यः पूर्वसाधिविद्याविद्याया सह विद्याया एककालावस्थि-
तत्वात् विद्योत्तरनविद्यानिवृत्तेः अन्यथा विद्यावैयर्थ्यात् । न
द्वितीयः कथधिकरणयोर्विद्याऽविद्यायोर्विरोधाभावेनैकाधिकरण-
त्वस्यावश्यं चकठ्यत्वात् । तृतीये सध्यस्य घातो वाच्यः । यत्न-
स्तत्वं घातकत्वम् एवंतो घातकत्वकृतत्वं घातकत्वमिति चेत् स
तर्हि सध्योद्भिन्नः स्वतन्त्रः पदार्थः कश्चित् उत गदुमः सदात्मैव
वा । आद्ये सध्यस्य एवंतो न स्वादिभबद्धिन्ध्ययोरेव परस्परस-
ध्यन्त्वात् । द्वितीये धर्म एव धर्मियो दीर्घाद्युद्भवमानयति
अन्यथा निराश्रयो धर्म एव न स्यात्

25. Now the objection may be raised:—How can Knowledge be the destroyer of Nescience, ? Because (the Siddhāntin replies) they are opposed. What, then, is the

Objection: the supposed opposition between Knowledge and Nescience cannot be intelligibly stated. opposition between them? Does it consist (i) in the impossibility of their existing at the same time? Or (ii) in the same place? Or (iii) in the one being the destroyer of the other, i.e. that which is to be destroyed? Or (iv) in the positive and negative characters respectively of knowledge and nescience?

Not the first, for knowledge must exist at the same time along with Nescience which preceded, because the destruction of Nescience is subsequent to knowledge; otherwise knowledge would be useless. Not the second: since (to prove his point of mutual opposition*) the Siddhāntin is bound to declare that Knowledge and Nescience have the same locus, because there would be no opposition between Knowledge and Nescience, if they had separate loci. On the third alternative, the destruction (ghāta) of that which is to be destroyed must be maintained. If it be replied that ghāta-katva implies agency:—thus, it is that which brings about ghāta, i. e. dhvamsa, destruction; then it may be asked whether (a) this ghāta is an independent something, distinct from that which is to be destroyed (vadhyā) or (b) is an attribute of the vadhyā or (c) is the vadhyā itself?

If (a), then destruction of the vadhyā would be impossible.

* विरामनिदृश्यमित्यथ ॥ १०० ॥

द्वितीये तु विद्याऽविद्योत्पादिकैवेति कुतो विरोधः । न चतुर्थः विद्याऽविद्ययोर्भयोरपि भावरूपत्वात् अविद्यायाः प्राग-भावरूपत्वस्य निरस्तत्वात् अन्यथा एककालावस्थानं न स्यात् ॥ तस्माद्विद्याऽविद्ययोर्विरोधस्य निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात्कथं विद्याया अविद्याबाधकत्वं विपरीतं वा किं न स्यादिति । अत्रोच्यते ।

उपमर्त्यैवभावत्वमविद्याया विरोधिता ।

तत्कवृत्त्वं तु विद्यायाः प्रकाशतमसोरिव ॥ ४१ ॥

यद्यपि विरोधात्तरनिह निर्वक्तुमशक्यं तथाप्युपमर्त्यापम-र्दकभावलक्षणोऽयं विरोधः शक्यत एव निर्वक्तुम् अविद्योपमर्द-कत्वस्य विद्यास्यभावस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकान्यां लोकप्रसिद्धत्वात् ।

for the two are as unconnected as the mountains Himā-
laya and Vindhya. If (b) then the attribute prolongs the
existence of its substrate, otherwise a substrateless attribute
could not exist. If (c) then Knowledge itself brings about
Nescience ; and thus there would be no opposition between
Knowledge and Nescience. Not the fourth ; for both Kno-
wledge and Nescience are positive entities, in that we have
refuted the view that Nescience is the antecedent non-existence
(negation) of knowledge : if this were not so, knowledge
and nescience could not exist at the same time. Hence
(argues the opponent) since the opposition between
Knowledge and Nescience cannot be intelligibly set
forth, why should Knowledge be regarded as the destroyer
of Nescience, or why should not the reverse be held, sc.
Nescience is the destroyer of Knowledge ?

To this we reply :—

Nescience is by nature the thing to be destroyed ;

Met : they are by nature opposed, as light and darkness and the nature of things is not to be called in question. whereas (destroying) agency belonging to Knowledge constitutes the opposing character of Knowledge, just as this is ex-

emplified in the case of darkness and light...XLI.

Although in this case no other opposition can be intelligibly maintained, yet the opposition indicated above as the relation of destroyer and thing to be destroyed can certainly be thus maintained, in that it is generally admitted fact of induction that Knowledge is by nature the destroyer of Nescience.

न च विरोधिताऽविज्ञेये विद्योपनर्दकत्वमेवाविद्यायाः किं न स्यादिति वाच्यम् । तथा सति विद्योत्पत्तिरेव न स्यात् । उपमर्दिकाया अविद्यायाः पूर्वमेव स्थितत्वात् प्रतिनियतस्वभावस्य पर्यनुयोक्तुमशक्यत्वाच्च यथा प्रकाशतमसोः । न च तत्र वैपरीत्यं शङ्कितुं शक्यते दृष्टविरोधात् ।

न च वध्यघातकपक्षोक्तदोषप्रसक्तिः उपनर्दकस्य कालत्रयेपि नास्तीति प्रमितिरूपस्य बाधापरपर्यायस्य विद्योत्तरं जायमानत्वात् ॥

इदं नन्वविद्योपनर्दकस्वभावत्व चेद्विद्यायास्तर्हि विदुषो विद्योत्पत्त्यनन्तरमविद्यायाः सकार्यायाः समूलकार्यं कथितत्वात्तदैव विदेहकै वल्यमाप्नोति देहपातस्तात्कालिकः स्यात् तथा चोच्छिन्नः सम्प्रदायः स्यात्

Nor may it be asked by way of objection why Nescience should not be the destroyer of Knowledge, since the opposition between the two is quite the same, (whether Nescience or knowledge be considered). Because if this were so, Knowledge could not indeed arise, since Nescience, the destroyer, was already existing; and further, because the settled nature of a thing cannot be called in question, as in the case of light and darkness. Nor can the reverse of this be urged, as being opposed to experience. Nor will there follow (in regard to our view) the defects noted in regard to alternative (in) pp. 135, 136, because it is subsequent to knowledge that the negation expressed in 'Nescience is not in trinal time' arises,—which negation is true knowledge, and is another synonym for bādha (destruction)

26. Here it may be argued that if knowledge is by

Reductio ad absurdum of the Vedānta - emancipation, or the cessation of bodily existence, is possible only through a sacred teacher. But the teacher is an impossibility, if knowledge destroys Nescience of which bodily existence is a product.

nature the destroyer of Nescience, then corporeal existence should at once cease for the man who has knowledge, on his obtaining that state of isolation in which consciousness of his body is an end (vidhehkaivalya).² Since subsequent to the rise of knowledge Nescience together with its products is entirely destroyed. And thus the traditional line of teachers (of Brahmavidyā) would be destroyed, (and, without a guru no emancipation!).

* Vidhehkaivalya to be distinguished from jvanmuktaye which refers to the

न च प्रारब्धसामर्थ्याद्देहपातो नास्तीति वाच्यं प्रारब्ध-
स्याप्यविद्याकार्यतया तदभावे स्थालुमशक्यत्वात् तन्त्वभावे पट-
स्यैव । न च प्रारब्धकर्मफलभोगनिर्वाहकतया कियत्कालमवि-
द्याप्यनुवर्त्ततइति वाच्यं विद्याया अविद्योपमर्दकत्वस्वभावहा-
निप्रसङ्गात् । न चोत्तरकालएव तथास्वभावः एकस्य स्वभावद्वया-
नभ्युपगमात् न चावरणशक्तिप्रधानमज्ञानं निवृत्तमेव विक्षेपश-
क्तिप्रधानं त्वनुवर्त्तते प्रारब्धनिर्वाहायेति वाच्यम् । अज्ञानद्वया-
त्वात् । न चैकमेव शक्तिद्वयविशिष्टम् । एकस्य युगप-
त्स्थितिनिवृत्त्योर्विरुद्धत्वात् । न च शक्तिनिवृत्तिमात्रमेव
विवक्षितं शक्तिशक्तिमतोरभेदात् भेदे वा अज्ञान न निवर्त्तत

Nor may it be argued against this view that corporeal existence does not cease because of the retributive efficacy of actions. For being a product of Nescience, this retributive efficacy cannot prevail when Nescience has ceased to exist, just as the cloth is at end when the threads have ceased to exist.

Nor may it be further urged that Nescience also continues to exist for a short time sufficient to bring about (for the individual) the fruition of the actions (by him) in earlier spheres of existence. For this view would imply the loss to knowledge of its nature as the destroyer of Nescience. Nor against the above is it to be urged that this character of destroyer belongs to knowledge only at a time subsequent (to that indicated above). For one and the same thing cannot have two natures. Nor again that Nescience *quâ* concealing power ceases (with the rise of knowledge, but *quâ* projecting power it continues to exist in order to work out the retributive efficacy of actions. For there are not two Nesciences. Nor again that though *one* only, Nescience is possessed of two-fold power. For that the one thing should at the same time both be and cease to be is contradictory. Nor again that the cessation of the power merely is implied (above). For the power and that which possesses power are identical : or if different, Nescience could not cease to be.

न च प्रारब्धनिवृत्त्या तद्विवृतिः प्रारब्धनिवृत्तेः अप्रमाण-
त्वात् । न च तदनन्तरं ज्ञानमेवाप्रतिबहुं तद्विवर्तकमिति वाच्यं
प्रारब्धनाशे देहपातानन्तरं ज्ञानस्यैवाभावात् पूर्वज्ञानस्य च प्रा-
रब्धेन प्रतिबहुत्वात् । न चाविद्यासंस्कारो ज्ञेशविद्याशब्दाति-
थेयोऽनुवर्तन इति वाच्यं तस्याप्यविद्याकार्यत्वात् । अविद्या-
साव्रतत्वे च संस्कारशब्दप्रयोगवैयर्थ्यात् । जीवन्मुक्तिप्रतिपादक-
श्रुतिस्मृतिप्रामाण्याद्विदुषो देहस्थितिः कल्प्यतइति चेन्न
शास्त्रस्य जीवन्मुक्तिप्रतिपादने प्रयोजनानाभावात् ।

Nor again that there is cessation of Nescience (tat) through
ce-sation of prārabdha. For the cessation of prārabdha
is not a source of knowledge (pramāṇa, and only
Knowledge can put an end to Nescience). Nor is it
to be argued that after the² cessation of prārabdha,
Knowledge being unobstructed (by prārabdha) puts an end
to Nescience (tat). For when following on the destruction
of prārabdha bodily existence has ceased, knowledge itself is
not; and because knowledge prior (to the destruction of
prārabdha) was obstructed by prārabdha (and could not
therefore operate as the destroyer of nescience) Nor again,
that a mental retentum of Nescience, technically termed *kleśa-
vidyā*, continues to exist. For this also is a product of Nes-
cience (and must therefore perish along with Nescience, its
upādāna or material cause) and because it is useless to ap-
ply the term *retentum* to that which really is Nescience. Nor
may it be argued that the continued existence of a body for
him who has gained knowledge is inferred on the authority of
Śruti and Smṛiti passages, which declare the (technical) *jīvan-
mukṭi* is ate or enaie pation of one while alive. For it is
not the aim of the *Śāstra* to teach *jīvanmukti*

मुमुक्षुणा अवगाहौ प्रवृत्तिः प्रयोजनमिति चेत् अस्तु तर्हि अव-
गादिधिषेरर्थवादस्तत् शास्त्रं तथाच लौकिकधैदिकप्रमाणविरो-
धात्तेन कथं विदुषो देहस्थितिः कल्पयते । न च मुक्तपुरुषास्तेन
प्रारब्धस्थितिः साधितेति वाच्यं, दृष्टान्ते वैषम्यात् तत्र कर्मापा-
दानं स्येदोरनाशात् । न च जीव-मुक्तो साध्वर्णौकिकी प्रसिद्धिर-
व्याहृतेति वाच्यं प्रमाणाविरहेण प्रसिद्धेरन्धपरम्परारूपत्वात् । न
चाप्रामाणिकस्य शास्त्रकारैरुपपादनसमर्थकमिति वाच्यं शिष्यस्या-
विद्वत्तया गुरावविश्वासपरिहारप्रयोजनतया तत्कार्यवत्त्वात् ।

If against this it be said that its aim is to urge those who seek emancipation to engage in *hearing* &c. then it must be granted that the passage in which jīvanmukti is taught (taccāstram) is an *arthavāda* passage laudatory of the injunction (*vidhe*) to *hear* &c. and thus it is not possible to infer by means of the passage teaching jīvanmukti that the body of him who has gained knowledge continues to exist, for this is opposed to both natural and supernatural evidence.* Nor again is it to be argued that the continued existence of prārabdha is confirmed by the example of an arrow shot from a bow. The analogy is not strict; for in the former case, the arrow as the substrate in which the motion inheres is not destroyed (whereas Nescience, the substrate of prārabdha, is destroyed *ex hypothesi*). Nor again that the universal opinion (of teachers) in regard to Jīvanmukti is untouched (by the above objection). For in the absence of proof, common opinion is but blind tradition. Nor again that the exposition by the Sūtra-teachers of something unproved would be purposeless. For such exposition has its purpose in destroying the distrust in his teacher which the pupil through his ignorance might entertain.

* natural, so the destruction of the samskara follows on the destruction of avidyā, its upādāna, as is commonly observed in regard to cause and effects. *Super-*
natural, so, that afforded by such Vedic passages as 'the letter of the heart is broken &c. Mu. Up. II 2.8

तस्माद्विद्याया अविव्योपमर्दकत्वस्य स्वाभावात् विदुषः स-
द्योसुक्तावुपदेष्टुरभावात् कुतो विद्योत्पत्तिः न चाचार्यनि पेशेन
विद्येति साम्प्रतं आचार्यवाच्यपुरुषो वेद नैया तर्केण नतिराप्रनेया
प्राप्य वरास्त्रिवोचन आचार्यस्ते गतिं वक्तेनि अनन्यप्रोक्ते गतिरात्र
नास्ति प्रोक्तान्येनैव सुज्ञानाय प्रेष्ठ इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः . नैव दोषः ।

कल्पितोप्युपदेशा स्वाद्ययाशास्त्रं समादिशेत् ।

न चात्रिनिगमो दोषो ऽविद्यावत्त्वेन निर्णयत ॥ १२ ॥

Hence (concludes the opponent) since Knowledge is by nature the destroyer of Nescience, instant emancipation accrues to him who knows ; and thus, in the absence of a teacher, the rise of Knowledge is impossible.

Nor is it correct to say that knowledge is certainly independent of a teacher. For as declared in Śruti passages — So he who has a teacher knows : That knowledge is not to

Chānd. Up. VI. 14.

Kātha Up. I. 2. 7

" " I 3 14.

Chānd. Up. IV 14.

be obtained by argument Having obtained your boons (sc. excellent teachers) understand them: but a teacher

will tell you the way to another life . Unless it (Self) be taught by another there is no way to it . but when it is decla-

Kātha Up. I. 2. 8.

" " 1. 2. 9.

red by another, then, O Dearest, it is easy to understand.

Our conclusion is not incorrect.

A teacher there cannot be, even though he be surmised ;

Met an unreal teacher can declare the Real, Brahman, just as the unreal face seen in water makes known the real face reflected therein.

he can teach, as the Veda teaches. Nor is there here the fault of proposing alternatives wi-

thout giving a reason for the adoption of one of them, for decision is arrived at though the fact that ignorance pertains (to one only, sc the pupil, avidyāvatvena) XLII

१४२ चिद्धान्तमुक्तावली ।

यद्यपि विदुषस्तदानीमेव मुक्तत्वात् पारमार्थिकः कश्चिदुप-
 देष्टा नास्ति तथापि कल्पितेन गुरुणा विद्योत्पत्तिरुपपन्नत्वात् ज्ञानु-
 पपत्तिः काचित् । न च कल्पितस्य कथं सत्यज्ञानजनकत्वमिति
 वाच्यं शास्त्रबहुपपत्तेः प्रलम्बिन्मवचच । न च गुरुशिष्ययोर्मध्ये
 कतरः कल्पक इत्यविनिगमो दोष इति वाच्यम् । अविदुषः
 कल्पकत्वात् गुरोरेव विदुषः कल्पनाश्रीकाभावेन तद्विदुषः ।
 तस्माच्छास्त्राचार्यप्रसादासादितस्त्वमस्यादिकाक्योत्पत्तिस्तत्का-
 रेण मोक्षाविर्भावप्रतिबन्धकाज्ञानगतकार्यतिरस्कारसमनन्तरं नि-
 त्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावाद्वितीयानन्दोऽस्मीति मन्यते ततः कृत-
 कृतयो भवतीति ।

Although no real teacher exists, for (the teacher as) one who knows is at once emancipated, yet no contradiction finds place here, because knowledge can arise through an *imagined* teacher. Nor can it be argued that what is imagined (sc. the teacher) cannot bring about real knowledge. For this is possible as in the case of the Veda, and in the case of a reflexion. Nor again that our position is logically defective because a doubt exists as to which of the two, the teacher or the pupil, is here the surmiser. For the surmiser is he who knows not, and this character cannot belong to the teacher, because in him, as one who knows, the germ of surmiser (sc. avidyā) exists not. Hence when the pupil has gained intuition (of Self as Brahman) which comes from the sentence 'that thou art' through the favour of Veda and teacher, and has set aside Nescience and its products which are obstructive of emancipation, then he becomes conscious of himself as the Eternal, pure Intelligence, unrelated, one without a second, Bliss; then for him all duties are at an end. Thus we rightly spoke (in the opening verse p. 1) of 'having directly through Śruti ascertained the Self which is bliss &c.'

अतः सुष्ठूक्तमात्मानन्दं साक्षाद्विनिश्चित्येत । विज्ञानमा-
नन्दं ब्रह्म को ह्येवान्यात्कः प्रायपाद्यद्येष आकाश आनन्दो
न स्यात्तैषा आनन्दस्य मीमांसा इत्यारभ्य यश्चायं पुरुषे
यश्चासावादित्ये स एक इत्यन्तं भृगुर्वै वारुणिरित्यारभ्याऽऽनन्दो
ब्रह्मेति व्यजानादित्यन्तं यो वै भूमा तत्सुख नालपे सुखमस्ती-
त्यादिश्रुतिश्लेषैः न वा अरे पत्युः कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति
आत्मनस्तु कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति इत्यारभ्य न वा अरे
सर्वस्य कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं
भवतीत्यन्तेन व्युत्पादनाच्च आत्मनः परमानन्दरूपत्वस्य ।

And because Self has been proved to be absolute Bliss
in such many passages as 'Brahma is Intelligence, Bliss' and
in that beginning, 'who could breathe, who could breathe

Taitt Up. II 7 8.
" " III 1. 6.

forth, if that Bliss existed not
in the ether (of the heart) ? Now
this is an examination of Bliss';

and ending, 'that Bliss which is in man and that Bliss which
is in the sun, both are one'—and again in the passage begin-
ning Bhṛigu Vāruṇi (went to his father), and ending with
'He perceived that Bliss is Brahman.'—and again in the
passage, that which is Infinite is Bliss. There is no Bliss

Chānd. Up VII 23.

in anything finite'—and in the

passage beginning, 'Verily, a husband, is not dear that you
Bṛhad Up. II 4. may love the husband, but that
you may love the Self, therefore a husband, is dear' and
ending 'Verily, everything is not dear that you may love
everything, but that you may love the Self, therefore
everything is dear

२३ नन्वानन्दत्वादयो धर्मा आत्मनि सन्ति न वा आद्ये ते किं सत्या असत्या वा आद्यः द्वैतापत्तेः नेतरः धर्मिणोऽनानन्दत्वापत्तेः न हि रजतस्य यत्रारोप्यनेतद्रजतम् । न चानानन्द-
त्वमानन्दभिन्नस्य तदपि नास्तीति वाच्यं तथाप्यनन्दरूपत्वा-
सिद्धेः । न द्वितीयः आनन्दत्वानाश्रये आनन्दव्यवहारादर्शनात् न
च सर्वव्यवहारातीतोऽलौकिक एवायमानन्दः । लौकिकवैदिकप-
दार्थोपारेकत्वात् अन्यथा लोकवेदाधिकरणविरोधः ।

27 Here it may be asked by way of objection whether

Objection. Bliss, ananda, implies blissful character and the other blissful character, anandatva, techni- cally known as the jati class-attribute or generality. Hence, over and above Brahman or Self, there exists ananditva and thus Monism (advaitavada) is overthrown.

If so, whether they are real or unreal (i. e. surmised) Real they cannot be; for this would imply duality (sc. Self, and the real attributes) Nor can they be unreal; for this would imply that the substrate (i. e. Self in which these attributes are surmised) does not really possess blissful character: just as that substrate, sc. nacre in which silver-ness is surmised is not really silver. Nor (in reply) may it be urged (by the Vedāntin) that the possession of a not blissful character = possession of a character other than blissful; and that such character also does not pertain to Self. For the blissful character of Self would still remain unproved. And the second alternative, sc. that blissful character does not exist in Self, will not hold. For the term bliss is not applied to anything which is not the substrate of the attribute blissful. Nor can it be urged that this, the Bliss (or Brahman of Vedānta), is something transcending the common usage of the word. For the common and Vedic meanings of a word must be identical: to deny this (anyathā) would be to deny the adhikaraṇa (of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā I 3 30) teaching that words have the same meaning in Veda that they have in common speech

न च वाक्यार्थ एवायमानन्दस्वतेनाऽपि जानन्दत्वाप्रतिपा-
दनात् अखण्डे एव तात्पर्यात् । न च सर्वथा अलौकिके सुखे
कस्यापि कामना सम्भवति स्वर्गादेरपि लौकिकसुखसजातीयत्वात् ।
अत्र के चिन्त । अनानन्दव्यावृत्तिमात्रमानन्दत्वं न तु प्रसिद्ध जानन्द
एवात्मा धर्मवर्तिभावानभ्युपगमात् न च व्यावृत्त्यापि द्वैतापत्तिः
तस्या आश्रयानतिरेकात् । एतेन जानन्त्वादयो व्याख्याताः । तन्न
व्यावृत्तेरपदार्थत्वात् अपोहवादापत्तेः व्यावर्तकधर्मस्यावश्यं वक्त-
व्यत्वाच्च अन्यथा व्यावृत्त्यसिद्धेः ।

Nor is this transcendental Bliss what the sentence (as a whole, considered apart from its constituent words) means. For even so (the Vedic sentence) does not predicate blissful character as an attribute, since it is devoted to teaching the *impartite* (attributeless) Brahman. Nor is at all possible for one to desire transcendental bliss, for Paradise and like supersensuous objects of desire are also generically the same as worldly bliss. Here some teachers might interpose that blissful character is (predicated) merely with a view to the

The view of the Samkshhepaśāstrakā exclusion of all that is not
L. 1 sl 174 is unsatisfactory : bliss ; but it is not meant that
bliss as commonly understood is Self, for the relation of sub-
ject and attribute is not admitted (in regard to the Self) .
Nor (continue these teachers) does dualistic doctrine follow
logically on such exclusion differentiation), for such exclusion
is nothing other than the substrate (or Self). In this way
the attributes of possessing knowledge &c. are (by them)
explained. The above view must be rejected ; for the *exclu-
sion* urged above is nothing at all. And because thereon
would follow the view of universal negation of the Vijnāna-
vādins). *

* Apohavāda is the sensationalist's reply to the question—If no object exists

न च स्वरूपेणैव व्यावृत्तिः आत्मनोऽव्यावृत्तत्वात् अन्यथा
 प्रकृतत्वापत्तेः । अन्ये तु आनन्दत्वाद्वा यो धर्मो यत्र कल्पितास्ते
 एव आनन्दादिपदार्था लोके अपि प्रसिद्धाः तत्राप्यानन्दत्वादीनां
 कल्पितत्वात् न चैतावता आनन्दस्य का चित्कतिरस्ति धर्मस्यानु-
 पादेयत्वात् तदाश्रयव्यक्तेरेवामिच्छयणीयत्वात् । तदप्यापातरमणी-
 यमिव प्रतिभाति विशिष्टस्यैवानन्दपदार्थत्वात् व्यक्तित्वात् तदनुप-
 पत्तेः कल्पितानन्दत्वाश्रयस्यानानन्दत्वप्रसङ्गानिवृत्तेश्च ।

And because some differentia or excluding attribute must
 be granted : if not, the differentiation remains unproved.
 And it cannot be said that the differentiation proceeds *per se*.
 For Self is the undifferentiated : if not, it cannot be Brahman.

Others again hold that the substrates, in which blissful
 Also that of the Panchapādiki- character and like attributes are
 vivaraja. surmised, are just what the words
 bliss, (knowledge &c), are commonly taken in this world to
 mean ; for in such worldly substrates also are surmised
 blissful character &c. Further, that on this view no harm is
 done to Bliss (sc. the Self as the aim of man), for the attribute
 (sc. blissful character) is not accepted as an object of desire ;
 since it is only an individual substrate (of certain attributes,
 tat) that is desired. This view also commends itself only at
 first sight. For the meaning of the word bliss attaches inde-
 ed to the individual as possessed of certain attributes (viśiṣ-
 ta), because it cannot attach to the individual *per se*. And be-
 cause it would for ever follow that non-blissful character
 pertains to that which is the substrate (sc. Brahman) of a
 surmised attribute, sc. blissful character.

apart from the sensation (vijñāna). whence variety (bheda) of perceptions in the
 forms 'this is blue,' 'this is yellow' &c ? He admits, that blueness, yellowness &c.
 are the causes of the variety of perceptions, but denies that these attributes are
 anything distinct from the various sensations: every such attribute is the attribute
 of a sensation and is nothing more than the *negation of a negation of itself* (svabheda-
 bhava), that is to say, sensation is self-differentiating. Another definition of apoha
 is atadvāyavṛttiḥ. here tat = uṣa; atat = pīṭa; vyāvṛttiḥ = bheda, cf. Siddh.
 muktāḥ : and Dhakari to 21, 49 of Bhāṣāparīccheda.

न हि यो धर्मो यत्र न स्वाभाविकस्तदन्तर्भावितः पदार्थः

स सम्भवति अन्यथा शुत्पादेरपि रजतपदार्थत्वापत्तेः ।

अप्रोच्यते ।

उपाधिसंश्रयो ह्यात्मा आनन्दत्वं तदाश्रयः ।

विशिष्टशक्यपक्षे तु व्यक्तिर्वा शक्तिर्नाशरः ॥ ४३ ॥

यदि लोके आनन्दत्वविशिष्ट एवानन्दपदार्थस्तदाप्यात्मैवा-

नन्दपदार्थो मुख्यः एकस्यैव नानोपाध्वनुप्रविष्टस्यानुगतव्यावृत्ति-

बुद्धिजनकतया जातिव्यक्त्युभयपक्षोपपत्तेः ।

For in a case where, in a certain substrate (yatra, sc. nacre,) an attribute (sc. silver-ness,) is not real (i. e. is falsely surmised), that substrate cannot mean that thing (sc. silver) which included within itself the surmised attribute : otherwise it follows that nacre would have to bear the meaning of the word silver.

We reply :—

On the view that the power* of a word attaches to an

Reply blissful character is really individual as possessing certain attributes, Self is the substrate of attributes ; blissful character is the substrate of Self (tat). Or the view that it is only the individual that is declared by the power* of a word may be adopted.....XLIII.

Although the word *bliss*, as commonly understood, means as individual possessing blissful character, yet Self is the primary meaning of the word *bliss*. For since a single substrate (ekasya), when in relation with many limiting adjuncts, can give rise to uniform, persistent knowledge (anugata, whence existence of jāti or class is inferred, cf. pp 101, 8 supra) and to knowledge of difference, (vyavritti, i. e. of individual things), to that single substrate can belong both *class* character and *individual* character. And thus we declared in discussing

यथा एकस्मिन्नेव स्वरूपे सर्वकल्पनाग्रहिते मुख्यमद्राक्षी
 विम्बप्रतिविम्बस्वरूपमिति त्रिविधव्यवहारस्योपाध्यनुप्रविष्ट-
 त्वारोपानन्तरं दर्शनादित्युक्तं लक्षणास्थले । अथवा व्यक्तिरेव
 सर्वत्र पदशक्तिगोचरेऽस्तु न च व्यक्तीनामानन्तर्यात्पदशक्तिसम्ब-
 न्धव्यभिचारदोषप्रसङ्गः विशिष्टशक्यपक्षे ऽपि तुल्यत्वात् विशेष-
 नाभेदे ऽपि विशेष्यभेदेन प्रतिविशेष्यं विशिष्टभेदात् । तस्मादश-
 क्येनापि शक्यतावच्छेदकेनानुगतशक्यव्यवहाराऽशक्यव्यावृत्तिव्य-
 वहारयोर्जनयितुं शक्यत्वात् ।

lakṣhaṇā (p. 97) . 'in regard to the own nature of a thing (i. e. the thing in itself), which is really one and without any attributes (cf. p. 64), e. g. a human face or the moon, a three-fold consciousness of reflected object, reflexion and the own nature of the thing is observed to arise after a connexion between the own nature of the thing and certain limiting adjuncts has been imagined.' Or let it be granted, that in all cases it is the individual alone that is made known by the power of the word. The objection to this view,—namely, that since the individuals are infinite in number, the connexion of the power of the word (with any one individual object) would sometimes fail (vyabhichāra)—will not hold good. For this objection would apply equally to the other view—namely, that the literal meaning of a word (śākya as coming directly from the śakti of the word) is the individual as possessing a certain attribute (viśiṣṭa). Because, although the attribute may be only one, the individuals possessing this attribute are many, as each is a subject,—there being many subjects. And since both views are on the same footing (tasmāt), both the knowledge of the persistent, (sc. jāti) which is the literal meaning of the word, and the knowledge of difference (sc. vyakti) can be produced through that attribute sc. blissful character, which, while it essentially constitutes the literal meaning, is not itself the literal meaning of the word (bliss)

तत्रापि शक्तिकल्पने मानाभावात् कारणस्वरूपबहिर्भूतकारणतावच्छेदकवत् । तस्मादानन्दरूपत्वे अस्मिन् न काचिदनुपपत्तिः ।

आनन्दरूपमात्मानं सच्चिदद्वयस्वरूपम् ।

अपूर्वादिप्रमाणैकं प्राप्याहं ब्रह्मपुःस्थितः ॥ ४४ ॥

योहमद्वयस्त्वेष सद्वये दृढनिश्चयः ।

प्राप्य आनन्दमात्मानं सोहमद्वयविग्रहः ॥ ४५ ॥

For there is no reason to assume that the word bliss possesses a power in regard to this essential constitutive attribute also (tatrāpi *sc.* ānandatve): just as it is unnecessary to assume causal power as residing in that attribute, which, while it is constitutive of causality, is outside (*i. e.*, is not) the cause itself. * Hence there is no contradiction in holding that blissful character pertains to Self.

Having gained intuition of Self, which is Bliss, Existence,

The teacher's Song of Joy.

One without a second, made

known through that new and originaive source of knowledge (*sc.* the Witness, *cf.* p. 102), I am become that Self....XLIV.

That same 'I' who, though really the One without a second, was once firmly persuaded of duality, am now identified with that One, having gained intuition of Bliss which is Self...XLIV.

* Taking the stock example of danda as the kāraṇa of ghata da dātava resides in danda and is the kāraṇatāvachchedaka or attribute which essentially constitutes the causal power belonging to the danda as being exactly co-extensive with it (anyūnātiprasakta), but, on the other hand, dādatva is not the kāraṇa. And so, while there is a relation technically termed śakyata between the word ānanda and the individual, *i. e.* the Self which is Bliss, it would be incorrect to say that ānandatva which is the śakyatāvachchedaka in this case is the śakya or literal meaning of the word ānanda.

नास्ति ब्रह्म सदानन्दमिति मे दुर्मतिः स्थिता ।

क गता सा न जानामि यदाहं तद्वपुःस्थितः ॥४६॥

पूर्णातान्दाद्वये तत्त्वे मेवादिजगदाकृतिः ।

बोधे ऽबोधकृतैवासीदबोधः क्व गतोऽधुना ॥ ४७ ॥

संसाररोगसंग्रस्तो दुःखराशिरिवापरः ।

आत्मबोधसमुन्नेषादानन्दाविधरहं स्थितः ॥ ४८ ॥

योऽहमल्पेऽपि विषये रागवानतिविह्वलः ।

आनन्दात्मनि संप्राप्ते स रागः क्व गतोऽधुना ॥ ४९ ॥

यस्य मे जगतां कर्तुः कार्यैरपहृतात्मनः ।

आविर्भूतपरानन्द आत्मा प्राप्तः श्रुतेर्ब्रह्मात् ॥ ५० ॥

Brahman the existent, Bliss, is not'—such was my mistaken judgment : but now that I have become that Brahman I know not whither that judgment fled.... XLVI.

The external world of Meru, &c , was through Nescience wrought in the One Reality which is perfect Bliss . but now that knowledge of Brahman has been attained, where is that Nescience gone ?...XLVII.

Seized by the ills of life I became another, a mountain of pain, as it were , but now through knowledge of Self I am an ocean of Bliss.. XLVIII.

Then yearned I for little things and was much disquieted ; but such yearning is no more, for now know I the Self which is Bliss..., XLIX.

That creator of worlds am I, whose Self was drawn away by the products of Nescience (sc. by mind, sense-organs &c) : now through Śruti my Self, the highest Bliss, has been manifested...L.

परासृष्टो ऽसि लब्धो ऽसि प्रोदितोसि चिरं मया ।

इदानीं त्वामहं प्राप्तो न त्यजामि कदा चन ॥ ५१ ॥

त्वां विना निःस्वरूपोऽहं मां विना त्वं कथं स्थितः ।

दिष्ट्येदानीं मया लब्धो योसि सोसि नमोऽस्तु ते ॥ ५२ ॥

देहाभिमाननिगडैर्बद्धो ऽवोधारयतस्करैः ।

चिरं ते दर्शनादेव त्रुटितं बन्धनं क्षणात् ॥ ५३ ॥

विमुक्तोऽस्मि विमुक्तोऽस्मि पुर्णात्पुर्णतमाकृतिः ।

असंस्पृश्य ममात्मानमन्तर्ब्रह्माण्डकोटयः* ॥ ५४ ॥

सर्वमादिवक्षोजालमावृतमसकृत्पुरा ।

इदानीम् तत्प्रसादेव पूर्णानन्दो ऽयमस्थितः ॥ ५५ ॥

Thou hast been pondered and gained : long wert thou absent from me : now have I gained thee, never to leave thee LI.

Without thee I cease to be : without me thou canst be ; oh joy ! thou art what I now have gained : Hail to thee ! ... LII.

Bound was I in the bonds of conceit of body by those thieves, the many forms of Nescience : but at the very sight of thee that bondage was destroyed ... LIII.

I am pure and emancipated, my form is more pervasive than the pervading† (ākāśa, ether) : let numberless worlds then be within me, they touch not my Self ... LIV.

Formerly the whole collection of Vedic passages such as 'that thou art' was concealed (by Nescience) again and again ; but now absolute Bliss remains constant through the 'hearing' of the Veda ... LV.

* Var. loc. तमात्मानं सन्तु ब्रह्माण्डकोटयः ।

† पूर्णाद्विभोराकाशमपि पूर्णतम इति त्रिविधपरिच्छेदशून्य इत्यर्थः
N D's gloss त्रिविध = दश, काल, वस्तु

२८ ननु परिपूर्णानन्दस्वभावश्चेदात्मा कथं संसारावस्थायां न स्फुरति । न च परमप्रेमास्पदतयाऽऽत्मनः स्फूर्तिरेवानन्द-
रूपस्य स्फूर्तिरिति वाच्यं तादृगतिमानाभावात् न हि मोक्षा-
वस्थायां यद्दृगानन्दस्वरूपतत्त्वमात्मनः श्रूयते एवस्यैवानन्दस्था-
न्यानि भूतानि मानामुपजीवन्तीत्यदिश्रुतेस्तादृगानन्दात्माभि-
मानः कस्य विदस्ति आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो रूपं तच्च मोक्षे प्रतिष्ठित-
मिति मोक्षे एव तदभिव्यक्तिश्रवणाच्च संसारावस्थायां प्रतिबन्ध-
सत्त्वाद्वासमानमप्यानन्दरूपत्वं नाभिमन्यत इति चेत्कस्तर्हि प्रति-
बन्धः अज्ञान तत्कार्यं वा आद्यो जीवस्य परस्य वा नान्त्यस्तस्य सर्व-
ज्ञस्य निरवद्यस्य तदभावात् नाद्यस्तस्य परेकाभेदात् नान्यो तास्ति
द्रष्टेत्यनेन जीवेनात्मना तद्व्यवस्थयमात्मा ब्रह्मेत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः ।

28. Here it may be asked by way of objection why Self, if it is by nature absolute Bliss, does not appear in consci-

Objection . Self is not commonly known as Bliss. To argue that this is due to Nescience is to raise the question, Who knows Nescience?—to which no answer can be given.

ousness during the transmigratory existence of the individual. Nor may the reply to this be that the appearance of Self in consci-ousness as the object of our highest love is indeed the presentation of (Self as) absolute Bliss (cf. p. 10, note). For our consciousness (abhimāna) does not take this form (so I am pure Bliss). And further, because no one is conscious of such Bliss as that which Veda declares to be the nature of Self in the state of emancipation (moksha) in the passage—all other creatures live on a part of this same Bliss &c.

And because the manifestation of bliss (tat) is declared by Śruti to take place only at the time of moksha in the pas- sage:—Bliss is the form of Brahman and is fixed in moksha.

Again it may be urged that though Self as Bliss shines forth yet we are not conscious of it during transmigratory life, because of the hindrance then existing. What is this hindrance? Is it Nescience or a product of it? If Nescience, does it pertain to jīva or to Brahman (parasya)? Not to Brahman, for to that which is all knowledge and is blameless Nescience cannot pertain. Nor to jīva which is identical with Brahman, as declared in the passages:—
‘there is no other sver but that one’; ‘(let me enter) with this living Self, jīva that thou art all is that Self

न च कल्पनामात्रेणैव जीवस्याप्यज्ञानं न वस्तुतो ऽस्तीति वाक्यं परस्मिन्नपि प्रसङ्गात् न च चिन्मात्रनिष्ठमज्ञानं तत्सर्वो-
त्तमना प्रतिबन्धनात्पेवेति वाक्यं यदि संसारावस्थायामप्रतिबद्ध
आत्मन्दो नास्त्येव कस्य प्राप्तेऽपि तर्हि प्रतिबन्धनिवृत्तिः स्यात्
नहि संसारिप्राप्तेऽपि संसारनिवृत्तिः सम्भवति न चाप्रतिबद्ध एवा-
त्मन्दः संसारावस्थायामप्यस्त्येव केवलमज्ञानमुद्भूतद्वैतान्तःपा-
तिशब्दादिविषयविषयिवरणस्य तद्दर्शनातिलालसमानसस्य तद्दर्श-
नवेलायामप्यत्यन्तभावज्ञानमुत्थापितविषयवह्निशकृष्टद्वयस्य प-
रमप्रियतमं जगदीश्वरं सर्वोद्गमोत्तमया ऽतिसन्निहितमप्यात्मानमी-
क्षितुं लज्जामलज्जमानस्य स्वयीवस्यपेवेवकाद्यनवधानवदनवधान-
आत्रमात्मनि प्रतिबन्धः न वस्तुतः प्रतिबन्धो ऽस्तीति वाच्यम् ।

Nor may it be replied that Nescience does not really pertain even to jīva but by a mere fiction. For the same would apply to Brahman also. Nor can it be urged (as in Samkshepasārīraka of. p 14, supra) that Nescience which has undifferenced Intelligence as its locus, obstructs *completely* (i. e. both jīva and Brahman). If unobstructed Bliss exists not during transmigratory life, there is nothing by the attainment of which an end may be put to the obstruction (of Bliss) For transmigratory life cannot be put an end to by the attainment of anything that pertains to the transmigratory life (sc. jīva). Nor may it be urged that even during transmigratory life unobstructed Bliss exists ; that the obstruction is not real but consists entirely in inatten- tion to (non-discrimination of, anavadhāna) Self, just as inattention makes one lose sight of the jewel round one's neck ; (that this inattention) pertains to him who is over- come by the poison of sensuous objects, sc. sounds and the rest, which fall within the duality wrought by Nescience, and whose mind eagerly desires the sight of Self, and whose heart is drawn away, even while he beholds Self, by the bait of sensuous objects awakened by the firm impressions (these had left behind in his mind), and who thus finds no time to recognise that Self most dear, the lord of the univer- se, who as the web entering all things is very near to him.

तद्दर्शनरूपस्य प्रतिबन्धस्याश्रयनिश्चयसाधनार्थात्तया हि
 कोऽसौ द्वैतद्रष्टा किं परमात्मा किं वा जीवः किं वा परः काश्चित्
 नाद्याः तस्य सर्वज्ञस्य अमत्रीज्ञाज्ञानाभावेन द्वैतदर्शनानुपपत्तेः
 यस्याज्ञानं अमस्तस्य आन्तः सम्यक् च वेति स इति न्यायादज्ञा-
 नमिथ्याज्ञानसम्यग्ज्ञानानां समानाधिकरणत्वनिश्चयेनाविद्यावत्
 एव तत्सम्भवात् अस्तु तर्हि जीवस्याविद्यावतो द्वैतद्रष्टृत्वम् ।
 न । तस्य परिणामेदस्योक्तत्वात् न चाभेदेऽपि विम्बप्रतिविम्बव्य-
 वस्थया सर्वज्ञत्वद्वैतद्रष्टृत्वयोरुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यं वैषम्यात् ।

For of this obstruction, consisting in the contemplation
 of those things* (see pain, duality &c.), the substrate cannot
 be known with certainty. To explain—who is the seer of
 duality? The supreme Self (Brahman)? Jīva? Or some-
 thing? Not Brahman: for Brahman, consisting of all
 knowledge, cannot have a vision of duality, since Nescience,
 the cause of error, is absent. For according to the rule that
 errors pertains to him to whom Nescience pertains, that the
 deluded one knows truly (afterwards), it is ascertained that
 Nescience, false and true knowledge, refer to one common
 substrate (or person) and therefore vision of duality (tat)
 can belong only to that which possesses Nescience. Next
 suppose that jīva, as associated with Nescience, is the seer
 of duality. This cannot be. For the identity of jīva with
 Brahman has been declared (in Śruti). Nor may it be
 urged that though Brahman and jīva are really identical
 (abhīde'pi), the characters (belonging to them respectively)
of consisting of all knowledge and of being the seer of duality
 may be satisfactorily accounted for by recourse to the set-
 tled relation of reflected thing and reflexion of that thing.
 For there is a difference here.

* The gloss explains that this is the refutation of the second alternative
 i.e. that obstruction is a product of Nescience—inattention being the product
 of Nescience.

तत्र हि पूर्वसिद्धे उपाधौ बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभावान्तरं प्रतीय-
मानयोर्गलितत्वस्वच्छत्वयोर्द्वयवस्थयोपपत्तिर्युक्ता इह तु द्वैत-
द्रष्टव्युत्थापितद्वैतस्यैवोपाधितया तदनुप्रवेशेन बिम्बप्रतिबिम्ब-
भावकल्पनायां ततः पूर्वं द्रष्टव्यवस्थापकानुपपत्तेः न चानादि-
सिद्धाऽज्ञानप्रतिबिम्बस्याप्यनादितया ततः पूर्वमिति पर्यनुयोगा-
नुपपत्तिरिति बाध्यम् अनादिसिद्धाऽज्ञानद्रष्टुरप्यनादिसिद्धस्यैव
वक्तव्यत्वात् । न चासौ वक्तुं शक्यः न च साक्ष्येव तथा तस्य
स्वप्नस्य स्वाविद्याविरहेण तद्द्रष्टृत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

Thus, in the latter case, since the limiting adjunct (sc. the mirror) is already in existence, it is proper, after the relation of reflected object, sc. the face, and reflexion of the face in the mirror) has been formed, to account for the perceived characters of purity and impurity (belonging respectively to the face and the reflexion of it) by recourse to this settled relation. But since in the present case, that very duality which has been brought about by the vision of duality, is the limiting adjunct through whose influence the summation of a relation as between reflected object (sc. Brahman) and reflexion (sc. jiva) is made, there could be nothing to constitute a seer (of this duality) previous to that duality (or Nescience, *tatāh*). Nor may it be replied that the objection implied in the words *previous to that* cannot be raised, since the reflexion in Nescience, which is eternal *ab ante*, must also be eternal *ab ante*. For then an eternal seer of this eternal Nescience would also have to be maintained ; but such an eternal seer cannot be maintained. Nor can it be said that the Witness is such an eternal seer (*tathā*). For to the Witness itself as consisting of all knowledge Nescience cannot attach, and therefore power of seeing that Nescience (*tat*) cannot be only

न च सर्वज्ञस्याप्यन्याऽविद्याद्रूपदृष्ट्वेनाविरोधः स्वभिन्नाऽविद्याद्रूपदृष्ट्वेन परमात्मनो आन्ततत्त्वप्रसङ्गात् नान्योतो ऽस्ति द्रष्टेति शास्त्रविरोधाच्च न च सर्वज्ञत्वं नाम स्वरूपचैतन्येन स्वाध्यस्तसकलभासकत्वं तच्चाविद्यावद्वेपि न विरुध्यत इति वाच्यं निरवद्यं निरञ्जनमिति श्रुत्या अविद्याया अपि तत्र निषिद्धि-
त्वात् न च वस्तुभूताऽविद्यानिषेधः न तु कल्पिताया अपीति वाच्यं साधारणनिषेधात् वस्तुभूताऽविद्याऽप्रसिद्धेश्च जीवस्य चाविद्योत्तरभाजितया ऽनादित्वानुपपत्तेः अन्यथा ऽविद्यानि-
वृत्त्यापि जीवभावो न निवर्तत । न तृतीयः जीवपरमात्मन्यति-
रिक्तस्य सर्वस्यैव जडत्वेन द्रष्टृत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

Nor can it be said that there is no contradiction in holding that the Witness, although consisting of all knowledge, is the seer of that Nescience which attaches to something other (than the Witness). For it would follow that the Highest Self is subject to error in thus beholding that Nescience which attaches to something other (than Self) ; and because this would contradict the passage—'there is no other seer but this one.' Nor again that *consisting in all knowledge* means the illumining by Intelligence *per se* (Brahman) of all that is erroneously surmised in it, and that this character (tat) is not opposed to that of being associated with Nescience (avidyāvattvena). For by the passage—'without fault, without taint', Nescience is also denied in regard to Brahman (tatra). Nor may it be replied that this prohibition extends to a *real* and not to an *unreal* (surmised) Nescience. For the prohibition is general, and because a *real* Nescience is not a fact of experience. And because to jiva, as being something subsequent to Nescience, eternalness *ab ante* cannot belong : otherwise the jiva state would not be put an end to by the cessation of Nescience, (according to the maxim that a positive entity, sc. jiva, eternal *ab ante* is eternal *without end*—and thus emancipation would be impossible). Nor will the third alternative hold. For everything that is different from jiva and the Highest Self is unintelligent (jñāna) and could not therefore possess the power of vision.

न चोक्तवानुगतचित्तमानान्यस्यैव द्रष्टृत्वमिति वाच्यं तथा च
सति अविद्याया अपि तत्रैव वक्तव्यतया जीवस्य निरवद्यात्वाऽभा-
सस्य परमात्मवन्नित्यमुक्तत्वं सर्वज्ञत्वाद्यापत्तिः उपाधिसिद्धयुक्त-
रकालीनत्वाच्च त्रितयविज्ञागस्य । न चाविद्यानङ्गीकारे तद्विषय-
कप्रश्नास्तेष्वनुपपत्त्या तत्रैव प्रष्टुराक्षेप्तुर्वा ऽविद्याद्रष्टृत्वं युक्तमिति
वाच्यं तस्यैव समाप्यविद्याद्रष्टुः स्वरूपस्येदानीं त्वया तदवनि-
र्णयार्थं वक्तव्यत्वात् न च यस्तत्त्वं स्वात्मस्वरूपमपि न जानासि
अयमहमिदं पृच्छामिति तस्य तत्र प्रश्न एव कथं स्यादिति वाच्यं
प्रश्नविषयाऽङ्गाने सत्येव प्रश्नोपपत्तेः अन्यथा प्रष्टव्यार्थज्ञानाज्ञा-
नविकल्पेन प्रश्नाभावेन नाऽपृष्टः कस्य चिद् प्रयात्त चान्यायेन
पृच्छतः जानन्नपि हि मेधावी जहद्वलोक भाचरेदिति न्यायेन
स्वयं वक्तुमशक्यतया सर्वं शास्त्रनख्यरुदितं स्यात् ।

Nor may it be argued that power of vision belongs inde-
ed to that pure Intelligence which pervades both (jiva and
Brahman). For if this were so, Nescience would have to be
admitted also in regard to that pure Intelligence (tatrāpi;)
and so to jiva, (which would then have to be regarded as)
faultless and undeluded, would pertain the characters of be-
ing ever free and of consisting of all knowledge, as is the
case with the Highest Self. And because this threefold divi-
sion² must be, in point of time, subsequent to the existence
of the limiting adjunct (sc. Nescience).

Nor may it be urged that the power of seeing Nescience
is rightly predicated of you, whether you question or deny ;
for if you do not admit the existence of Nescience, your question
or denial in regard to it is impossible. Because, to ascertain
the truth, you must declare what the true nature is of that very
seer of Nescience, sc. myself. Nor again, that you who know
not the nature of your Self, thus, *this I am asking about this*
(nature of Self) could not ask a question. For a question is
possible only when Nescience exists as to the matter of the
qu-stion : otherwise, by admitting as alternatives knowledge
or Nescience of the matter in question, there would be no
question at all ; (and then) in accordance with the maxim
that one unquestioned should not address another, &c.
(Manu, II. 110) the whole Veda would be a crying in the
wilderness, for of itself it could not speak (until questioned)

न च प्रश्नविषयापरिज्ञाने कथं बुद्धिष्यकशब्दरचना न हि संसर्गमज्ञात्वा शब्दरचना नामेति प्रसिद्धिरिति वाच्यं स्तोमश-
कदम्बत्सार्यकस्यापि शब्दस्य तत्स्वरूपज्ञानादेव रचनोपपत्तेः सर्वत्र
शब्दस्वरूपज्ञानस्यैव शब्दरचनाहेतुत्वात् संसर्गज्ञानस्य च शब्द-
रचनाहेतुत्वेन प्रसिद्ध्योपात्तस्य प्रमाद्यशब्दप्रामाण्यप्रयोजकतया
अन्यथाभिद्धेः न च देहादीनां बुद्धिपर्यन्तानामहम्प्रत्ययालम्बनी-
भूतानामितरादनात्मव्यावृत्ततया प्रतीयमानानां मध्ये अन्यतमं
तत्समुदायो वा तव स्वरूपमिति वाच्यं ।

Nor may it be argued that, if the matter of a question is unknown, the employment of words in regard to that question is impossible, in accordance with the well known fact that words are not employed where a certain relation has not been perceived. For even a word with a meaning can be employed when there is simply a knowledge of the form of the word, as is the case with meaningless words technically termed *stobha* (e. g. interjections), since in all cases it is simply a knowledge of the form of a word that is the cause of its employment. And because the knowledge of a certain relation, (which knowledge is) commonly accepted as the cause of the employment of a certain word, is the cause (or logical reason) determining the correctness (*prāmānya*) of the word which is here *pramān*, it is *not* the true cause (of the employment of that word).^{*} Nor can it be said that the real nature of your Self is one of the following, or these taken together, viz. those things beginning with the body and ending with the mind, which are the objects of the consciousness expressed by the word I, and are perceived as different from the not-Self which is other than they are.

* To decide whether a certain word has been rightly used we must know the ~~addition~~ which that word is intended to convey ; but merely to enounce it all that we need know is the form, i. e. letters ~~affection~~ *affection* of the word

तेषामप्यज्ञातकार्याणां सद्भोगोपकरणतया समप्रत्ययविषयाणां
 स्रष्टृत्वात्तदीतरभोगसाधनवन्मदुपसर्जनतया प्रतीयमानानां प्रत्ये-
 क समुदाययोः कार्यकारणविलक्षणोद्देशानुपादेयस्वभावसमप्रत्य-
 याविषयपरमप्रियतमस्वातिरिक्तसर्वावभासकसर्वदाऽव्यभिचार्या-
 त्मवस्तुस्वरूपतवानुपपत्तेः न च देहादिवृद्धिर्व्यन्तेभ्यो यत्स्वरूपं
 त्वया परिशेषितं तदेव तव स्वरूपमिति श्रद्धायेति वाक्यं तस्या-
 प्यज्ञातत्वात् न चाज्ञान परित्यज्य तद्विषयस्वरूपमात्रं प्रत्यक्तत्वं
 ग्राह्यमिति वाक्यं तस्यापि जीवेश्वरतद्विभक्त्यादिरूपेण निर्णेतुम-
 शक्यतया सन्देहाकान्तत्वात् न च किं नाम निरूपेण वस्तुस्वरूपं
 तु निर्णीतमेवेति वाक्यम् अशेषविशेषेण तत्त्वबुभुक्षुम्प्रत्येतस्या-
 नुत्तरत्वात् ।

For these things are products of Nescience, are known under the word *my* so far as they minister to *my* enjoyment, are known as subordinate to me, just as the umbrella &c. are, the means of comfort to another (sc. the raja), hence these things, singly or together, cannot possibly constitute that Self, which is neither cause nor effect, which in its own nature is not to be rejected or accepted as an object of desire, which is not made known by the word *my*, which illumines all that is different from itself most dear, which at no time fails to pervade all things. Nor may it be replied thus—Accept as your own nature (Self) that thing (svarūpa) which was distinguished by you from body &c., down to mind. For that thing also, the Self within, or Witness, is unknown. Nor again that putting Nescience out of view, we should accept as Self the Reality within, which *per se* is the object concealed by Nescience (tat). For doubt attaches to that Reality also, in that it cannot be discriminated as jiva or Isvara, or as something different from them. Nor may it be urged that such discrimination is unnecessary since the Reality itself is ascertained. For this is no reply to the man who desires to know that Reality *in toto*

न च सामान्यविशेषशून्ये विशेषबुभुत्सैवानुपपन्नेति वाक्यं तस्मै च सामान्यविशेषशून्यस्य वक्तव्यत्वापत्तेः न चाज्ञानउपति-
रिक्ततया निश्चिते स्वरूपे सन्देह एव नोपपद्यत इति वाक्यम्
अज्ञानस्याद्याप्यनिवृत्तत्वात् स्थिते एवाज्ञाने विवेकदृष्ट्या तद्वि-
विकस्वरूपनिर्णये ऽपि तेनैवाज्ञानेन विषयीकृते सन्देहोपपत्तेः न
चाद्यस्तज्ञानस्वरूपे स्थिते तदधिष्ठानस्यात्मनो विवेकी ऽशक्य
एवाधिष्ठानभेदेनाद्यस्तस्य पृथक्स्वरूपाभावात् ततो यदि विवेकदृ-
ष्ट्या ऽधिष्ठानस्वरूपमात्मनरत्वं निश्चितं तदा तत्राद्यस्तमज्ञानं
तत्कार्यं वा ततो भेदेन तत्र नास्तीत्यवधार्य विनिश्चेतव्य तथा
च तत्राज्ञानविरहात्सन्देहानुपपत्त्या प्रश्नानुपपत्तिरिति वाक्यम् ।

Nor to this may it be answered that, in regard to that which is destitute of both general and special attributes, the very desire for special knowledge is impossible. For it follows that that some thing destitute of general and special attributes must be declared by you to exist. Nor, again, that no doubt is possible in regard to this reality (svarūpa), since it has been ascertained as something different from Nescience. For a doubt is possible in regard to that Reality which has been invested by Nescience, even though the Reality may have been carefully discriminated from Nescience (tat), in that the latter is existing, since even up to this time Nescience has not been destroyed. Nor again may it be argued that since Nescience is proved to be something surmised, it is quite impossible to discriminate it from Self which is its substrate, for that which is surmised has no existence apart from the substrate in which it is surmised : hence when by discrimination the real nature of Self as the substrate of all things has been ascertained, then a further conviction should arise in the form—Nescience and its products, surmised in the Self (tatra), have no existence apart from the Self : and thus since Nescience exists not in Self, doubt is impossible, and question (in regard to Self) is also impossible.

एतावता अपि द्वैतद्रष्टुरव्युत्पादनात् न हि शुद्धस्य कूटस्थस्य द्वैत-
द्रष्टृत्वमुपपद्यते मोक्षकाले अपि द्वैतदर्शनप्रसङ्गात् । ननु मोक्षस्य
नित्यत्वेन सर्वदा सत्त्वात्सर्वो हि कालो मोक्षकाल एव विमुक्तश्च
विमुच्यते इति शास्त्रात् अन्यथा मोक्षस्य कादाचित्कत्वेनानि-
त्यत्वप्रसङ्गः तथा च मोक्षकाले द्वैतदर्शनप्रसङ्गो नास्ति इदानीं
तद्दर्शनादिति चेन्न सार्वभौमिकानुभवविरोधात् न हि द्वैतदर्शन-
काले कश्चन मोक्षमनुभवति न हि सर्वलोकविरुद्धमर्थं श्रुतिरपि
प्रतिपादयति अन्यथा शिलाप्लवनवाण्यानामपि स्वार्थे
प्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गः । ततो न सर्वः कालो मोक्षकालः सर्वलोकानुभव-
विरोधादिति । इत्त तर्हि ये सर्वेऽनुभवितारस्ते एव द्वैतद्रष्टार-
स्त्वयैव निश्चितस्तथा च स्वाधीननिश्चये द्वैतद्रष्टरि कः प्रश्नः ।

The above argument is rejected because it does not ex-
plain the original question, sc. Who is the seer of duality ?
For the unrelated, unchanging Self or Witness cannot be
the seer of duality ; if this were so, there would be a vision
of duality even at the time of moksha, emancipation.

Here one (sc. the pupil) may argue that the above con-
clusion, viz. a vision of duality at the time of moksha, is not
an unsatisfactory one, as duality is seen now (during mok-
sha) ; for since moksha is eternal it exists always, hence the
time of moksha is *all time* according to the passage—and
the freed is free—otherwise, if moksha were *occasional*, it
would be noneternal. The above is to be rejected because
it contradicts universal experience, for while knowledge of
duality lasts no one experiences moksha. Nor does Veda
teach what contradicts common experience : if such were the
case it would follow that (Vedic) sentences declaring that
stones float would have to be regarded as literally true ;
hence the time of moksha is not *all time*, for this would
contradict common experience. Well then, since you have
yourself ascertained that all who know duality are seers of
it, you cannot ask a question in regard to the seer of duality
thus proved by you (sva) to exist

किमत्र वदन्तीति श्रवति एतेषां यद् द्वैतदर्शनं तदेव सच्चि-
दानन्दपरिपूर्णतत्त्वस्वरूपमोक्षाधिकार्यप्रतिबन्धकमिति गृह्यते ।
अस्तु तर्हि तेषां प्रतिबन्धो ननु द्वैताद्भट्टः कुतो न मोक्ष आ-
विर्भावतीति चेत् तर्हि एव किमेतेष्वो भिन्नो येन द्वैताद्भट्टस्य
भवेत् । कः संशयः न हि तानात्मस्वेनानुभवामि तेषां सुखदुःखा-
दीनां ननु तेषां भावात् । अहो आश्चर्यं ताननेकविधानेषु देवति-
र्यङ्मनुष्यादिभेदभिन्नान्पश्यन् द्वैतं न पश्यामीति वदन्सते वचः
कथं ब्रह्मेयं स्वात् न हि सुप्रसोः संन्यासिनस्तत्त्वबुभुक्षोरिदमु-
च्यते वदन्त्याभिधानमिति । ननु स्वतोऽभिन्न एवाहं तथा च
अमानस्याभिधानमापादयतस्त्वयैवात्म्याभिधानमायातीति चेत्
तर्हि कीदृशं त्वयात्मस्वेन दूष्टः किं सद्धितीयेऽद्धितीये वा ।

What follows from this, you ask? This, namely, that the vision of duality those seers have is just that (already mentioned) hindrance to moksha whose manifestation is the absolute Self, (Sachchidananda) : thus understand. A hindrance may exist (the pupil replies) in the case of those seers of duality ; but why is moksha not manifest to me who am not a seer of duality (having been taught by Veda through you my teacher)? What! (asks the teacher) are you different from those persons that you say you are not a seer of duality? Doubtless I am! For I do not know them as myself: their joys and sorrows touch me not. Strange indeed! What trust can be placed in your statement; for while you behold those persons so. that varied complex of gods, men and animals, you say, I see not duality! Such untruthfulness is improper in one aspiring to moksha, a Sannyāsin and seeker after Reality! Since I am identical with you (retorts the pupil) the charge of untruthfulness recoils on you. The teacher replies, in knowing me as identical with yourself, was I known as one with a second or as one without a second.

यद्याद्यस्तस्यैवमप्यपरो दोषो यत्त्वं विद्वांसं तथैवाचार्यं मां
ब्रह्मरूपेण पर्यवसितं द्वैतवार्तानभिज्ञं सद्वितीयं कल्पयसि एकमे-
वाद्वितीयं नेह नानास्ति किंचन इतिशास्त्रविरोधश्च । अस्तु
तर्हि अद्वितीयपक्ष उक्तदोषविरहादिति चेत् । इत्त तर्हि कुतो
नामद्वितीयमात्मत्वेन ज्ञातवानसि । त्वद्वचनादुदाहृतशास्त्राच्चेति
चेत् एवं तर्हि प्रबुद्धोसि नातः परं प्रपञ्चमस्ति न ज्ञातमनि विदिते
अपरमविदितं वस्तुमस्ति यत्प्रपञ्चं स्यात् । अस्त्यनात्मेति चेन्न आ-
त्मनो वा अरे दर्शनेन श्रुत्या मतया विज्ञानेनेद् सर्वं विदितमि-
तिश्रुत्या आत्मदर्शनेनेतरत्सर्वं द्रष्टुं भवतीति उक्तत्वात् । ननु
इदमनुपपन्नं यदात्मदर्शनेनेतरत्सर्वं द्रष्टुं भवतीति कुत इति चेत्
तथा हि किमितरत्सर्वमात्मनो भिन्नमभिज्ञं वा ।

If the former, a further fault of yours is that me, your teacher attained to Brahman-hood and unconscious of the least trace even of duality, you imagine to exist as one with a second : and your view contradicts the Veda passage—One without a second : there is no duality here. Grant then the second alternative, because from it the above fault is absent. Then (rejoins the teacher) how do you know me one without a second as identical with Self ? Through your statement and that of the Veda text quoted above. In this case you have attained the highest knowledge : nothing remains for you to question . when Self is known, nothing remains to be questioned. The not-Self remains (says the pupil). No ! For we have declared that by seeing Self all else becomes seen, in accordance with the passage—Indeed by seeing, he-aring, pondering, knowing Self, all this becomes known. The pupil again argues that it is impos- sible that by the knowledge of Self all else should become known. To the teacher's question, Why so ?—he replies Is all else different from or identical with Self ?

नाशः अन्यदर्शनेनान्यस्य द्रष्टुमशक्यत्वात् न हि घटे दृष्टे पदे दृष्टो भवतीति शक्यं ज्ञेयम् अन्यथा तयोर्भेदापत्तेः । न द्वितीयः आत्मानात्मनोर्विरोधात् परमार्थमत्यात्माऽभिज्ञस्य नेतिनेत्यादिना निषेद्धुमशक्यतया व्याधानुपपत्तेश्च अन्यथा आत्मनोऽपि वाचिततया शून्यमेवावशिष्येत । तस्मादात्मदर्शनेन सर्वमेव दृष्टं भवतित्यनुपपन्नम् । नैप दोषः ।

आत्मसत्तैव द्वैतस्य सत्ता नान्या यद्वस्तुतः ।

आत्मन्येव जगत्सर्वं दृष्टे दृष्टं श्रुते श्रुतम् ॥ ५६ ॥

आत्मसत्तातिरिक्ताया द्वैतसत्ताया अभावात् आत्मनि दृष्टे सर्वं द्वैतं दृष्टं भवति यथा रज्जुस्वरूपे दृष्टे तत्राद्यवस्तानां स्रग्द-
यकादीनां स्वरूपं दृष्टं भवति तद्वत् आत्मनि दृष्टे सर्वं दृष्टं
भवतीति नानुपपन्नम् ।

Not different. For by seeing one thing a second thing cannot be seen; thus, a piece of cloth cannot be said to be seen when an earthen pot is seen : if so it would follow that the pot and the cloth were identical. Nor can it be said that all else is identical with Self. For Self and not-Self are contradictories ; and because sublation of not-Self would be impossible, since that which is identical with the absolutely real Self could not be negated as in the Śruti passage—Not this, not this :—otherwise, on Self also being proved false, blank non-entity (śūnya) would remain. Hence the statement, that by seeing Self all else becomes seen, is untenable.

There is no fault here replies the teacher :—

Since the existence of duality is indeed the existence of

Reply : Self, Brahman, is All. To know Self, is to know All : this is ^{emanipation.} Self and no other, all the world is seen and heard when Self is seen and heard....LVI.

For duality has no existence apart from that of the Self ; hence when Self is known, all duality is known ; for just as when the rope is known, the things surmised in it so, the garland or stick (which may be mistaken for it) are also known, so too it is not contradictory that when Self is known all else should be known

अत एव विधिनिषेधशास्त्रयोरपि नानुपपत्तिः तद्यथा इदं सर्वं यद्यन्मात्मा सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम् । ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीत् । अहं सनुरभव सूर्य-इचेति । यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् । नारायण एवेद सर्वं श्रुभूतं यच्च नाठपम् इत्यादिविधिशास्त्रं तथा निषेधशास्त्रमपि नेह नास्ति किञ्चनेति अयात आदेशो नेति नेति न ह्येतस्मादिति नेत्यन्यत्परमस्ति । अतोऽन्यदार्त्तं । न तु तत् द्वितीयमस्ति नैवेह किञ्चनाग्र आसीत् । नाशदासीन्नोऽशदासीदित्यादि । भवति हि लोके रज्ज्वा स्रगाद्यध्मातिनं प्रत्युपदेश इदं सर्वं रज्जुरिति नेह स्रगादिरस्तीति तथाप्युभयोरुपदेशयोर्मध्ये कतरः श्रेयानिति चेत् यद्यप्युभयोरेकार्यत्वमेव तथापि विधेरस्ति कश्चिदतिशयः ।

Hence also no contradiction attaches to the injunctory and prohibitory Śruti passages. Of the former kind are the following.—This everything, all is that Self. O dear One ! Existent alone was this in the beginning, one without a second. All this consists of this Self. Brahman, indeed, was this in the beginning. (Seeing this, the Rishi thought) :—I was Manu and the sun. But when to one all has become Self. All this that is, and is to be, is Nārāyaṇa. Of the latter kind are the following :—There is no diversity here. Now follows the declaration, No ! No ! For beyond this No there is nothing. Other than this (Brahman) is perishable. There is no second. There was no diversity here in the beginning. Entity was not, non-entity was not.

Indeed, in every day life, the instruction given to the man who mistakes a piece of rope for a garland or the like is either—all these imaginary things are that rope, or—no garland or the like exists here. Still it may be asked, which of these two forms of instruction is the better ? Thought both perform the same function, the injunction has the

तत्र हि परिदृश्यमानानां या मता सा आत्मैवेत्युक्ते न-
न्यन्नास्तमेव आत्मैव परिपूर्ण इति ज्ञानं साक्षादेवाविर्भवति निषेधे
त्वर्थो निषेधाधिष्ठानतया । कथं तर्ह्युभयप्रवृत्तिः विधिनैव पुन-
र्वाच्यस्य परंपरितत्वादिति चेन्न अविकारिभेदेनाभयोरुपयोगा-
द्य । कश्चिद्द्वि संसारादुत्थेनात्यन्तमुपहृतचेतास्तन्निवृत्तिमेव प्रथ-
मतः कामयते तं प्रत्यादौ निषेधवाक्यमेवोपयुक्तं द्विविधाक्यं तु
पश्चात् यथा सर्प इति निषेधवाक्यमेवोपयुक्तं द्विविधाक्यं तु
पश्चात् यथा सर्पमारोप्य भिया कम्पमानं प्रति नायं सर्प इति-
निषेध एवादौ न तु विधिः । यस्तत्त्वत्यन्तमनुद्विग्नः क्रिमस्य जग-
तस्तत्त्वमित्येव जिज्ञासते तं प्रतीदु सर्वं यद्यभात्ता इत्येवात्तरं
न्याय्य निषेधस्तु पश्चात् ।

For in this case when it is enjoined that the existence
of all things seen is indeed the Self, then the knowledge that
nothing other than Self exists, that Self is absolute,
directly manifests itself; whereas in the case of the negation
the knowledge is gained indirectly through inference that
Self is the substrate to which the negation refers. How
then it may be asked, do both find scope : since the aim of
man (sc. moksha) would be reached through the injunction
alone ? Not so, for both forms of instruction are of service
according to the varying qualifications of those who seek
moksha. Thus, he whose mind is utterly overthrown by the
pains of life desires first of all the cessation of those pains :
in his case the prohibitory text is certainly the first to be
of service, after which the injunctory text avails. To illus-
trate :—he who fancying he sees a snake trembles with fear
needs, in the first instance, the prohibition sc. this is no
snake that you see—, but does not need the injunction sc.
this that you see is a rope or stick &c. Again in the case
of the man who quite undisturbed by this world, desires
to know what reality underlies it, the fitting answer is—All
this world is Self After this may come the prohibitory text.

यथा सर्पमध्यस्थ तत्प्रतीकारज्ञानान्तिर्भवः पृच्छति किमिदं पुरोवर्त्तानि तं प्रति रज्जुः हत्येवेत्तरं न तु निषेधः । नस्मादवस्थाभेदेनोपयोग्ययोगान्न कस्यापि वैयर्थ्यभूतो विधिनिषेधाभ्यां परिपूर्णसच्चिदानन्दः प्रत्यगात्मेति सिद्धम् ।

२९ ननु तथापि कोदौ द्वैतद्रष्टेति अद्यापि न निश्चितम् इति चेत् यस्त्वं पृच्छसि । कोहमिति चेत् ब्रह्मैव । एवं तर्हि ब्रह्मणो विकारित्वापत्तिरिति चेत् कोयं विकारो द्वैतं न दृष्टुर्हि वा । नाद्याः द्वैतस्य सर्वस्य ब्रह्मातिरिक्तस्य निषिद्धत्वात् न हि यन्नास्ति तत्कस्य चित्परिणामः यथा नरशृङ्गम् । ततोऽस्य वैलक्षण्यं दृष्टिरेवेति चेत् तर्हि प्राप्ताप्राप्तविवेकेन दृष्टिरेव परिणामोऽस्तु तदतिरिक्तदृश्याभावात्

Thus for him who fancying he sees a snake and knowing the antidote for its poison can fearlessly ask,—What is (really) this thing before me?—the fitting answer is—You see a snake—and not the prohibition, so.—This that you see is no snake. To sum up—neither form of Sruti is useless, for both find scope under varying circumstances. Hence it has been proved by both injunctory and prohibitory texts that the absolute Intelligence, Existence, Bliss, is the Self within.

29. But the pupil may again urge that the question,

Objection *Parīśamavāda* follows : Self who this seer of duality is, must be *materially* changed into not-Self ; has not yet been decided. for duality is a fact of experience. Reply : You who question me are No ! the change is illusory—*Vivarttavāda* —For the indivisible Self could not be *materially* changed that seer of duality says

the teacher. Then who am I ? asks the pupil—You are really Brahman. Then (rejoins the pupil) it follows that Brahman suffers modification. What (inquires the guru) is this modification? Is it duality ; or the vision of duality ? Not the former, for all duality as distinct from Brahman has been negated (by Veda); nor indeed can the non-existent, e.g. the horns of a man, be a modification of anything. It may be said the difference between duality (*asya*) and the above example (*ta-*
tabh) is the fact of a vision of duality. Well then, it follows through induction (*praptāpraptavivēka* of p. 106) that vision *only* is the *parīśama*, material modification, of Brahman for apart from it things visible exist not.

नोमिति चेन्न दृष्टेः कलरूपाया आत्मरूपास्तर्भावेन सत्प-
रिणान्तत्वानुपपत्तेः न हि स्वयं स्वस्य परिणामः कातरन्यैकदेशवि-
कल्पेन परिणामपक्षानुपपत्तेरपि । ननु विवर्तपक्षेऽप्ययं दोषः समान
इति चेत् न विवर्तस्वरूपापरिज्ञानात् न ह्यधिष्ठानस्वरूपातिरि-
क्त विवर्तौ नाम किञ्चिद्वस्तुवस्ति यदाग्रित्य कातरन्यैकदेशविक-
ल्पावतारः स्यात् किन्त्वधिष्ठानमेव दोषवशाद्विलक्षणाकारेण
मात्रमानं विवर्तं मन्युच्यते । स एव विलक्षणाकारः कस्येति चेत्
वस्तुतो न कस्यापि अधिष्ठाने तस्य वाचात् अन्यत्राप्रतीतेः ।
अङ्गयन्तरेणासत्स्वरूपातिव्युत्पादनमेवैतदिति चेन्न स्यातेरप्यध्य-
स्तत्वात् असत्स्यातिवादिना च चार्वाकेण तस्याऽनभ्युपगमात्
सर्वशून्यवादिनस्तु पूर्व निरस्तत्वात् ।

This is so, replies the pupil. No ! (rejoins the "guru") for
it is impossible that this vision or product, as included within
the Self, should be at parināma of Self : since a thing is not
a parināma of itself, and because the parināma view is viti-
ated by the alternative assumptions of whole or a part of
Self undergoing parināma. (cf. Ved. Sū. II, 1, 26.) Nor may
it be argued that the same fault attaches to the vivartta view;
for you have not understood the meaning of vivartta. A viva-
rtta, forsooth, is no reality existing apart from its substrate,
in regard to which the above alternatives may find place; but
what is termed a vivartta is nothing but the substrate itself,
which through some defect appears under a different form.
But *different form* of what ? asks the pupil. Of nothing
really, for this *different form* has its destruction in, i. e. by
knowledge of, its sub-strate (Self), since this *different* or
not-Self form, is not perceived in another substrate. Then
(rejoins the pupil) this is simply a teaching of asatkhyāti
under another guiso. Not so, says the guru ; for in our
view the 'khyāti (perception) also is illusory, which the
Chārvāka or holder of asatkhyāti wld not admit (as he holds
that the khyāti is real) : moreover we have overthrown him
who holds to a universal bank of p 72).

किमिदं कथातेरप्यस्तत्त्वमिति चेत् वस्तुतो निष्प्रकारिकायाः
 सप्रकारकत्वेन ज्ञानमेवेति गृहाण । तथैव प्रकारस्य स्वरूपं वाच्य-
 मिति चेत् वस्तुतो निर्विकल्पकस्यातिस्वरूपमेव । तथैव तर्हि
 प्रत्येतव्यमिति चेत् उचितमेव तद्विज्ञस्य न तु ज्ञानस्य तस्य ज्ञान-
 त्वादेव । किं तेनाधिकं प्रतीतमिति चेत् न किमपि । कथमसौ
 ज्ञान इति चेत् अन्यप्रतीतेरन्यविषयत्वात्तिमानादेव यथा लोके
 रज्जुं प्रत्येति सर्पसन्निभमन्यते अयं सर्प इति । कौसावमिमान इति
 चेत् परमार्थस्थितविषयस्य मासमानस्याप्यसद्व्यनिश्चयः ।
 यदि वस्तुतो रज्जुप्रत्यय एव कथं तर्हि सर्पास्त्रेखितया च प्रत्ययः
 परिस्फुरतीति चेत् आकारसाम्यात् दोषवशाच्चेति वदामः ।

But what is this illusory character of perception? Know
 (replies the guru) that it consists in the appearing in cons-
 ciousness of that which is really predicateless as possessing
 a predicate (khyāti, here = chaitanya, Self). But (rejoins the
 pupil) the nature of the said predicate you should explain.
 It is really nothing but the predicate-less Self (khyāti).
 Then it should be perceived as such. True enough (rejoins
 the guru) in the case of him who knows Self (tat); but not
 in the case of the deluded man, simply because he is deluded.
 What, then, over and above (the real substrate) does this
 deluded man perceive? Nothing really. Why then call him
 deluded? Because he fancies that his perception of one thing
 makes known something different; thus, in common life,
 he sees a rope and fancying it to be a snake, says—this is a
 snake. But what is this fancy of his? It is his conviction
 as to the non-existence of a really existing thing, sc. the
 rope which is even present to his consciousness. But if he
 really has a perception of the rope, how does that perception
 present itself to him so as to make him use the word
 snake? This, we reply, is due to similarity (between rope
 and snake) and to certain defects (of eye-sight &c. which
 stand generically for Nescience).

अत एव वाचोत्तरं मन्यते रज्जुरेष सर्पतया नया प्रतिय-
जेति । तत्किं सर्पौ न प्रतिपन्न एव । कः संशयः । एवं तर्ह्यनुभव-
विरोध इति चेन्न भ्रान्तानुभवविरोधेऽप्यविरोधात् तस्य किं प्रतीतं
किं न प्रतीतमिति विवेकविरहात् अभ्रान्तस्य तदनुभवाभावेनानु-
भवविरोधाभावात् ।

३० नन्वेवं सति अधिष्ठानं तत्प्रतीतिश्चेति द्वयमेव द्रष्टव्यं
अतिरिक्तप्रतीतिप्रत्येतव्ययोः सत्त्वस्य व्युत्पादनात् दाहोन्तिके त्व-
धिष्ठानं तत्प्रतीतिश्च द्वयमप्यात्मैव स्वयंप्रकाशे प्रतीत्यन्तरान-
भ्युपगमात् तथा च तदतिरिक्तस्य विवर्तस्य दर्शयितुमशक्यतया
गतं विवर्तबादेन ततोतिस्फुटः स्वसिद्धान्तपरित्याग इति चेत्

Hence after the false perception of the snake has been
destroyed, his consciousness takes the form—this rope indeed
was perceived by me in the shape of a snake. What! did
he not perceive a snake at all! Certainly not. Then, in this
way consciousness is violated. Not so; because in contra-
dicting the consciousness of a *deluded* man, no violence is
done, for he does not discriminate between what he perce-
ives and what not; and because no violence is done to the
consciousness of the *undeluded* man, in that he was not
conscious of the snake at all.

30. The pupil argues that since the rope alone is perce-

Objection: Vivartavāda, then, is *ived* (evam sati, cf. supra)
false also.

Reply: Yes! false for him who knows the truth; but a way to the truth for him who knows it not. of. pp. 116-7, there are, in the example,
two things only, viz., sub-
strate or rope, and the co-
gnition of it; for the non-existence of any cognition or
cognised object other than these has been taught: whereas,
in the illustrated case, both substrate and cognition of it
are the Self alone, for in regard to self-luminous Self, a se-
cond cognition (making Self known) is not to be assumed.
And so, (continues the pupil) since a vivartta distinct from
Self cannot be shown, the vivartta doctrine is done away
with: hence the teacher clearly abandons his own doctrine.

न । तस्य बाह्यमुत्पत्तिमात्रप्रयोजनतया उपनिषत्सात्पर्या-
विषयत्वात् अन्यथा विपरीतदृष्ट्यैव द्वैतापत्तेः । मिथ्यैव सा
दृष्टिरिति चेत् किमिदं मिथ्यात्वं त्रैकालिकानन्तवत् असत्त्वावि-
शेषे ऽपि कदा चित्प्रतीयमानत्वं वा । नाद्यः दृष्टापत्तेः । न द्वितीयः
तत्प्रतीत्यैवाद्वैतसत्तेस्तादवस्थ्यात् । काश्येव तत्प्रतीतिरिति चेत् न
तस्यासङ्गत्वात् असङ्गे च्यं पुरुष इति श्रुतेः साक्षिणः कादाचित्-
कत्वानुपपत्तेश्च ।

No ! (replies the latter) for vivartta doctrine is not the
final aim of the Upanishads, in that it serves only to
instruct the uninitiated : otherwise, from the false percep-
tion of duality would follow duality as something real. But
(replies the pupil) that perception is false. What does
falsity mean ? Does it mean non-existence in time, present,
past and future ? Or, since non existence is a unity indivisible,
does falsity mean that the object is perceived temporarily.
(occasionally) ? * The former definition will not avail you (says
the guru), for that is the meaning of the term accepted (by us
Vedāntins). Nor will the latter avail, for even through such
occasional perception, Monism (the final teaching of the Upa-
nishads) is overthrown all the same. But (argues the pupil)
that occasional perception is the Witness itself No, beca-
use the Witness is unrelated, as declared in the passage—Fo
this Person is unrelated :—and because temporary character
cannot attach to the Witness.

* असत्त्वं मिथ्या इत्युक्ते गगनकमलादौ अनिव्याप्तिस्तत्रिवारणाय कदा
चित्प्रतीयमानत्वमिति कादाचित्कप्रतीतिविषयत्वम् इति यावत् । प्रतीतिरत्र
अपरोक्षा विवक्षिता । असत्त्वं नाम सद्विलक्षणत्वम् । कादाचित्कप्रतीतिविष-
यत्वं वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वेन आत्मन्यप्यस्ति इति तदर्थं विशिनष्टि असत्त्वाविशेषणेति ।
N D's gloss.

The qualification *occasionally* excludes a sheer non-entity, *se. a sky-forest*
which is never perceived. Again, perception of Self as an object, effected as this
is through a *vritti* or modification of the *antahkarṇa* (*vṛttivāpyatvena*) might
be considered *occasional* but is excluded from the by the mention of
non-entity

किञ्चात्मनो द्वैतदृष्टिः प्रमाणसिद्धा अन्तिसिद्धा वा । नाद्य-
 सद्द्वैतागमविरोधात् । नेतरः अन्तिसिद्धपदार्थस्यासत्त्वनियमात् ।
 अन्यथा अन्तित्वानुपपत्तेः । तथा चात्मनो द्वैतदृष्टिः कदा चिदपि
 नास्त्येव । तथा च श्रुतिः यद् द्वैतं पश्यति पश्यन् वै तन् पश्य-
 तीत्यादि आत्मनो अविलुप्तदृष्टित्वनावश्यं द्वैतदृष्टिं वारयति ।

बालान्प्रति विवर्तयं ब्रह्मणः सकलं जगत् ।

अविवर्तितमानन्दमास्थिताः कतिनः सदा ॥

इति स्मृतिरपि आत्मनो द्वैतदर्शनाभावमनुमन्यते ।

Further, is this vision of duality pertaining to Self effected by a *pramāṇa* (trustworthy source of knowledge), or by an erroneous cognition ? Not by the former, for this would contradict *Śruti* passages teaching *advaita*; nor by the latter, for the rule is that the thing made known by erroneous cognition is non-existent; otherwise the cognition could not be said to be erroneous. Thus vision of duality never indeed pertains to Self. So also *Śruti* debars vision of duality from Self whose nature is unbroken vision, as in the passage,—when he does not see, he still is seeing, though he sees not.

Smṛiti also approves the same, thus,—‘For the uninitiated it is taught that the whole world is this *vivartita* of *Brahman*. The wise hold it to be *Bhas* unmodified’

३१ नन्वात्मनो द्वैतदर्शनाभावे नित्यमुक्तस्यासंसारिणः शास्त्र-
साध्यप्रयोजनशून्यतया शास्त्रानाशङ्क्यम् इति चेत् न नित्यमु-
क्तस्यासंसारिणः अत्यन्तासत्संसारनिवर्तकत्वेन शास्त्रप्रामाण्योप-
पत्तेः । अत्यन्तासतो नित्यनिवृत्ततया तत्र शास्त्रउपायारो जन्यक
इति चेत् न सत्यस्यापि तुल्यत्वात् न हि सन्निवर्तयति शास्त्रमिति
कचिद् दृष्टम् । अनिर्वचनीयं निवर्त्तयितुं शास्त्रमिति चेन्न
तत्राप्यदर्शनस्य तुल्यत्वात् न ह्यनिर्वचनीयं निवर्त्तते इत्युभयसंग्र-
होपपत्तिरस्यलभस्ति तस्माद्विमुक्तश्च विमुच्यते निवृत्तं च निवर्त्तत
इत्यादिशास्त्रादत्यन्तासत्संसारनिवर्त्तकत्वेनैव शास्त्रप्रामाण्यम् ।

31 If to Self vision of duality pertains not, Self, as being

Objection (a) Veda is useless, if ever free and uninvolved in
Self is an unrelated Unity Reply :
Not useless, for it puts an end to transnigratory existence, will
Nescience or the false knowledge of lack the motive so, desire of
duality, which is sheer non entity. moksha, which Veda is to ac-
complish : hence Veda will become useless. Reply : Not
so ; for even to the ever free Self Veda becomes a source
of right knowledge by destroying (the false knowledge
of) an absolutely non-existent world. But the function
of Veda, it is urged, would be vain in regard to
such a world, for the absolutely non-existent has ceased
to be eternally. No ; for the argument would apply equally
to a real world, since no instance is found in which the Veda
puts an end to a real object. Then, it may be urged, Veda
aims at destroying (what the Vedāntins term) anirvacha-
nīya or inexplicable object. No ! we reply, for here too no
confirmatory instance is found, since what ceases to be is
not the anirvachanīya object (e. g. false snake, which never
existed at all ; but the false knowledge in regard to the
snake comes to an end). Thus both cases are propounded.
Hence Veda is authoritative in putting an end to the false
knowledge of an absolutely non-existent world, according
to the passage,—‘ the free is freed, that ceases to be which
had to be ’

नित्यबोधपरिधीडितं जगद्विश्वं नुदति वाक्यजा मतिः ।

वासुदेवनिहतं घनञ्जयो हन्ति कौरवकुलं यथा पुनः ॥

इति स्मृतिरपि जगदात्मकस्य विश्वस्य नित्यबोधस्वभा-
वस्यात्मनः स्वरूपं पर्यालोचयान्तासत्त्वमेवाह । किञ्च ब्रह्माति-
रिक्तं शास्त्रसत्त्वमस्तीति ये मन्यन्ते तान्मति मवतु शास्त्रप्रमा-
ण्यप्रसङ्गो दोषः तस्य प्रमाणैकस्वभावत्वात् । ये तु मन्यन्ते सदा
अद्वैतमेवास्ति द्वैतवार्तागमिज्ञास्तान्मति कथमयं दोषः स्यात्तेः
शास्त्रस्य वा तत्प्रामाण्यस्य वा ब्रह्मातिरिक्तस्यानभ्युपगमात् अ-
न्यथा ताभ्यामेवाद्वैतमिति स्यात् । न च वेदप्रामाण्यानभ्युपगमे
पाश्वरहत्वप्रसङ्गः तदप्रामाण्यस्याप्यनभ्युपगमात् ।

Smṛiti also, observing the reality (svatūpa) of Self whose nature is eternal Knowledge, declares the absolute non-existence of that error (termed) the world—thus : ‘ Knowledge, effected through Vedic sentences destroys that error termed the world, which had already been destroyed by eternal
Sankshepaśrīraka II. sl 38. Knowledge (Self, Brahman): just as Arjuna slays again the kuru race already slain by Vāsudeva’ Moreover, against those who hold that Veda is a reality apart from Brahman the charge of making Veda untrustworthy may be brought, since the sole character of Veda (tasya) is that of a pramāṇa or trustworthy source of evidence. But the charge cannot be brought against those who, unconscious of the least trace of duality, hold that Brahman alone ever is, since they do not admit Veda or its trustworthiness as existing apart from Brahman ; otherwise Vedantic Monism would be violated by the separate existence of these two sc. Veda and its trustworthiness. Nor can we be charged with heresy in not holding the trustworthiness of Veda ; for we do not (as the heretic does) hold the untru-
two also of Veda,

न च वेदप्रामाण्यानभ्युपगमे ऽद्वैतस्याप्रामाणिकत्वप्रसङ्गो
 दोषः द्वैतदर्शिनं प्रति प्रमाणाधीनसिद्धिके आत्मनि च तस्य दोष-
 त्वात् । ननु द्वैतदर्शित्वं किमात्मनो धर्मः स्वभावा वा नाद्यः
 द्वैतापत्तेः । नेतरः द्वैतजातस्य सर्वस्य स्वतः सिद्धिप्रसङ्गादिति चेत्
 न श्रुतिसिद्धात्मस्वरूपानुरोधेन द्वैतजातस्य सर्वस्य तुच्छत्वात् ।
 न हि तुच्छस्य स्वतःसिद्धिः सम्भवति तस्य निरस्तसमस्तसामर्थ्यस्य
 स्वतः परतो वा सिद्ध्युपशक्यत्वात् । नन्वात्मभिनस्य जगतस्तद्दर्श-
 नस्य च तुच्छत्वं लौकिकानामभिमतं परीक्षकाणां वा ।

Nor while not holding Veda as reliable, can we be charged
 with leaving Monism without any evidence ; for this charge
 would lie against the seer of duality (with whom) the exist-
 ence of Self has to be proved by some pramāṇa. Here an
 opponent may ask whether the character of being a seer of
 duality is an attribute of Self or is the own nature of Self.
 Not the former, for then duality is established ; (for this at-
 tribute, he argues, must be assumed to be a reality ; a non-
 existent attribute would be nonsense—). Not the latter for
 then it follows that the whole complex of duality is self-
 proved (i. e. is svaprākāśa, as Self is, into whose nature du-
 ality enters, on the above assumption, as a viśeṣhaṇa or ne-
 cessary predicate, thus—*dvaitasya drasṭā* cf. p. 70 n.)
 Nor we reply. For in accordance with the nature of Self
 as proved in Veda, all duality is sheer non-entity, Nor can
 non-entity prove itself, for being absolutely destitute of
 power it can neither prove itself nor be proved by someth-
 ing else.

Here it may be asked by way of objection whether the
 view that the world as distinct from Self, and the vision

Objection : (b) But the above doctrine of the world, are sheer
 of Maya is held only by the Vedāntin non-entity, is one held

Reply : The final appeal for all doctrin- by the vulgar or by trained
 es is to Veda which certainly teaches thinkers.

नाद्यः तेषामवाचितत्त्वबुद्धेस्तत्राद्याहृतत्वात् तुच्छत्वस्य दूर-
निरस्तत्वात् । नेतरः परीक्षकाणां सर्वेषामैकमत्याभावात् सर्व-
शून्यत्वादिना निःशेषप्रमाणप्रमेयापलापिता उपमानिकेन अशेष-
स्य तुच्छत्वस्वीकारात् । तद्विरुद्धस्य नित्यानित्यविभागेन सार्ध-
दिककादाचित्कत्वस्यासंख्यकणमुगादिभिः स्वीकारात् तद्विरु-
द्धस्य च सर्वदा सर्वसत्यत्वस्य सांख्यादिभिरभ्युपगमात् तस्मात्प-
रीक्षकाणां सर्वेषां परस्परविप्रतिपत्तेश्चात्मातिरिक्तस्य तुच्छत्वमश-
म्भप्रतिपन्नमेव । तथा च लौकिकपरीक्षकविरुद्धं जगत्तुच्छत्वं कथम-
स्वीकारयमादौहति न च परीक्षकाणां मतमपि प्रत्येक परस्प-
रविरुद्धमया हेयमेवेति वाक्यं तावता उप्येकैकारस्य तत्र तत्राठ्या-
हृतत्वात्तुच्छत्वे नदभावात् ।

Not by the vulgar (continues the opponent), for
since their notion of reality (abādhitattva) is not destroyed
in regard to the world and the vision of it (tatra), the view
that these are non-entity is completely rejected by them.
Nor by philosophers, for these are not unanimous.
Thus, the unreliable Nihilist (Śūnyavadin), denying
all sources, and objects, of true knowledge, holds that all is
sheer non-entity. In opposition to this view, the Naiyā-
yikas, Vaiśeṣhikas and others hold that existence is both
eternal and temporary, by dividing substances into eternal
and non-eternal. Opposed to this again is the view of the
Sāṃkhyas and others that the existence of all things is
eternal. And since all these trained thinkers are disagreed,
the view that the world as distinct from Self is sheer non-
entity is clearly unproved. This view, then, rejected as it is by
the common man and the philosopher alike, cannot be acce-
pted by us. Nor may it be urged that each and all of the
above views should be rejected as mutually opposed. For in
spite of such opposition (tāvaiṇi), in each of the above
cases (tatra tatra) the acceptance of some one view or other
is an incontrovertible fact; whereas the acceptance of the
world as sheer non-entity is found in no case whatever
(tadabbhāvāt)

सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली ।

१३१

न चात्रापि समाप्तीकारोऽत्येवेति वाच्यं तत्राप्रामाणिकत्वात् तुच्छ-
त्वप्राक्कप्रमाणभावात् । न च परीक्षकाणामपि परस्परविरुद्धानां
मध्ये कस्य सत्तं समीचीनं कस्याऽसमीचीनमिति विनिर्णयकमा-
त्रात् एकमपि न ग्राह्यमिति वाच्यं नित्यनिर्दुष्टवेदमूलकत्वमा-
त्राभावाभ्यां विशेषात् यस्य हि सत्तं वेदमूल तद्व्याख्यं यस्य तु
तत्रास्ति तत्राख्यं यथा पाखण्डानां मतम् । इत्त तर्हि अन्त-
तोऽपि गत्वा श्रुत्यैव विश्वासश्चेत् श्रुतिविदुमेव मतमदुष्टं ग्राह्य-
मिति तदितरद्वयमेवाप्रामाणिकत्वात् अनिविरुद्धत्वाच्च ।
श्रुतिस्तु सदेव सौम्येदमग्रे आसीत् एकमेवाद्वितीयं स एव नेति
नेतीति अथ तस्यायमादेशः अभाक्प्रत्युर्थोऽयमवहार्यः प्रपञ्चोऽस्यः
शिवोऽद्वैत इत्येवंप्रकारिका सजातीयविजातीयद्वयगतभेदशून्यमा-
त्मानं बोधयन्ती आत्मातिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्य तुच्छत्वमभिमन्यते ।

Nor may the Vedāntin urge that of this latter view also (atrapī) *his* acceptance is forthcoming. For the Vedāntin is untrustworthy, because there is no evidence for the non-entitative character of the world. Nor may it be argued that no single view of the above opposed schools should be accepted, because no compelling reason for the adoption of any one as *the true* view exists. For there is a difference between these views according as they are, or are not, based on the eternal faultless Veda. Thus a tenet based on Veda must be accepted, of whatever school it may be ; but a tenet not thus based must be rejected, e. g. the tenet of heretics must be rejected. Well then, we Vedāntins reply, if your final position is that trust (in a particular tenet) follows through Veda alone, you must accept as faultless only that tenet which is vouched for by Veda, and reject all others as being without proof and contradictory of Veda. But Veda by making known Self as free from all differentiation,* as in the passages.—Existent only was this in the beginning, one without a second. There is no diversity here. That Self is to be described by No, No! And the fourth is without parts, is not an object of experience, is the cessation of experience, is the blessed One without a second—approves the view that all that is other than Self is sheer non-entity.

* Svagatabheda, inherent var. by e. g. the leaves, flowers and fruit of a

नदतिरिक्तस्य कथं विदपि सत्त्वे ऽद्वैतव्यापारमसङ्गात् तस्माज्ज-
गतस्तुच्छस्य श्रुत्यनुमतमेव । तदुक्तं गोष्ठेः ।

तुच्छाऽनिर्वचनीया य वास्तवी चेत्यसौ त्रिधा ।

ज्ञेया माया त्रिभिर्बीजैः श्रौतयौक्तिकलौकिकैः ॥

असिष्टोपिबभूव साश्चर्यमदाह

अहो नु चित्रं यत्सत्यं ब्रह्म तद्विस्मृतं नृणाम् ।

यदसत्यमविद्याख्यं तत्पुरः परिवर्त्तयति ॥

तथा

अहो नु चित्रं पद्मोत्थैर्बद्धास्तत्तुनिरद्वयः ।

अविद्यमाना या ऽविद्या तया विश्वं खिन्नीकृतम् ॥

तस्माद् द्वैततद्दर्शनयोस्तुच्छत्वात् स्वतःसिद्धबुद्धबुद्धमुक्तप-

रिपूर्वाभन्दात्मनो ऽदृष्टद्वयत्वमुपपन्नतरम् ।

For if apart from Self, anything existed in any form what-
ever, advaita would necessarily be overthrown. Hence the non-
entitative character of the world is certainly approved by Ve-
da. This view has been declared by Gaudapada :—‘Māyā is
to be regarded under three aspects as sheer non-entity, or as
inexplicable, or as something material, in accordance with the
three (sources of) knowledge, sc. Veda, ratiocination and the
common (or unphilosophic) consciousness’ This Vasishtha
also declares as something wonderful—, ‘Strange it is that Bra-
hman, that which is, should be forgotten by men, while that
which is not, sc. Nescience, dances before them.’ Again,
‘Strange it would be for mountains to be bound by lotus-fibres,
and (stranger still it is) that the world is destroyed by Nesci-
ence which is really nothing’ Hence, since duality and the
vision of it are sheer non-entity, it is all the more clearly esta-
blished that no second is known to that Self which is absolute
Bliss, self-existent Intelligence and unrelated.

तथा च श्रुतिः

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः ।

न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥

तदेव निष्कलं ब्रह्म निर्विकल्पं निजजनम् ।

तद् ब्रह्माहमिति ज्ञात्वा ब्रह्म सम्पद्यते भवम् ॥

निर्विकल्पमनन्तं च हेतुदूष्टान्तवर्जितम् ।

अप्रमेयमनादि च यज्ज्ञात्वा मुच्यते बुधः ॥

इत्येषमादिका आत्मनो द्वैतदर्शनशून्यत्वमाह । तस्मात् ।

सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं च पूर्णानन्दवियहम् ।

मान्द्वार्णिकमात्मानं विनिश्चित्य विमुच्यते ॥ ५७ ॥

न चैतादृशमात्मज्ञानं न जायत इति साम्प्रतं साधनचतुष्टयसम्पन्नस्य विविदिषोर्मनननिदिध्यासनाभ्यामुपकृतप्रवणानुष्ठानसमनन्तरमेव तदुत्पत्तिदर्शनात् अन्यथा तादृशमात्मप्रतिपादकागन्नामानाद्यप्रसङ्गः ।

And so also Śruti declares that to Self vision of duality pertains not, in such passages as—'this is the absolute truth that there is no such thing as destruction and production (of the world), nor fettered soul, nor (Vaidic) sacrifices, nor soul seeking emancipation or emancipated. He who knows himself as that Brahman, without parts or attributes or passions becomes unchanging Brahman. That wise one is emancipated who knows that which is without attributes, endless, uncaused, unique, not to be known through a pramāṇa) without a beginning.' (Brahmavindūpanishad 8, 9.)

Hence, he is emancipated who recognises himself as identical with that Self described in the mantra* as Existence, Intelligence, infinity, absolute bliss by nature... LVII.

Nor is it right to say that such knowledge of Self is not brought about. For the production of such knowledge is observed in the case of him who is desirous of knowing the truth and is provided with the four means (cf. Ved. Sū. I. 1. 1), but only after he has performed *hearing* aided by *pondering* and *profound contemplation*. If this were not so, it would follow that Vedic passages declaring such a Self are untrustworthy.

न च जातमपि ज्ञानं साधनान्तराधिक्या कलदानाय विल-
 ष्यत इति वाक्यं तद्वैततत्त्वस्यैवार्थान्वेषः प्रतिषेदे अहं मनुर-
 भयं गन्धर्वः सूर्यश्चेति अहं वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति तरति शोकना-
 त्तमविदित्यादिश्रुतिभ्य आत्मज्ञानतत्फलयोः समानकालनिर्देशात्
 नश्ये साधनान्तरकालविलम्बधारभावप्रतिपत्तेः तमेव विदि-
 त्वाऽतिसृष्ट्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यते ऽयनायेत्यादिसाधनान्तर-
 प्रतिषेधश्रवणाच्च । तस्मात्सर्वव्याप्तात्मज्ञानमेवावृत्त्यसाधनं
 यत्नतः सम्पादनीयं तदभावे यतो महती विनष्टिः श्रूयते इह चेदवे-
 दीद्व्य सत्यमस्ति न चेदिहावेदिन्नइती विनष्टिरित्यत्र । सत्यमे-
 व ब्रह्मात्मज्ञाने विदुषः फलेन सह विद्योद्धारः स्मरति ।

Nor may it be urged that even when knowledge (of Self) has been effected, the result (sc. moksha) is delayed owing to the need of some means besides knowledge. For knowledge (of Self) and its result are declared to be simultaneous in such passages as—seeing it (Brahman) the Rishi Vāmadeva understood: I was Manu, I was the Sun. He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman. He who knows the Self overcomes grief—because the absence of any other means and of any time-pause intervening between knowledge of Self and moksha is made known (by such passages): and because the negation of any other means that knowledge is enounced in the passage—a man who knows him (Self) truly passes over death; there is no other path to go. Therefore knowledge of Self together with renunciation of the world must be carefully acquired as the means to immortality; since, in the absence of knowledge, great is the destruction, as declared in the Śruti passage—‘If a man know this here, that is the reality (true end of life); if he does not know this here, then there is great destruction (new births)’ And the out-pourings of the wise man’s knowledge, with its result, when knowledge of Self as identical with Brahman is attained, are set forth in the Smṛti

विद्याविग्रहप्रहेष विहितं प्रत्यक्षमुच्चैस्तरा-

सुतकृष्णोत्तमपुरुषं मुनिधिया मुञ्जादिषीकानिव ।

कैशात्कारणकार्यरूपविकृतात्पश्यामि निःसंशयं ।

नासीदस्ति भविष्यति कः नु गतः ससारदुःखोदधिः ॥

पश्यामि चित्रमिव सर्वमिदं द्वितीयं निष्ठानि निष्कलचिदेकवपु-
द्यनन्ते । आत्मानमद्वयमचिरत्पहुलैकरूपं पश्यामि दग्धरक्षणमिव
च प्रपञ्चम् ॥ अद्वैतमप्यनुभवामि करस्थविलम्बतुल्य शरीरमद्विनि-
र्लभ्यमीव वीक्षे । एव च जीवनमिव प्रतिभामजं च निःश्रेयसाधिग-
मनं च मम प्रसिद्धम् ॥ आश्चर्यमद्य नम भाति कथं द्वितीय नित्ये
निरस्तनिखिले शिवचित्प्रकाशे । आसीत्पुरेति किमिमाः श्रुतयो न
पूर्वं येन द्वितीयजन्मवत्तिभिरप्रसूतम् ॥

The Self within, the Highest Self, consisting of Intel-
Sankshobhasarir. IV. st 33-57 ligence, closely concealed by
Nescience, I now behold wit out a doubt, having with
the sage's mind discriminated it from the sheaths of Self
which are a complex of causes and effects; just as one draws
not a reed from its (enveloping) sheath. Lo! where was,
and is to be, this ocean of world-pain !

This world I now regard as a picture (or a mere sembl-
ance of reality). I take my stand on the Infinite which
is Intelligence alone, and without parts. I behold Self, one
without a second, infinite bliss by nature ; and the world I
regard as I would a burnt rope.

I am directly conscious of the one Self as if it were a
Vilva fruit lying in my hand: my body I look on as the cast off
skin of a snake. And thus, as the appearance of my being
alive, so the gaining of moksha, are both quite clear to me.

Strange it is how even now duality appears before me
in that eternal, unrelated, luminous Self. Duality existed
once—can I say this? what ' was not the eternal Veda
existing then; that duality was wrought by Nescience

एवं शास्त्राचार्यप्रसादापरोक्षीकृतमीश्वरज्ञातमस्तदस्य गुरुभ-
क्त्यभिनयोपि स्मर्यते असौप्यं विद्या जायत एव । तथा हि
त्वत्पादपङ्क्तसमाश्रयणं विद्या मे मत्प्रपन्नस्त्वत्परः पुरुषः पुरासी-
त् । त्वत्पादपङ्क्यायुगलाश्रयणादिदानीं नामीज चास्ति न भक्त्यानि
भेदबुद्धिः ॥ यस्मात् कृपावरवशोमम दुश्चिकित्सं संसाररोगमपने-
तुमसि प्रवृत्तः । त्वत्पादपङ्क्तजरजः शिरसा दधानस्त्वानाशरीरप-
सनादहमप्युपमे ॥

ननु विद्यायाऽविद्योपमर्देऽपि कथं संसारस्येह लोकपरलो-
कमञ्चारलक्षणस्य नानाविधयोनिप्राप्तिपरिहाराभ्यामनेकविधदुःख-
सङ्कुलस्य निवृत्तिः स्यात् तद्वेतोः कामकर्मादेस्तदवस्थायात् ।

And so the Smṛitis goes on to describe the adoration
of the Guru by the pupil, who through the grace of Veda
and teacher has gained a clear intuition of the truth that
Brahman and the Self are one. Thus it is a fact that this
knowledge (leading to moksha) is something brought about
as a product.

The Highest Self, though indeed it exists, was for me
Sankashapañcīr IV 6) 63, 59 nonexistent, until I had recourse
to thy lotus-feet. Finding shelter there, I can no more be
conscious of duality.

Placing the dust of thy lotus-feet upon my head, I will
serve thee till death ; for in pity of me thou hast undertaken
to remove this world-disease, hard to cure.

32. An opponent may here urge that even if destruction
Objection : Human effort is vain ; of Nescience takes place thro-
for knowledge through Veda can destroy ugh knowledge, cessation of
Nescience (cause) but not the world ugh knowledge, cessation of
(effect). Reply . Veda and all human transmigratory existence, whi-
experience teach that knowledge does ch consists in the passage into
put an end to the world. this and the next world and is a complex of pains effected
by the assumption and laying aside of many forms of life, is
impossible because the causes of transmigratory existence,
so desire and act on continue to exist

न चाविद्यानिवृत्तया तदुपादेयस्यापि सर्वस्य निवृत्तिरावश्य-
कीति वाच्यम् । वैशेषिकाणामुपादाने निवृत्तेऽपि कर्णं कार्यवस्था-
नवदनिवृत्तिशङ्काया दुरपत्तव्यत्वात् न च क्षणान्तरे नङ्क्ष्यत्येवेति
न दोषः तत्क्षणवदुत्तरक्षणेऽप्यनुपपत्त्यभावस्यानुमातुं शक्यत्वात्
तस्मादज्ञाने निवृत्तेऽपि संसारो न निवर्त्तिष्यति प्रमाणाभावा-
दिति ठयर्थः प्रयासः सैवं

कर्म मूलजननानां तच्च ज्ञानेन वाच्यते ।

क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तथा च श्रुतिशासनम् ॥ ३८ ॥

ज्ञाने जातेऽपि कर्ममूलकः संसारोऽनुवर्त्तिष्यति इति यदुक्तं
तत्र अविद्यावत्कर्मणोऽपि ज्ञानेन बाधितत्वात् अविद्यावत्कार्य-
णापि विद्याया विरोधित्वा विशेषात् ।

Nor (continues the opponent) may the reply to this be that the cessation of every product (upādeya) of Nescience follows necessarily on the cessation of Nescience itself. For, as with the Vaiśeṣika school, an effect is held to exist for a moment of time after the destruction of its material cause, so the objection here urged that the effects of its Nescience do not cease to exist is one that cannot be lightly set aside. Nor to obviate the difficulty can it be said that the effect will perish at some later time. For the possibility of the effect's existence, as well in the subsequent as in the preceding moment, may fairly be inferred. Hence (concludes the opponent) even when Nescience has ceased to be the world will not cease to be—there being no evidence for such non-existence of the world—and therefore human effort is vain.

Not so, we reply. Action is the root of all evil; and action is destroyed by knowledge. And thus Śruti teaches—
'And his works perish.'...LVIII.

The opponent's statement, that the world which has its root in action will continue to exist even after knowledge has been gained, will not hold. For action as well as Nescience is destroyed by knowledge, because knowledge is as much the contradictory of the effect of Nescience as action, as of Nescience its self.

न हि सम्भवति रज्जुमात्रात्कारे तद्विद्यानिवृत्तौ तत्कार्यं
 सर्पाद्यनुवर्तत इति न च यतो ज्ञानमज्ञानस्यैव निवर्तकमित्यव-
 धारणं शास्त्रकाराणामेवं सत्यसमञ्जसमिति वाक्यम् । अज्ञानकार्य-
 स्यादप्यज्ञानानतिरेकात् तदभावे तत्सत्त्वानुपलम्भात् न चात्र प्रमा-
 नाभावः सिध्यते हृद्यग्रनिष्प्रित्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः क्षीयन्ते चास्य
 कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे कतिश्रुतेः । न चैतद्वाक्यमशुभकर्मनिवृ-
 त्तिपरमेवेति वाक्यं कर्मशब्दस्य शुभाशुभसाधारणत्वात् विद्यासा-
 मर्थस्य चाभयत्र तुल्यत्वात् ।

ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानं शब्दं दैशिकपूर्वकम् ।

बुद्धिपूर्वकृतं पापं कृत्स्नं दहति बहिः ।

इत्यत्र बुद्धिपूर्वकनपापस्यपि ब्रह्मज्ञानेन दाहस्मरणात् ।

Since it is impossible that the effect, e. g. the snake or the like should continue to exist after the Nescience concealing the rope has come to an end on the rope being perceived. Nor can the opponent urge that if this is so, the conclusion of the founders of the (Vedānta) Sāstra, sc. knowledge puts an end to Nescience alone, is improper. For the products of Nescience do not differ from Nescience itself, since when Nescience exists not, the existence of its products is not perceived. And proof for our position is not wanting, for Śruti thus declares — 'The father of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, his works perish when he has been beheld who is the higher and the lower.' Nor may it be argued that this passage implies the 'destruction of evil actions only. For the word action is common to both good and evil actions, and the power of knowledge is equally operative in regard to both kinds of action. Thus in the Śrutī passage—'The knowledge of Self and Brahman as identical, gained through Veda and attendance on a Guru consumes like fire every evil deed (though) done intentionally'—the consuming of even an intentional evil deed by the fire of) knowledge of Brahman is declared.

यथैषांश्च समित्तेऽग्निर्भस्मसात्कुहतेऽर्जुन ।

ज्ञानाग्निः सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात्कुहते तथा ॥

इत्यत्र सर्वशब्देनाशेषपुण्यपापे गृहीत्वा तस्य सर्वस्यैव ज्ञानाग्निना दाहस्य भगवताप्युक्तत्वाच्च । किञ्च यस्य दर्शनमात्रा-
दन्येषामपि पापकर्मो जायते का कथा तस्य ब्रह्मीभूतस्य पापक्षये
तदाह भगवान् यस्मिष्ठः

यस्यानुभवपर्यन्तं तस्वे बुद्धिः प्रवर्तते ।

तद्बुद्धिगोचराः सर्वे मुच्यन्ते सर्वपातकैः ॥

तथा च कुलपात्रिभ्यश्चैतुष्यमपि ब्रह्मविदः स्मर्यते ।

कुलं पवित्रं जननी कृतार्था क्षिप्रवस्त्ररा पुण्यवती च तेन ।

अपारसंक्षितसुखसागरेऽस्मिन् लीनं परे ब्रह्मणि यस्य चेत् ॥

तस्माद्यथोक्तब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानेन कृतकृत्यो भवतीति नाम

विवक्षितव्यम् इति ।

And in the passage—'As kindled fire reduces fuel to ashes O Arjuna ! so the fire of knowledge reduces all actions to ashes'—the Divine Krishna, understanding by the word *all* both good and evil deeds, has declared that all action is consumed by the fire of knowledge. Further, need it be said that the sins of the man who has become Brahman are destroyed, when by the mere sight of such an one the sins even of other men are destroyed ! This his reverence Vasishṭha declares—'All men are freed from their sins who come within the sight of him whose mind is engaged with Brahman till intuition (of Brahman) arises.' And Smṛiti too declares that he who knows Brahman purifies his own family—'He whose mind has melted into that infinite ocean of Intelligence and Bliss, the absolute Brahman, has purified his family, fulfilled his mother's desires and sanctified the earth.'

To conclude, then,—our statement, that a man realises all desires through the aforesaid knowledge of the identity of his Self with Brahman, is indisputable.